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PANACEA OR CORPORATE TOOL?: DEBUNKING
THE SUPREME COURT'S PREFERENCE FOR
BINDING ARBITRATION
JEAN R. STERNLIGHT*
I. INTRODUCTION: ATTENTION ALL CONSUMERS, EMPLOYEES,
FRANCHISEES, AND "LITTLE Guys"'
The next time that you try to file a lawsuit against a big company you may
well find the door of the courthouse has been barred. Large companies such
as banks, hospitals, brokerage houses and even pest exterminators are
increasingly including mandatory binding arbitration clauses in the fine print
contracts they require all customers, employees, franchisees and other little
guys to sign.2 While legal commentators are beginning to take note of such
clauses,3 the general public remains quite unaware of the importance of such
* Assistant Professor of Law, Florida State University College of Law; Director of Education
and Research, Florida Dispute Resolution Center, J.D., Harvard Law School, 1983; B.A., Swarthmore
College, 1979. I also appreciate the help of Mark Budnitz, Lawrence George, Robert Kennedy, Cliff
Palefsky, Lois Sheperd, Jeffrey Stempel, and especially Sylvia Lazos in commenting upon prior drafts.
I am also very grateful for the help of my research assistants: Leigh Braslow, Kay Fennell, and Emilia
Quesada. Finally, I thank Florida State University College of Law for providing the funding for this
research.
1. As used in this Article the term "little guy" is gender neutral and refers to small companies as
well as humans.
2. See, e.g., Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 115 S. Ct. 834 (1995) (requiring consumer
who sought to sue termite exterminator for breach of contract to arbitrate claim); Gilmer v.
Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20 (1991) (requiring employee who had signed arbitration
agreement in connection with registering as a securities representative to arbitrate age discrimination
claim). In fact, binding arbitration has been imposed on consumers who were merely notified that
arbitration would be required but never signed a single document. Badie v. Bank of Am., No. 94496,
1994 WL 660730 (Cal. Super. Ct. Nov. 22, 1994).
3. See, e.g., Mark E. Budnitz, Arbitration of Disputes Between Consumers and Financial
Institutions: A Serious Threat to Consumer Protection, 10 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 267 (1995);
Thomas E. Carbonneau, Arbitral Justice: The Demise of Due Process in American Law, 70 TUL. L.
REv. 1945 (1996); Robert A. Gorman, The Gilmer Decision and the Private Arbitration of Public-Law
Disputes, 3 U. ILL. L. REV. 635 (1995) (focusing particularly on employment disputes); Norman S.
Poser, When ADR Eclipses Litigation: The Brave New World of Securities Arbitration, 59 BROOK. L.
REV. 1095 (1993); G. Richard Shell, ERISA and Other Federal Employment Statutes: When Is
Commercial Arbitration an "Adequate Substitute"for the Courts?, 68 TEx. L. REv. 509 (1990); Lloyd
N. Shields, The Role of Mandatory Arbitration for Financial Institutions, 46 ARB. J., Dec. 1991, at 49;
N. Sue Van Sant Palmer, Comment, Lender Liability and Arbitration: Preserving the Fabric of
Relationship, 42 VAND. L. REv. 947 (1989). See generally Business Law Symposium, Commercial
Washington University Open Scholarship
WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY
agreements. Yet, from a practical standpoint, the arbitration clauses are
crucial in that they not only bar judicial relief but also may allow companies
to select the arbitrators,4 set the arbitration in a location convenient for the
company but not for the little guy,5 exclude certain recoveries such as
punitive damages,6 shorten the statute of limitations,7 deny discovery and
other procedural protections,' and eliminate virtually any right to appeal.'
Nor are courts rushing to protect consumers and other little guys from
these mandatory arbitration clauses. Instead, the Supreme Court itself is
leading the revolutionary transition from litigation to mandatory binding
private arbitration, proclaiming "federal policy favors arbitration, over
litigation."'" Despite consumers' and other little guys' protests that they were
Arbitration: A Discussion of Recent Developments and Trends, 31 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1 (1996)
(examining securities, medical malpractice and employment arbitration).
4. See Shell, supra note 3, at 534-40 (claims against securities brokerage houses arbitrated by
persons associated with securities industry).
5. See, e.g., Vimar Seguros y Reaseguros, S.A. v. MV Sky Reefer, 115 S. Ct. 2322 (1995)
(requiring U.S. fruit grower to arbitrate dispute in Japan); Doctor's Assocs., Inc. v. Stuart, 85 F.3d 975,
979 (2d Cir. 1996) (refusing to void arbitration clause that required Illinois Franchisee to travel to
Connecticut for arbitration); Casarotto v. Lombardi, 901 P.2d 596, 597 (1995) (rejecting on other
grounds arbitration clause requiring Subway sandwich shop franchisee in Great Falls, Montana to
arbitrate all disputes in Bridgeport, Connecticut), rev'd sub. nom., Doctor's Assocs., Inc. v. Casarotto,
116 S. Ct. 1652 (1996). See generally Edward A. Purcell, Jr., Geography As A Litigation Weapon:
Consumers, Forum-Selection Clauses, and the Rehnquist Court, 40 UCLA L. REV. 423 (1992).
6. See, e.g., Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., 115 S. Ct. 1212, 1216 (1995)
(holding that parties to arbitration agreement may determine whether or not they wish to provide
arbitrators with power to award punitive damages); DeGaetano v. Smith Barney, Inc., No. 95 Civ.
1613, 1996 WL 44226 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 5, 1996) (requiring employee to arbitrate Title VII sex
discrimination claim against employer even though arbitration agreement precluded employee from
obtaining attorney's fees, punitive damages or injunctive relief).
7. See, e.g., Graham Oil Co. v. ARCO Prods. Co., 43 F.3d 1244 (9th Cir. 1994) (invalidating
arbitration clause that purported to waive longer statute of limitations as inconsistent with particular
statute under which claim was brought but implying that such waivers might be valid under other
statutes), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 275 (1995).
8. See, e.g., Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20 (1991) (upholding mandatory
arbitration of employee's suit under federal age discrimination law even though discovery provided in
arbitration was more limited than that available in court).
9. Pursuant to the Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 10 (1994), an arbitral award may only be
vacated upon a showing of narrow grounds: that it was obtained by corruption or fraud; that the
arbitrator was partial; that the arbitrator's procedural misconduct substantially prejudiced a party's
rights'; or that the arbitrator so exceeded her power as to negate the award. Courts have interpreted
these grounds extremely narrowly and virtually never reverse arbitral decisions. See generally IAN R.
MACNEIL ET AL., FEDERAL ARBITRATION LAW: AGREEMENTS, AWARDS AND REMEDIES UNDER THE
FEDERAL ARBITRATION ACT § 40.1.4 (1994).
10. See, e.g., Mastrobuono, 115 S. Ct. at 1215-16; Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 26; Rodriguez de Quijas
v. Shearson/Am. Express Inc., 490 U.S. 477,481 (1989); Volt Info. Sciences Inc. v. Board of Trustees
of Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 489 U.S. 468,475-76 (1989); Perry v. Thomas, 482 U.S. 483, 489-90
(1987); Shearson/Am. Express Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 226 (1987); Mitsubishi Motors Corp.
v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 625 (1985); Southland v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 10
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unaware they were signing away their day in court, courts are upholding the
clauses on the ground that Congress has declared arbitration the preferred
method of dispute resolution."
The Court's enunciated preference for binding arbitration over litigation in
the commercial area takes several forms, all purportedly based on the 1925
Federal Arbitration Act ("FAA"). 2 First, the Court has held that where parties
have entered a contract that may or may not call for arbitration of a particular
issue, any such ambiguity is to be construed in favor of arbitration rather than
litigation. 3 Second, it has stated that where a party seeks to avoid being
(1984); Moses H. Cone Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24 (1983).
11. Sidestepping potential constitutional concerns, courts have shown little sympathy for parties
who claim they did not see, read, or understand the arbitration provision. E.g., Pierson v. Dean Witter
Reynolds, 742 F.2d 334, 339 (7th Cir. 1984) (reversing district court decision voiding arbitration
clause and observing that even if plaintiffs did not read or understand the clause they should have done
so); McCarthy v. Providential Corp., No. C94-0627 FMS, 1994 WL 387852 (N.D. Cal. July 19, 1994)
(requiring senior citizens who signed arbitration clauses in connection with deeding over homes to
obtain reverse mortgage loans to arbitrate claims for violation of Federal Truth in Lending Act). The
McCarthy court stated:
Contrary to plaintiffs' assertions, it does not take a "clairvoyant" to understand the meaning
of the clause. Regrettably, plaintiffs' assumption of loans without understanding all of the
terms of the contract may represent the norm and not the exception. This failure to inquire,
however, will not shield them from obligations clearly and explicitly contained in the
agreement.
Id. at5.
A strong argument can however be made that the Supreme Court's application of the expressed
preference for binding arbitration over litigation deprives persons of their jury trial right under the
Seventh Amendment, their right to a "impartial judge under Article III, and their due process" rights
under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. See generally Jean R. Stemlight, Rethinking the
Constitutionality of the Supreme Court's Preference for Binding Arbitration: A Fresh Assessment of
Jury Trial, Separation of Powers, and Due Process Concerns (Sept. 1996) (unpublished manuscript on
file with author); see also Lewis Maltby, Paradise Lost-How the Gilmer Court Lost the Opportunity
for Alternative Dispute Resolution to Improve Civil Rights, 12 N.Y. L. SCH. J. HUM. RTs. 1 (1994)
(arguing for imposition of minimum due process standards pursuant to the FAA).
12. Act of Feb. 12, 1925, eh. 213, 43 Stat. 883 (1925) (current version codified at 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-
208 (1994). The Act, originally known primarily as the U.S. Arbitration Act, increasingly came to be
known as the Federal Arbitration Act following Congress' deletion in 1947 of the section naming the
statute the USAA. IAN R. MACNEIL, AMERICAN ARBITRATION LAW: REFORMATION,
NATIONALIZATION, INTERNATIONALIZATION 231 n.48 (1992).
13. Moses H. Cone, 460 U.S. at 24-25 ("[Q]uestions of arbitrability must be addressed with a
healthy regard for the federal policy favoring arbitration.... The Arbitration Act establishes that, as a
matter of federal law, any doubts concerning the scope of arbitrable issues should be resolved in favor
of arbitration...."); see also Armijo v. Prudential Ins. Co., 72 F.3d 793, 798 (10th Cir. 1995)
("Notwithstanding the ambiguity of [the arbitration provision) ... (or perhaps more correctly, because
of such ambiguity), we conclude that the most appropriate construction ... is to apply its arbitration
provisions to employment disputes involving these Plaintiffs.").
The Court has also recently relied on the policy favoring arbitration to reject arguments that
claims under certain federal statutes should be non-arbitrable as a matter of public policy. E.g., Gilmer,
500 U.S. 20 (requiring arbitration of claim brought under Age Discrimination in Employment Act); see
Washington University Open Scholarship
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bound by an arbitration agreement on the grounds that the agreement was
obtained through coercion, fraud or duress, a court should construe such
defenses narrowly and favor arbitration. 4 Third, the Court has relied on the
policy favoring arbitration to hold that the Federal Arbitration Act broadly
preempts all state legislation that might attempt to limit the reach of binding
arbitration.'5 Most recently, in Doctor's Associates, Inc. v. Casarotto,6 the
Court held that the FAA preempts a Montana statute mandating a company to
state on the first page of a contract that the contract contains an arbitration
clause.' Fourth, again relying on the preference for arbitration, courts have
held that where a party seeks to appeal an arbitrator's determination to a
court, the court should rarely grant such an appeal.' 8
infra notes 177-210 and accompanying text.
14. E.g., David L. Threlkeld & Co. v. Metallgesellschaft Ltd., 923 F.2d 245, 248 (2d Cir.)
(considering policy favoring arbitration in refusing to invalidate agreement as contract of adhesion),
cert. dismissed, 501 U.S. 1267 (1991); see also Cohen v. Wedbush, Noble, Cooke, Inc., 841 F.2d 282,
285 (9th Cir. 1988) (rejecting unconscionability defense in light of policy favoring arbitration);
Benoay v. E.F. Hutton & Co., 699 F. Supp. 1523, 1526 (S.D. Fla. 1988) (rejecting arguments as to
unequal bargaining power, unconscionability, duress, lack of mutuality and fundamental unfairness in
view of federal policy encouraging arbitration). Even where the company's agent allegedly made
allaying statements to the customer, representing that the arbitration agreement was a "mere
formality," one court upheld the agreement, observing that "[a] party who signs an instrument is
presumed to know its contents." Benoay, 699 F. Supp. at 1529.
15. E.g., Southland, 465 U.S. I (preempting California court's interpretation that claims under a
certain California statute could not be arbitrated); Perry, 482 U.S. 483 (preempting California fair
employment statute's proscription on arbitration); Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 115 S. Ct.
834, 838 (1995) (preempting an Alabama statute that barred pre-dispute arbitration agreements); see
also Threlkeld, 923 F.2d at 249 (preempting Vermont law requiring that "any agreement to arbitrate
must be displayed prominently in the contract or contract confirmation and must be signed by the
parties"); Securities Indus. Ass'n v. Connolly, 883 F.2d 1114, 1117 (1st Cir. 1989) (preempting
Massachusetts securities regulations that ordered arbitration clause to be placed "conspicuously" and
further demanded "full written disclosure of the legal effect of the pre-dispute arbitration contract or
clause"), cert. denied, 495 U.S. 956 (1990); Webb v. R. Rowland & Co., 800 F.2d 803, 806-07 (8th
Cir. 1986) (preempting Missouri statute requiring that "arbitration clauses be introduced by a notice, in
ten point capital letters, that the contract contains a binding arbitration clause"); Mr. Mudd, Inc. v.
Petra Tech, 892 S.W.2d 389 (Mo. Ct. App. 1995) (preempting state statute requiring notice of
arbitration clause to be specially stated in contract); Woermann Constr. Co. v. Southwestern Bell Tel.
Co., 846 S.W.2d 790 (Mo. Ct. App. 1993) (striking down state law requiring notice of binding
enforceable arbitration appear in 10 point type).
16. 116. Ct. 1652 (1996).
17. Id. at 1656. The Montana Supreme Court held that because the notice requirement was
consistent with the purpose of the FAA, it was not preempted. Casarotto v. Lombardi, 901 P.2d 596
(Mont. 1995), rev'd sub. nom., Doctor's Assocs., Inc. v. Casarotto, 116 S. Ct. 1652 (1996). The Court
reasoned that the notice requirement reflected a hostility to arbitration that was inconsistent with the
purpose of the FAA. It expressly rejected the reasoning of the Montana Supreme Court that a notice
requirement was consistent with the FAA's purpose of supporting a knowing choice of arbitration. See
id.; cf. Casarotto v. Lombardi, 886 P.2d 931 (Mont. 1994), vacated and remanded, 115 S. Ct. 2552
(1995).
18. Court after court has stated that the strong federal policy favoring arbitration requires that
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol74/iss3/6
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The language of the Court's recent decisions implies that Congress
mandated a preference for arbitration over litigation many years ago, and that
the Court has subsequently enforced that preference consistently.19 However,
Section II of this Article demonstrates that this preference for arbitration is a
myth that has no historical basis.2" When Congress passed the FAA in 1925,
it intended only to require federal courts to accept arbitration agreements that
had been voluntarily entered into by two parties of relatively equal bargaining
power in arms' length transactions. Congress did not intend to enforce
arbitration agreements that had been foisted on ignorant consumers, and it did
not intend to prevent states from protecting weaker parties.2'
Section II also exposes two other current myths with respect to the FAA.
First, it shows that whereas the Court currently propounds the "scope'
myth-that the FAA was intended to apply in state as well as federal courts-
Congress originally envisioned that the Act would apply only in federal
courts.22 Section II further demonstrates the "substance" myth-that whereas
the Court currently insists that the substantive results obtained in arbitration
arbitral awards be reviewed on a very limited basis. See, e.g., Flexible Mfg. Sys. Pty. Ltd. v. Super
Prods. Corp., 86 F.3d 96, 100 (7th Cir. 1996) (even clear nor gross legal errors by an arbitrator do not
justify overturning her award); Dole Ocean Liner Express v. Georgia Vegetable Co., 84 F.3d 772 (5th
Cir. 1996); Revere Copper & Brass v. Overseas Private Inv., 628 F.2d 81, 83 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied,
446 U.S. 983 (1990). As a well-known arbitration treatise puts it: "Over the years, the courts have
taken a fairly uniform approach to awards: Awards should be confirmed and enforced as is unless there
is clear evidence of a gross impropriety." MACNEIL ET AL., supra note 9, § 40.1.4.
19. When the Court first announced the preferential policy in Moses H. Cone it stated: "Courts of
Appeals have since [Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395 (1967)]
consistently concluded that questions of arbitrability must be addressed with a healthy regard for the
federal policy favoring arbitration. We agree." Moses H. Cone Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460
U.S. 1, 25 (1983). The Court's subsequent arbitration decisions virtually all reiterate this supposed
policy and imply that it has existed since 1925. See, e.g., Southland, 465 U.S. at 10 ("In enacting
section 2 of the federal Act, Congress declared a national policy favoring arbitration and withdrew the
power of the states to require a judicial forum for the resolution of claims which the contracting parties
agreed to resolve by arbitration."); see also supra note 10. while the word "favor" might in some
contexts be interpreted to mean only that arbitration be looked upon with favor, rather than favored
over litigation, the Court has made clear that it uses the word in the latter sense. Moses H. Cone Hosp.
v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 25 (1983).
20. See Cliff Palefsky, Arbitrary Arbitration: The Founders Would Frown on Mandatory ADR,
S.F. DAILY, Mar. 1, 1995, at 4 (arguing that judges "have chosen to deal with their lack of resources by
creating a fictitious new public policy that trumps all others-'the policy in favor of clearing my
docket'). Palefsky further states that "[a]ny claim that the FAA creates a preference for arbitration or
permits courts to ignore or overrule the Constitution is a dishonest representation of Congress' clearly
articulated intentions." Id; see also Thomas E. Carbonneau, Arbitration and the U.S. Supreme Court:
A Plea for Statutory Reform, 5 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 231, 238 (Supreme Court mistakenly
views arbitration as a cure-all).
21. See infra notes 43-76 and accompanying text.
22. See infra notes 58-76 and accompanying text.
19961
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are no different than those likely obtained in litigation, historically Congress
and the Court have recognized significant differences between the results
obtained in arbitration and in litigation.'
Breaking the Court's decisions into three distinct time periods, Section II
shows that these three myths evolved gradually and simultaneously.
Following a lengthy period of "original intent" and an intermediate
transitionary period, finally, in the early 1980s, all three myths burst into full
flower. Not coincidentally, the Court's enunciation of a preference for
arbitration coincided with the Court's growing concern that dockets were
overloaded and with a wider, general societal acceptance of alternative
dispute resolution.
One might be able to overlook the Court's skewed interpretation of history
if its enchantment with binding arbitration fairly and equally served the
interests of all members of our society. However, as discussed in Section III,
the Court's preference for binding arbitration in the context of consumer and
other little guy transactions is supported by neither theoretical arguments nor
empirical evidence. In assessing the validity of the Court's new preference
from a policy standpoint one must avoid two conceptual pitfalls. First, one
must be careful to distinguish between unionized labor arbitration and
commercial arbitration. Binding arbitration is already well ensconced in the
unionized labor arena. Courts, unions and management have all generally
found that it is better to resolve their disputes over contractual terms and
grievances through binding arbitration than to resort to the labor strike, which
is debilitating to all.24 However, as the Court itself has recognized, using labor
arbitration in lieu of a labor strike is entirely different than using commercial
arbitration in lieu of a public court proceeding.25 Second, and equally
important, it is critical to distinguish between commercial arbitration
voluntarily agreed to by parties of approximately equal bargaining power, and
commercial arbitration forced upon unknowing consumers, franchisees,
23. See infra note 77-82 and accompanying text.
24. See generally United Steelworkers of Am. v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574,
581-82 (1960) (declaring that given Congressional policy favoring labor arbitration as a mode of
industrial self-governance, labor contracts should be liberally construed to promote arbitration);
Textile Workers Union of Am. v. Lincoln Mills of Ala., 353 U.S. 448,455 (1957) (holding that federal
court has jurisdiction to order arbitration pursuant to collective bargaining agreement because "the
agreement to arbitrate grievance disputes is the quid pro quo for an agreement not to strike ... and ...
industrial peace can be best obtained only in that way").
25. Warrior & Gul, 363 U.S. at 578. See generally Martin H. Malin & Robert F. Ladenson,
Privatizing Justice: A Jurisprudential Perspective on Labor and Employment Arbitration from the
Steelworkers Trilogy to Gilmer, 44 HASTINGS L.J. 1187 (1993) (contrasting rules of labor and
commercial (employment) arbitrators).
[V€OL. 74:637
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employees or others through the use of form contracts.26
Given these two clarifications, Section III focuses on whether society
benefits when parties of substantially different strengths and levels of
knowledge resolve their commercial disputes through binding arbitration
rather than through litigation. The section concludes that while binding
arbitration may well be preferable from the standpoint of certain segments of
society-particularly large companies that draft the terms and court
administrators and judges who can reduce their own workload-there is no
reason to believe that society as a whole is better off with binding arbitration.
Rather, the Court's espousal of largely unregulated and unregulable
mandatory binding arbitration appears likely to harm the poorest and least
educated members of society.
Section IV demonstrates that the Court's application of its preference for
binding arbitration to preempt state protective legislation also raises serious
federalism concerns. As several Justices have pointed out, although Congress
never expressly stated an intent to preempt state arbitration legislation, the
Court's recent interpretations of the FAA endanger virtually all such state
legislation.27 Having voided a mere notice provision last Term in Casarotto, 8
the Court has left states almost powerless to regulate unfair binding
arbitration provisions.2 9
Despite these hesitations, the advocates of binding arbitration are correct
that properly regulated binding arbitration has the potential to greatly improve
our system of justice. This Article does not advocate reviving the old hostility
toward binding arbitration. Rather, as detailed in Section V, the Court should
once again apply the FAA as it was intended to be applied: to accept binding
arbitration where it is fair and has been accepted by the parties, and to reject
binding arbitration where it has been foisted unfairly upon a weaker party.3" If
26. See generally Jeffrey W. Stempel, Reflections on Judicial ADR and the Multi-Door
Courthouse at Twenty: Fait Accompli, Failed Overture, or Fledgling Adulthood?, 11 OHIO ST. J. ON
DISP. RESOL. 297, 334-40 (1996) (contrasting "new" and "old" ADR); Sternlight, supra note 11
(arguing that courts' implementation of the preference for binding arbitration may often result in
consumers and other little guys being deprived of their constitutional rights to a jury trial, an Article M
judge, and due process).
27. See infra notes 148-76, 349-56 and accompanying text.
28. 116S. Ct. 1652 (1996).
29. See supra notes 16-17 and accompanying text; infra notes 145-47, 387-95 and accompanying
text.
30. Some commentators, recognizing the potential unfairness of mandatory binding arbitration,
have advocated prohibiting altogether the arbitration of certain categories of claims. See, e.g., Shell,,
supra note 3 (arguing that discrimination claims brought under Title VII and under the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act should not be subject to arbitration); Stewart E. Sterk,
Enforceability ofAgreements to Arbitrate: An Examination of the Public Policy Defense, 2 CARDOZO
1996]
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the Court fails to change its course, Congress should step in to ensure that
binding arbitration is used to further rather than defeat justice.
II. THE EVOLUTION OF BINDING ARBITRATION-THE POWER
OF MYTH AND PERSUASION
A. The Period of Original Intent (1925-1966)
The enactment of the Federal Arbitration Act in 1925 marked a significant
milestone in the emergence of arbitration in this country. To understand the
limitations as well as the importance of the FAA as originally envisioned by
Congress, one must place the FAA in its proper legal and economic historical
context."
Prior to the passage of the FAA and the adoption of similar acts by state
legislatures, it was generally impossible for two merchants with equal
bargaining power to enter a binding contract to resolve their future disputes
through arbitration. American courts, following English precedents, would
allow two willing parties to submit a dispute to arbitration but generally
refused to enforce a pre-dispute arbitration agreement ("PDAA") where one
L. REv. 481, 486 (1981) (asserting that rather than making all arbitration more legalistic we should
refuse to enforce arbitration agreements where the statute or case law at issue "has aims other than
promoting justice between the parties" and where "a party to the agreement belongs to a class
peculiarly subject to imposition by the class to which the other party belongs"). But see Jeffrey W.
Stempel, Pitfalls of Public Policy: The Case ofArbitration Agreements, 22 ST. MARY'S L.L 259 (1991)
(opposing reliance on public policy exclusion to void arbitration agreements). Others argue that certain
due process protections must be appended to arbitration. For example, various groups including the
ABA Section of Labor and Employment Law, the American Arbitration Association, the Society of
Professionals in Dispute Resolution, and the National Employment Lawyers Association have
endorsed A Due Process Protocol for Mediation and Arbitration of Statutory Disputes Arising Out of
the Employment Relationship, which calls for voluntary, informal agreements; a prohibition on waivers
of statutory rights; a right to representation and discovery; and a diverse group of arbitrators trained in
the law. Section Endorses the Due Process Protocol, LAB. & EMPLOYMENT L. (ABA Lab. &
Employment Sec.) Winter 1996; see also U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR & U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, REPORT
AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE COMMISSION ON THE FUTURE OF WORKER-MANAGEMENT
RELATIONS 25-33 (1994) [hereinafter DUNLOP COMMISSION REPORT] (arbitration of employment
disputes is fair only where employees are guaranteed such protection as a neutral arbitrator, adequate
discovery, range of remedies equal to those available through litigation, right to counsel, a written
opinion, and adequate judicial review); Gorman, supra note 3 (discussing need for formal procedural
standards such as discovery, written opinions, and improved appeal where public law disputes are
arbitrated); Maltby, supra note 11 (calling for due process standards). The approach taken in this
Article is different and more fundamental than these approaches in that it calls upon the Court to
rethink its premise that there is a societal preference for binding arbitration.
31. Fortunately, Professor Ian Macneil has recently published an excellent history of the FAA
and its development that proved very helpful in drafting this section. See MACNEIL, supra note 12.
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party had changed its mind and no longer wanted to arbitrate?2 While courts
would generally enforce an actual arbitration decision,33 the nonenforceability
of the contractual clause allowed either party to the contract the option to
choose litigation over arbitration at any time, regardless of prior agreement.34
As business began to boom in the early 20th century, and as courts
became increasingly overloaded, business groups began to lobby for the
option of using enforceable arbitration clauses in their contracts.35 The
reformers worked on two fronts-state and federal.36 The reformers soon
learned, however, that the passage of state laws alone would not preserve
their contractual arbitration agreements unless federal courts would honor
such state laws." Working through an American Bar Association committee,
the reformers produced a draft federal statute that was approved by the ABA
32. MACNEIL E" AL., supra note 9, § 4.1.2; Linda R. Hirshman, The Second Arbitration Trilogy:
The Federalization of Arbitration Law, 71 VA. L. REV. 1305, 1309 (1985); Henry C. Strickland, The
Federal Arbitration Act's Interstate Commerce Requirement: What's Left for State Arbitration Law?,
21 HOFSTRA L. REV. 385, 389 (1992). The courts based their refusal to enforce consensual arbitration
agreements either on the theory that private parties could not lawfully usurp court jurisdiction, see
Zhaodong Jiang, Federal Arbitration Law and State Court Proceedings, 23 LOY. L.A. L. REv. 473,
478 n.20 (1990); Hirshman, supra, at 1309-11, or on the theory that appointment of an arbitrator, like
appointment of an agent, was always revocable, Hirshman, supra, at 1309. Pursuant to English law,
pre-dispute arbitration agreements are still invalid in the consumer context. Carbonneau, supra note 3,
at 1955 n.30.
33. MACNEIL ET AL., supra note 9, § 4.1.2; Strickland, supra note 32, at 389.
34. Strickland, supra note 32, at 389. A party could also use the threat of litigation to obtain an
advantage in settlement negotiations. See generally Julius H. Cohen & Henry Dayton, The New
Federal Arbitration Law, 12 VA. L. REV. 265, 270 (1926) (discussing how a party might refuse to
abide by arbitration agreements to gain strategic advantage).
35. Cohen & Dayton, supra note 34, at 266; MACNEIL, supra note 12, at 25-27 (observing that
arbitration reform movement grew substantially out of commercial interests); Hirshman, supra note
32, at 1311. As Justice Black observed, dissenting in Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co.,
388 U.S. 407, 409 n.2 (1967), "principal support for the Act came from trade associations dealing in
groceries and other perishables and from commercial and mercantile groups in major trading centers."
36. At the state level the merchants initially advocated passage ofa state arbitration act in New
York and then sought adoption of a similar uniform act for consideration by all of the states. They
were elated when the highest court in New York upheld the 1920 New York act in the face of
numerous constitutional challenges. Berkovitz v. Arbib & Houlberg, Inc., 130 N.E. 288 (N.Y. 1921)
(New York act does not violate right of trial by jury, does not impair jurisdiction of New York courts,
and does not impair obligation of contract). The court upheld the New York law in part on the ground
that it was procedural and remedial, as opposed to substantive. Id.
37. In Atlantic Fruit Co. v. Red Cross Line, 276 F. 319, 323 (S.D.N.Y. 1921), aft'd, 5 F.2d 218
(2d Cir. 1924), the federal court for the Southern District of New York held that despite a contractual
agreement to arbitrate and despite the New York law, one merchant could sue another in federal court
because the state remedial and procedural statute did not govern admiralty cases brought in federal
court.
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in 1922 without dissent?8 Congress adopted the statute, also with very little
change, in 1925.' 9
The centerpiece of the FAA is section 2 of the Act:
A written provision in any maritime transaction or a contract
evidencing a transaction involving commerce to settle by arbitration
a controversy thereafter arising out of such contract or transaction,
or the refusal to perform the whole or any part thereof, or an
agreement in writing to submit to arbitration an existing controversy
arising out of such a contract, transaction, or refusal, shall be valid,
irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law
or in equity for the revocation of any contract.
40
Sections 3 and 4 provide the enforcement mechanisms, instructing United
States courts to stay any action brought in court that should have been
arbitrated,4' and instructing federal courts to compel arbitration when one
party is inappropriately refusing to arbitrate a dispute.42
38. MACNEIL ET AL., supra note 9, § 8:2.
39. Hd § 8:3. See generally Cohen & Dayton, supra note 34 (article by drafters of statute
summarizing their view of the new statute).
40. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (1994). Significantly, the FAA creates a body of federal substantive law and yet
does not create any independent federal-question jurisdiction. Federal courts have jurisdiction over
FAA issues only to the extent that the case involves issues or parties that would otherwise provide a
basis for federal jurisdiction. Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1,
25 n.32 (1983).
41. Section3 states:
If any suit or proceeding be brought in any of the courts of the United States upon any issue
referable to arbitration under an agreement in writing for such arbitration, the court in which
such suit is pending, upon being satisfied that the issue involved in such suit or proceeding is
referable to arbitration under such an agreement, shall on application of one of the parties stay
the trial of the action until such arbitration has been had in accordance with the terms of the
agreement, providing the applicant for the stay is not in default in proceeding with such
arbitration.
9 U.S.C. § 3 (1994).
42. Section 4 states:
A party aggrieved by the alleged failure, neglect, or refusal of another to arbitrate under a
written agreement for arbitration may petition any United States district court which, save for
such agreement, would have jurisdiction under title 28, in a civil action or in admiralty of the
subject matter of a suit arising out of the controversy between the parties, for an order
directing that such arbitration proceed in the manner provided for in such agreement....
9 U.S.C. § 4 (1994). The remainder of the section spells out details of how the court is to determine
whether arbitration should be compelled.
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1. Policy/Purpose of FAA: To Support Genuine and Knowing
Selection ofArbitration by Parties
Most commentators have concluded that the FAA was envisioned as
applying to consensual transactions between two merchants of roughly equal
bargaining power, and not necessarily to transactions between a large
merchant and a much weaker and less knowledgeable consumer.43 In 1925,
the economy looked substantially different than it looks today. There were
very few transactions between large merchants and individual consumers that
would have involved interstate commerce and thus fallen under the
jurisdiction of the FAA.4 In fact, when one Senator raised a concern that
arbitration contracts might be "offered on a take-it-or-leave-it basis to captive
customers or employees," the Senator was reassured by the bill's supporters
that they did not intend to cover such situations.4'
The Supreme Court's decisions initially were consistent with the premise
that arbitration should be based on voluntary, knowing consent by both
parties, and that such consent was critical given the public interest in justice.
At the time of the FAA's passage, in the 1920s, business was booming and
very popular.46 There was therefore little concern that allowing businesses
knowingly to enter into arbitration agreements would have any detrimental
effect on either individual consumers or on the public at large.47 However, as
the Roaring 20s gave rise to the Depression of the 1930s, as well as to
concerns regarding the strengthening of German business interests, several
critics began to question whether business interests might use one-sided
arbitration agreements to gain an advantage over weaker parties and thereby
undermine the public interest injustice."
43. Jiang, supra note 32, at 483; Stempel, supra note 26, at 334-38; see also Prima Paint Corp. v.
Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 407,409 (1967) (Black, J., dissenting) (arguing that the FAA was
primarily intended to cover merchants engaged in interstate commerce).
44. Strickland, supra note 32, at 459 (observing that Congress may well have felt regulation of
consumer disputes exceeded their power under the commerce clause). Further, assuming for the
moment that the FAA was only intended to apply in federal court, and even assuming the parties were
from diverse states, few large merchant/small consumer transactions could have met the federal court
amount in controversy requirement in effect in 1924 of $3,000. Id.
45. Prima Paint, 388 U.S. at 414 (Black, J., dissenting) (citing Hearing on S. 4213 and S. 4214
before the Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 67th Cong., 4th Sess. 9-11 (1923)).
46. As President Coolidge reportedly said, "the business of America is business." JEROLD S.
AUERBACH, JUSTICE WITHOUT LAW? 111-12 (1983).
47. MACNEIL,supra note 12, at 61.
48. See id. at 61-63; AUERBACH, supra note 46, at 113 (discussing concern that "[d]ominant
business interests ... would use compulsory arbitration clauses as a shield for their efforts to control
prices, suppress competition, and thwart legislative regulation while they removed their private rules
from public supervision"); Heinrich Kronstein, Business Arbitration-Instrument of Private
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Wilko v. Swan,49 the Supreme Court's first interpretation of the scope of
the FAA,50 reflected such critics' concerns that arbitration must be genuinely
consented to and must serve the public interest. A 7-2 majority explained that
the FAA allowed transactional participants to secure arbitration "if the parties
are willing to accept less certainty of legally correct adjustment."' The Court
went on to prohibit arbitration with respect to a customer's securities fraud
action against a brokerage house, interpreting the Securities Act of 1933 as a
Congressional determination that customers lacked the information to
knowingly select arbitration in the securities context.52 In the Court's words,
the Securities Act of 1933 "was drafted with an eye to the disadvantages
under which buyers labor"53-specifically, the fact that sellers possess more
relevant information than buyers.54
The Court's decision in Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co. of America5 also
illustrates the Court's concern during this first period with protecting
consumers and workers from unknowingly or non-consensually selecting
arbitration. By ruling the FAA inapplicable,56 the Court refused to force a
discharged employee to bring his claim in arbitration.57 Although the Court
Government, 54 YALE L.L 36, 68 (1944) (arguing that modem arbitration is "[a]n instrument of cartels
and monopolistic trade associations" and that courts have abrogated their duty to enforce the
Constitution and ensure justice by condoning private organizations' usurpation of judicial power);
Philip G. Phillips, Rules of Law or Laissez-Faire in Commercial Arbitration, 47 HARV. L. REV. 590
(1934) (arguing that it is undesirable to allow private interests to shield their practices from public
control); Philip G. Phillips, The Paradox in Arbitration Law: Compulsion as Applied to a Voluntary
Proceeding, 46 HARv. L. REv. 1258 (1933) (asserting that enforced arbitration is not really
arbitration).
49. 346 U.S. 427 (1953).
50. Wilko was not the Court's first discussion of the FAA. See Shanferoke Coal & Supply Corp.
v. Westchester Serv. Corp., 293 U.S. 449 (1935) (holding that a federal court sitting in diversity had
power to stay an action, pending arbitration, even though court would not have had jurisdiction to
compel arbitration); Marine Transit Corp. v. Dreyfis, 284 U.S. 263 (1932) (affirming lower court's
confirmation of arbitral award in maritime case despite challenges to applicability of FAA and
constitutionality of statute as applied).
51. Wilko, 346 U.S. at 438.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 435.
54. Id. The court implied that the arbitration agreements buyers signed were all identical form
margin agreements, id. at 429, casting doubt on the position that buyers knowingly negotiated the
clause.
55. 350 U.S. 198 (1956).
56. The Court found the FAA inapplicable because interstate commerce had not been
established, even though plaintiff, a New York citizen who had moved to Vermont by the time he
brought suit, had contracted to perform certain services in Vermont for a New York corporation. Id. at
200-01.
57. The Supreme Court remanded the case to the district court to assess whether New York
contract law applied, under which the arbitration agreement would be irrevocable, or Vermont contract
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did not explicitly reference a policy of protecting consumer choice, the Court
was concerned with protecting the employee from a result he had not
anticipated when signing the agreement.
2. Scope of the FAA: Federal Court Only
Most commentators believe that the FAA was intended to govern only
disputes as to arbitration agreements that were brought in federal court.5 8
While the legislative history on this point is not entirely clear59 and the U.S.
Supreme Court ultimately reached a contrary conclusion,' virtually all those
who have studied the history of the Act in its context have concluded that the
FAA was viewed at the time as a procedural and remedial statute governing
only federal courts.6 The fact that the same groups that sought passage of the
FAA were working simultaneously on state laws that would have been
superfluous if the FAA were truly intended to govern the state forum as well
law governed, under which the arbitration clause was revocable. Id. at 205.
58. See, e.g., Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395, 417-18 (1967)
(Black, J., dissenting) (citing legislative history); Hirshman, supra note 32, at 1305 ("For years, courts
and commentators agreed that the statute applied only in the federal courts and so governed only the
few contract suits that happened to involve diversity or admiralty jurisdiction."); Strickland, supra note
32, at 391 ("Few if any commentators ... thought that state courts were obligated to apply the Act.").
59. See Hirshman, supra note 32, at 1315 ("Little emerges from the legislative history other than
unhappiness with prior law.") Given the fact that Erie RR. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938), had not
yet been decided, it is perhaps not surprising that Congress did not succinctly enunciate whether the
law was substantive or procedural, by what constitutional provision it was authorized, or whether the
FAA was intended to displace state law. Until Erie, such distinctions had little significance. See
Hirshman, supra note 32, at 1313-15 (noting that it is not clear whether FAA was based on procedural
powers under Article II, substantive powers to determine federal law under Article II, or substantive
powers under Commerce Clause and admiralty provisions). The drafters of the FAA were also
ambiguous in a law review article written immediately after passage of the Act They stated that
Congress had
ample power to declare that all arbitration agreements connected with interstate commerce or
admiralty transactions shall be recognized as valid and enforceable even by the State
courts....
Even if, however, it should be held that Congress has no [such] power ... the present
statute is not materially affected. The primary purpose of the statute is to make enforceable in
the Federal courts such agreements for arbitration, and for this purpose Congress rests solely
upon its power to prescribe the jurisdiction and duties of the Federal courts.
Cohen & Dayton, supra note 34, at 277-78.
60. Led by Justice Burger, in Southland v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1 (1984), a majority of the Supreme
Court concluded that the FAA was intended to apply in state as well as federal courts. Justice
O'Connor wrote a vigorous dissent. 465 U.S. at 21.
61. MACNEIL, supra note 12, at 117 (arguing that "the hearings [regarding the proposed FAA]
confirm what is already clear from the prior background and the bills themselves: the proposed USAA
was intended to apply only in federal courts"); see also Southland, 465 U.S at 21 (O'Connor &
Rehnquist, JJ., dissenting); Prima Paint, 388 U.S. at 401 (Black, J., dissenting).
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as the federal bolsters this conclusion.62
Moving beyond the legislative history, from 1925 until 1945 no federal or
state court even seems to have contemplated applying the FAA to an action
brought in state court.63 Although the Supreme Court did not directly address
the issue, its 1932 decision in Marine Transit Corp. v. Dreyfus' strongly
implied that the FAA was a procedural statute that would apply in federal but
not state courts.65
As this era continued, from 1945 through 1959, courts still assumed that
the FAA was applicable in federal but not state courts. Professor Macneil
found just five cases around the country that even considered applying the
FAA to state court actions during this period.66 Further, only one of the five
found that the FAA displaced state arbitration law, absent an agreement to
that effect by the parties.67
While courts were failing even to consider the applicability of the FAA to
62. See generally MACNEIL, supra note 12, at 34-57 (noting that arbitration reformers worked to
achieve state law reforms both prior and subsequent to passage of the FAA).
63. MACNEIL, supra note 12, at 127-28. Arbitration actions brought in state court were governed
by the states' own arbitration laws, which often were much less hospitable to arbitration and pre-
dispute arbitration agreements than was the FAA. See id. at 54-57 (discussing individual states'
passage of modem arbitration acts).
64. 284 U.S. 263 (1932).
65. In this maritime case the Court affirmed a lower federal court's confirmation of an arbitral
award, holding that the confirmation was covered by the statute's terms as a maritime matter. Id. at
271-77. It further held that the FAA itself was constitutional as applied because Congress has the
power to impose procedural remedies with respect to maritime matters. Id. at 277-79. A second
Supreme Court case, Shanferoke Coal & Supply Corp. v. Westchester Serv. Corp., 293 U.S. 449
(1935), also failed to address the question of whether the FAA would apply in state courts, while
stating that it did apply to diversity claims involving state law that were brought in federal court. In
focusing on the FAA as an exercise of procedural rather than substantive authority, the Court strongly
implied that it would apply in federal but not state courts under Erie. MACNEIL, supra note 12, at 132.
Professor Macneil also notes that FAA drafters Julius Henry Cohen and Kenneth Dayton submitted an
amicus brief on behalf of the New York Chamber of Commerce in Marine Transit which emphasized
that the FAA was purely procedural in nature. Id.
66. MACNEIL, supra note 12, at 127-30. French v. Petrinovic, 54 N.Y.S.2d 179 (App. Div. 1945)
(holding that the FAA may be applicable but only because parties had agreed to its application);
Wilson & Co. v. Fremont Cake & Meal Co., 43 N.W.2d 657 (Neb. 1950) (applying Nebraska law
despite defendant's argument that FAA must be followed), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 812 (1951); Parsons
& Whittemore, Inc. v. Rederiaktiebolaget Nordstjernan, 143 N.Y.S.2d 74 (App. Term.) (per curiam),
aflrd, 145 N.Y.S.2d 466 (App. Div. 1955) (reversing lower court's refusal to grant stay of action
pending arbitration under FAA); In re Omnium Freighting Corp., 185 N.Y.S.2d 857 (Sup. Ct. 1958)
(considering and denying appeal under FAA in which federal court consented to concurrent state
jurisdiction); Deep S. Oil Co. v. Texas Gas Corp., 328 S.W.2d 897, 906 (Tex. Civ. App. 1959)
(refusing to apply FAA where it was not clear from parties' conduct or intent that interstate commerce
would be involved).
67. Although Parsons & Whittemore did apply the FAA, it did not discuss whether the FAA
would preempt New York's own arbitration statute. 145 N.Y.S.2d 466.
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state courts, legal developments were taking place that would soon require
consideration of this issue. In 1938, the Court decided Erie Railroad v.
Tompkins, 6 holding that federal courts should apply federal procedural law in
all their cases but that state substantive law rather than federal common law
would govern cases brought pursuant to the federal courts' diversity
jurisdiction.69 After Erie, much would turn on two questions that had
mattered very little when Congress passed the FAA: whether the statute was
construed as "procedural" or "substantive' and whether the statute was
premised on Congress' authority to regulate federal courts or rather on its
power to regulate interstate commerce. If the FAA were truly procedural, the
Constitution would prohibit application of the Act to state courts.70 But if the
FAA were to be interpreted as substantive, and based perhaps upon the
Commerce Clause, then there would seem to be little logical way to prevent it
from being applied in state as well as federal courts.
The Supreme Court began to wrestle with the ramifications of Erie for the
FAA in Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co. ofAmerica.7' In that diversity case, the
Court's application of Eie led it to limit the scope of the FAA.72 Specifically
concluding that arbitration was "substantive" rather than "procedural" under
the "outcome determinative test' of Guaranty Trust Co. of New York v.
York," the Court held the FAA inapplicable to the case at hand because it
found the transaction at issue did not involve interstate commerce.74 Justice
Douglas, writing for the Court, found the FAA must be interpreted narrowly
to avoid impinging on the states' right to regulate substantive law.75 Although
Bernhardt itself did to apply the FAA in state courts, in categorizing the FAA
as substantive rather than procedural it did lay the groundwork for the Court's
68. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
69. Id. at 78.
70. See Erie, 304 U.S. 64 (finding unconstitutional Congress' or courts' attempts to impose on
states rules that are not supported by specific constitutional provisions).
71. 350U.S. 198 (1956).
72. Id.
73. 326 U.S. 99 (1945).
74. Bernhardt, 350 U.S. at 200-01. Although the Court's analysis is based primarily on statutory
interpretation, it also addresses the constitutional implications of Erie. Id. at 202. Note that by today's
standards the Court's conclusion that the transaction did not involve interstate commerce is somewhat
puzzling, in that the case involved a contract dispute between a New York corporation and its
employee who, although he was a New York resident at the time he entered the contract, had
subsequently moved to Vermont and was to perform the contract in Vermont. Id at 198.
75. Id. at 202-04 (emphasis added). Justice Frankfurter, concurring, took the Erie analysis
further, concluding that to avoid having to decide whether it was unconstitutional for the federal
government to require a state law claim to be taken to arbitration, the FAA should be interpreted not to
apply to diversity cases at all. Id. at 208.
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subsequent decisions that would do just that.7s
3. Significant Substantive Differences Between Litigation and
Arbitration
In both Wilko and Bernhardt the Court emphasized the substantive
differences between the arbitral and judicial fora. Wilko found as a matter of
law that arbitration would provide a less favorable forum than would
litigation for a plaintiff alleging securities fraud by the brokerage.7' The Court
stated: "Even though the provisions of the Securities Act, advantageous to the
buyer, apply, their effectiveness in application is lessened in arbitration as
compared to judicial proceedings.""8
Similarly, in Bernhardt, Justice Douglas flatly rejected the conclusion that
"arbitration is merely a form of trial."79 Instead, he found the choice of
arbitration over litigation could "make a radical difference in ultimate
result."80 For this reason the Court found the choice between arbitration and
litigation to be substantive rather than procedural in the sense of Erie.8 '
Justice Douglas apparently presumed arbitration would benefit the employer
when he noted that in arbitration there would be no jury trial, no instruction of
arbitrators as to the law, no statement of reasons nor record to support an
appeal, and no requirement that arbitrators follow the rules of evidence.8 2
76. Following the Bernhardt decision, more and more state courts began to consider the
applicability of the FAA to state court proceedings. MACNEIL, supra note 12, at 227 n.54.
77. Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427 (1953).
78. Id. at 435. The Court specifically noted that the arbitrators are not given judicial instruction,
id. at 436, nor even required to follow the law, id. at 434. The Court additionally noted that the
arbitrators need write no opinion, need not make a complete record of the proceeding, and could not
easily be reversed. Id. at 436. In dissent, Justice Frankfurter adopted the contrary position that would
come to be the law of the land by the 1980s:
There is nothing in the record before us, nor in the facts of which we can take judicial notice,
to indicate that the arbitral system as practiced in the City of New York, and as enforceable
under the supervisory authority of the District Court for the Southern District of New York,
would not afford the plaintiffthe rights to which he is entitled.
Id. at 439 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting); cf Shearson/Am. Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 231
(1987) (citing Justice Frankfurter's dissent in Wilko to support the proposition that arbitration may
properly be used to resolve claims of securities fraud).
79. Bernhardt, 350U.S. at202.
80. Id. at 203.
81. Id.at202-03.
82. Id. Perhaps Justice Douglas' sympathy for the employee, who may not have understood the
effect of the arbitration clause he had signed, led the Court to remand the case to the district court
which had already ruled favorably to the employee, rather than to the appellate court, as would have
been more usual. Justices Frankfurter and Harlan, concurring, both argued that the case should have
been remanded to the court of appeals and not to the district court. Id. at 205, 211.
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B. Seeds of Myths are Planted (1967-1982)
1. Policy/Purpose of the FAA: Not only to Support Knowing Choice
but also to Support Public Policy
Whereas the Court had previously found arbitration agreements
enforceable only to the extent they were genuinely accepted by the parties,
the Court in this second era began to evaluate the extent to which arbitration
was consistent with certain other societal, as well as individual, interests.
While the Court did not always find social policyfavored arbitration, its focus
on various social policies marked a significant shift from its exclusive focus
on individual consent.
a. Cases Limiting the Scope ofArbitration
In a series of cases involving statutory claims asserted by individual
unionized employees against their employers, the Court relied on social
policy to limit the reach of arbitration. In three separate cases beginning with
Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co.,83 the Court held that employees whose
union contracts contained arbitration clauses could nonetheless take certain
statutory claims to court, even if they had already lost on those claims in
arbitration. The three statutes expressly exempted from arbitration in this
context were Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,84 the Fair Labor
Standards Act ("FLSA"), 5 and the Civil Rights Act of 1871.6
The Court's treatment of the Gardner-Denver cases crucially illustrates
the Court's early differentiation between labor arbitration and commercial
arbitration. Just a few years earlier, in Textile Workers Union of America v.
Lincoln Mills ofAlabama 7 and the Steelworkers Trilogy 8 of cases, the Court
83. 415 U.S. 36 (1974).
84. See id. (permitting union member to pursue race discrimination claim in court, even though
he had previously filed a grievance alleging violation of his employment contract).
85. See Barrentine v. Arkansas-Best Freight Sys., Inc., 450 U.S. 728 (1981) (allowing employees
to bring minimum wage claim under FLSA even though they had unsuccessfully submitted wage claim
based on same underlying facts to joint labor/management grievance committee).
86. See McDonald v. City of W. Branch, Mich., 466 U.S. 284 (1984) (permitting discharged city
police officer to raise claim of violation of First Amendment and Due Process Clause pursuant to
§ 1983 even though an arbitrator had previously ruled against the officer). I have included McDonald
in this section even though the decision was handed down in 1984, thus falling slightly outside my
arbitrary definition of the second period. It is noteworthy that two of the three decisions were
unanimous. Alexander, 415 U.S. 36, was authored by Justice Powell, and McDonald, 466 U.S. 284,
was penned by Justice Brennan. Barrentine, 450 U.S. 728, was decided by a margin of 7-2, with
Justice Brennan writing the majority opinion and Justices Burger and Rehnquist dissenting.
87. 353 U.S. 448 (1957).
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had interpreted the text of the Labor Relations Management Act to heartily
endorse binding arbitration in the unionized labor context as a mechanism for
ensuring industrial peace." While at first glance the Court's preference for
binding arbitration in the Steelworkers cases might seem inconsistent with the
Court's rejection of arbitration in the Gardner-Denver line of cases, in fact
there is no contradiction. Rather, the Court is simply distinguishing between
labor arbitration, which is essentially used in lieu of the labor strike as a mode
of governing the workplace, and individual or commercial arbitration, which
is used in lieu of litigation."
Thus, the Gardner-Denver line of cases required the Court to determine
whether the arbitration of individual employees' statutory claims looked more
like labor grievance arbitration, which the Court favored as furthering
industrial peace, or like individual or commercial arbitration, to which a
different set of policy analyses would be relevant. Concluding that the
statutory grievances were more akin to individual or commercial grievances,
and that a union had no power to waive individual employees' statutory right
to non-discrimination,9" the Court went on to examine whether, as a matter of
social policy, the employees should be required to arbitrate their individual
88. United Steelworkers of Am. v. Enterprise Wheel and Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960); United
Steelworkers of Am. v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960); United Steelworkers of
Am. v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960).
89. In the 1957 Lincoln Mills decision the Court explained that because grievance arbitration is a
"quid pro quo for an agreement not to strike" and because industrial peace can best be achieved
through enforcement of such arbitration agreements, section 301 of the Labor Management Relations
Act of 1947 should be interpreted to provide federal courts with jurisdiction to order specific
enforcement of such agreements. 353 U.S. at 451-52. In the 1960 Steelworkers Trilogy the Court went
on to enunciate that all doubts as to the scope of a labor arbitration agreement should be resolved in
favor of coverage, Warrior & Gulf, 363 U.S. at 581-82, that courts should review arbitration decisions
only in an extremely limited manner, Enterprise Wheel, 363 U.S. at 595-98, and that claims which a
court might well reject as invalid could nonetheless be upheld by an arbitrator, applying the "law of the
shop," Warrior & Gulf, 363 U.S. at 579-82.
90. The Court explained the distinction in United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation
Co.:
Thus the run of arbitration cases, illustrated by Wilko v. Swan becomes irrelevant to our
problem. There the choice is between the adjudication of cases or controversies in courts with
established procedures or even special statutory safeguards on the one hand and the
settlement of them in the more informal arbitration tribunal on the other. In the commercial
case, arbitration is the substitute for litigation. Here arbitration is the substitute for industrial
strife. Since arbitration of labor disputes has quite different functions from arbitration under
an ordinary commercial agreement, the hostility evinced by courts toward arbitration of
commercial agreements has no place here. For arbitration of labor disputes under collective
bargaining agreements is part and parcel of the collective bargaining process itself.
363 U.S. at 578 (citations omitted).
91. Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36,51 (1974).
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statutory claims."
In assessing whether arbitration should be mandated in the Gardner-
Denver line of cases the Court used an analysis that was different from that
which it had employed in Wilko. Whereas Wilko focused exclusively on the
rights and knowledge of the individual securities customers,9 3 the Gardner-
Denver cases looked beyond individual employees' interests to consider
broader social interests. Specifically, Gardner-Denver emphasized that "the
private litigant not only redresses his own injury but also vindicates the
important congressional policy against discriminatory employment
practices."9 This focus on societal interests, initially used to void arbitration
agreements, would eventually be used to justify broad enforcement of binding
arbitration agreements.95
b. Cases Expanding the Scope ofArbitration
In this same period, the Court looked to broader social policies to expand
the role of arbitration. In Scherk v. Alberto-Culver," the Court found that
social policy favoring the use of arbitration in the international commercial
context was relevant to require arbitration of a section 10(b) securities claim
where it might not have been required in a domestic context.97 Rather than
92. The Court considered whether the courts should "defer" to an arbitration decision. Id. at 55.
93. See supra notes 49-54 and accompanying text.
94. Gardner-Denver, 415 U.S. at 44. The Court further observed that "waiver of these rights
would defeat the paramount congressional purpose behind Title VII." Id. at 51. Similarly in
Barrentine, the Court implied that even if the employees had knowingly and voluntarily agreed to
resolve their statutory claims exclusively through arbitration, such an agreement would be forbidden
by social policies favoring courts' resolution of such claims. 450 U.S. 728,740 (1981). It stated: "[W]e
have held that FLSA rights cannot be abridged by contract or otherwise waived because this would
'nullify the purposes' of the statute and thwart the legislative policies it was designed to effectuate."
Id. In McDonald, the Court stated that "according preclusive effect to arbitration awards in § 1983
actions would severely undermine the protection of federal rights that the statute is designed to
provide." 466 U.S. 284, 292 (1984). Consequently, the Court held that parties could not agree to
private arbitration of their § 1983 disputes. Id.
These three cases also address the issue of genuine consent, which arises when union leadership
waives a statutory right to litigate on behalf of each of its members. See Gardner-Denver, 415 U.S. at
58 n.19 (noting union's exclusive control over manner and extent to which an individual grievance is
presented); Barrentine, 450 U.S. at 741 (noting that a union might, even acting in good faith, choose
not to present individual's claim in arbitration); McDonald, 466 U.S. at 290 (same).
95. See infra notes 126-36 and accompanying text.
96. 417 U.S. 506 (1974).
97. Alberto-Culver, an American company, had entered into a contract with Fritz Scherk, a
German citizen and owner of three interrelated businesses organized under the laws of Germany and
Liechtenstein. Id. at 506. Difficulties arose in the relationship, and Alberto-Culver attempted to sue
Scherk for securities fraud under section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §
78j(b)(1994). Alberto-Culver sought to avoid the arbitration clause it had signed by relying on the
Court's earlier holding in Wilko that securities fraud claims under section 12(2) of the Securities Act of
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reach the issue of whether section 10(b) claims should be held nonarbitrable,
as had been section 12(2) claims in Wilko,98 the Court, in a 5-4 decision,
instead found disputes between two international businesses more readily
arbitrable than disputes between two domestic entities.99 The Court based its
decision on the social policies of avoiding both choice of law chaos' 0 and
U.S. parochialism.' '
Thus, whether it was broadening or limiting the scope of arbitration, the
Court in the second era began to look beyond individual intent to other social
policies such as fighting discrimination or deterring U.S. parochialism.
Meanwhile, writing in dissent in Barrentine, Justices Burger and Rehnquist
emphasized another social policy that would soon prove extremely
influential: the goal of reducing court backlogs and resolving disputes more
cheaply and more quickly. 2
2. The Scope of the FAA: Growing Domestically and Internationally
In the period from 1967 to 1982 the Court also planted seeds that would
eventually flower into a dramatic expansion in the scope of the FAA. As
noted earlier, the Supreme Court's Erie decision, holding that federal
substantive but not procedural law should be applied in state courts, would
eventually lead to a great expansion in the scope of the FAA. 3 The Court's
1967 decision in Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Manufacturing Co."'4
was an important part of the expansion. A 6-3 majority of the Court stated
that the FAA was unquestionably based on Congress' power to regulate
interstate commerce, and not upon an assertion of general federal common
law or upon federal procedural powers. 1 5 Although Prima Paint was a
1933 could not be forced into arbitration.
98. Scherk, 417 U.S. at 514 n.8, 515-16.
99. Id. at 517.
100. Id. ("Whatever recognition the courts of this country might ultimately have granted to the
order of the foreign court, the dicey atmosphere of such a legal no-man's-land would surely damage
the fabric of international commerce and trade, and imperil the willingness and ability of businessmen
to enter into international commercial agreements.").
101. Id. at 517 & n.l 1 ('To determine that 'American standards of fairness' .. must nonetheless
govern the controversy demeans the standards of justice elsewhere in the world, and unnecessarily
exalts the primacy of United States law over the laws of other countries."). The Court also found that
because Alberto-Culver could not count on the normal advantages of litigation in the international
context, arbitration should be permitted. Id. at 518.
102. 450 U.S. 728,746 (1981) (Burger, C.J., & Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
103. See Erie R.R v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938); see supra notes 68-70 and accompanying
text.
104. 388 U.S. 395 (1967).
105. Id. at 405. The Court held in Prima Paint that whereas a claim of fraud in the inducement of
the arbitration provision itself may be heard by a court, a claim as to fraud in the inducement of the
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federal diversity claim, and thus could not expressly hold that the FAA should
apply in state court, the conclusion that the FAA was substantive law based
on the Commerce Clause would predictably require application of the FAA in
state court under the Supremacy Clause."° Justices Black, Stewart and
Douglas vigorously dissented in Prima Paint, recognizing that the majority's
conclusion would eventually impel the FAA into state courts."07
During this second era, the Court and Congress also expanded the scope
of the FAA significantly with respect to international disputes. In 1970, the
United States adopted the United Nations Convention on Recognition and
Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards (also known as the New York
Convention)0 . and enacted Title 2 of the FAA to allow implementation of the
New York Convention in the United States.0 9 The Convention generally
requires contracting countries to recognize arbitration agreements entered into
between citizens of contracting states,"0 but it also contains language which
appears to limit the Convention's superiority to national law."' Given these
limitations, one might have expected that the Court would have been at least
contract as a whole may only be heard by the arbitrators. Id. at 403-04. This division has come to be
known as the "separability doctrine." See generally MACNEIL ET AL., supra note 9, § 14.2.3.
106. U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2.
107. The dissenters concluded that Congress based the FAA primarily on its Article II1 power to
"create general federal rules to govern federal courts," Prima Paint, 388 U.S. at 418, and that "there
are clear indications in the legislative history that the Act was not intended to make arbitration
agreements enforceable in state courts.... " id. at 420 (footnote omitted).
108. A special conference of the United Nations had adopted the Convention on June 10, 1958.
See Scherk v. Alberto-Culver, 417 U.S. 506, 520 n.15 (1974) (citing Convention on the Recognition
and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, S. Exec. Doe. E, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. (1968)); Leonard
V. Quigley, Abcession by the United States to the United Nations Convention on the Recognition and
Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, 70 YALE L.I 1049 (1961).
109. Foreign Arbitral Awards Convention, Pub. L. No. 91-368, § 1, 84 Stat. 692 (1970) (codified
at 9 U.S.C. §§ 201-208 (1994)). Section 201 provides, "The Convention on the Recognition and
Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards of June 10, 1958, shall be enforced in United States courts in
accordance with this chapter." 9 U.S.C. § 201 (1994).
110. See 9 U.S.C. § 202 ("An arbitration agreement or arbitral award arising out of a legal
relationship, whether contractual or not, which is considered as commercial, including a transaction,
contract, or agreement described in section 2 of this title, falls under the Convention."). It also limits its
scope to those relationships involving foreign parties, property located abroad, or where performance
or enforcement must be secured abroad. Id.
11. See MACNEIL, supra note 12, at 162-63. For example, courts are not required to enforce
arbitration agreements that are "null and void, inoperative or incapable of being performed."
Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, art. II, para. 3. In
addition, courts are not required to enforce arbitral awards that are invalid under the law selected by
the parties or, absent such selection, laws that are invalid under the law of the country where the award
was made. Id. art. V, para. 1. Nor are courts required to recognize or enforce awards in which the
subject matter is not capable of settlement by arbitration, or if "recognition or enforcement of the
award would be contrary to the public policy of that country." Id. para. 2.
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as willing to void international arbitration agreements or to deny enforcement
of international awards as it would have been to take such actions in the
domestic context. Instead, the new emphasis on international arbitration
appeared to encourage the Court to allow private parties broad leeway in
entering into arbitration agreements.
First, in Scherk, the Court explicitly found that the FAA's support of
arbitration clauses went further in the international context than in the
domestic context."2 The Court held that a securities claim that might not be
arbitrable if brought domestically would be arbitrable if the contractual
dispute had international implications." 3 Second, in MIS Bremen v. Zapata
Off-Shore Co.,"4 the Court found that where a sophisticated U.S. company
and a sophisticated foreign company agreed in arm's length negotiations to
resolve disputes in a particular forum,"' this agreement would be enforceable
absent compelling and countervailing reasons to void the agreement." 6 While
not an arbitration decision, MIS Bremen affected FAA jurisprudence because,
as many courts and commentators have noted, an arbitration clause may itself
be seen as a type of forum selection."' Thus, the Court's decision to allow
private forum selection was a move toward a privatized dispute resolution
process."'
3. Differences Between Arbitration and Litigation Vary with the
Circumstances
Whereas in the first era of the FAA the Court emphasized the significant
differences between litigation and arbitration, in this second era the Court
instead opined that the two fora might or might not differ substantially,
112. 417 U.S. 506 (1974).
113. Id. at 515-16; see supra notes 96-101 and accompanying text.
114. 407U.S. 1(1972).
115. The parties had agreed to litigate any disputes arising out of their contract before the London
Court of Justice. id.
116. Id. at 11.
117. Scherk, 417 U.S. at 519; see also Lee Goldman, My Way and the Highway: The Law and
Economics of Choice of Forum Clauses in Consumer Form Contracts, 86 Nw. U. L. REv. 700, 736
(1992).
118. See generally Linda S. Mullenix, Another Choice of Law: Consensual Adjudicatory
Procedure in Federal Court, 57 FORDHAM L. REV. 291 (1988) (criticizing trend toward privatization).
But cf Michael E. Solimine, Forum Selection Clauses and the Privatization of Procedure, 25
CORNELL INT'L L.J. 51 (1992) (praising the trend). MIS Bremen also emphasized the obligation of the
U.S. not to parochially insist that disputes be resolved in our own courts, a theme that was picked up in
some of the later arbitration decisions including Scherk. The MIS Bremen Court stated: "[the
expansion of American business and industry will hardly be encouraged if, notwithstanding solemn
contracts, we insist on a parochial concept that all disputes must be resolved under our laws and in our
courts." 407 U.S. at 9.
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depending on the circumstances. In certain labor cases involving individual
workers' statutory claims, the Court repeatedly found that arbitration was
significantly different from (and from the worker's perspective likely inferior
to) litigation of federal statutory claims." 9 Thus, in 1974 in Gardner-Denver
the Court stated:
[T]he fact finding process in arbitration usually is not equivalent to
judicial fact finding. The record of the arbitration proceedings is not
as complete; the usual rules of evidence do not apply; and rights and
procedures common to civil trials, such as discovery, compulsory
process, cross-examination, and testimony under oath, are often
severely limited or unavailable. And . . . "[a]rbitrators have no
obligation to the court to give their reasons for an award."' 0
The Court further observed that "the specialized competence of arbitrators
pertains primarily to the law of the shop, not the law of the land."'' The
Court expressed similar views in Barrentine2 2 and McDonald.'
However, in some of its other decisions during this period the Court began
to emphasize that commercial arbitration can be just as good for decision
making as can litigation. Thus, in Prima Paint the Court rejected the dissent's
argument that arbitrators, most likely non-lawyers, were not capable of
adjudicating the legal validity of a contract. 24 Similarly, in Scherk the Court
119. See, e.g., McDonald v. City of W. Branch, Mich., 466 U.S. 284 (1984); Barrentine v.
Arkansas-Best Freight Sys., 450 U.S. 728 (1981); Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36
(1974).
120. 415 U.S. at 57-58 (citations omitted) (quoting United Steelworkers of Am. v. Enterprise
Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 598 (1960)).
121. Id.at57.
122. Barrentine, 450 U.S. at 743-44 ("Although an arbitrator may be competent to resolve many
preliminary factual questions, such as whether the employee 'punched in' when he said he did, he may
lack the competence to decide the ultimate legal issue whether an employee's right to a minimum wage
or to overtime pay under the statute has been violated."). The Court further noted that "arbitrators very
often are powerless to grant the aggrieved employees as broad a range of relief [as could a judge]." Id.
at 745.
123. McDonald, 466 U.S. at 290 (holding that "although arbitration is well suited to resolving
contractual disputes, our decisions in Barrentine and Gardner-Denver compel the conclusion that it
cannot provide an adequate substitute for a judicial proceeding in protecting the federal statutory and
constitutional rights that § 1983 is designed to safeguard").
124. Compare Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg., 388 U.S. 395, 407 (1967) (Black,
Douglas and Stewart, JJ., dissenting) ("The Court holds, what is to me fantastic, that the legal issue of
a contract's voidness because of fraud is to be decided by persons designated to arbitrate factual
controversies.... [These persons] in all probability will be non-lawyers, wholly unqualified to decide
legal issues, and even if qualified to apply the law, not bound to do so.") with Prima Paint, 388 U.S. at
403-04 (Fortas, J.) (requiring issue of fraud to be determined by arbitrators, rather than court, unless
the claim is for fraud in the inducement of the arbitration clauses itself, as opposed to the contract as a
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found that arbitrators were capable of ruling on a securities fraud claim
pursuant to federal law, at least in the context of an international
transaction.
125
C. The Myths Fully Develop (1983-Present)
1. Policy/Purpose of the FAA: To Favor Arbitration
During this third period the Court significantly recharacterized the policy
and purpose of the FAA, proclaiming the myth that commercial arbitration
served a substantial public purpose and should be favored regardless of the
parties' intentions.'26 In Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital v. Mercury
Construction27 in 1983, Justice Brennan enunciated the myth for the first
time:
[Q]uestions of arbitrability must be addressed with a healthy regard
for the federal policy favoring arbitration.... The Arbitration Act
establishes that, as a matter of federal law, any doubts concerning
the scope of arbitrable issues should be resolved in favor of
arbitration, whether the problem at hand is the construction of the
contract language itself or an allegation of waiver, delay, or a like
defense to arbitrability.1
28
Significantly, the Court did not provide an explicit rationale for why
arbitration should be favored over litigation. Most of the lower court cases it
whole).
125. Scherk v. Alberto-Culver, 417 U.S. 506 (1974); see also Shell, supra note 3 (contrasting
labor arbitration and commercial arbitration).
126. Attorney Cliff Palefsky notes: "There is a big difference between eliminating a hostility and
stating a preference, with a whole lot of room in between." Palefsky, supra note 20, at 4. Chief Justice
Burger previewed the new line of decisions in a 1982 address to the American Arbitration Association,
praising the numerous advantages of arbitration over litigation. Warren E. Burger, Isn't There a Better
Way?, 68 A.B.A. 1274 (1982); see also Warren E. Burger, Using Arbitration to Achieve Justice, ARB.
J., Dec. 1985, at 3, 4-5 (discussing use of arbitration to relieve flooding of courts); Warren E. Burger,
Agenda for 2000 A.D.-A Need for Systematic Anticipation, 70 F.R.D. 83, 93-96 (1976). Even earlier
Justice Rehnquist wrote an article comparing litigation and arbitration, concluding that the former was
far more costly than the latter. William Rehnquist. A Jurist's View ofArbitration, ARB. J., Mar. 1977,
at 1.
127. 460 U.S. 1 (1983).
128. Id. at 24-25 (emphasis added). In Moses H. Cone, a contractor sought arbitration of its
dispute with its client, a hospital. The hospital sued in state court, arguing no liability and no duty to
arbitrate. Id. at 6. The contractor then sued in federal court seeking arbitration. Id. Although the district
court denied arbitration, pending resolution of the state court claim, the Supreme Court affirmed the
appellate court's reversal of this decision. Id. at 1.
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cited as favoring arbitration also provided no rationale for this favoritism. 29
In the absence of any other rationale, it appears that the Court was
swayed or at least influenced by a desire to conserve judicial resources. One
of the cases cited by the Court to support favoritism toward arbitration does
explicitly base the policy on a desire to conserve judicial resources. 3 0 Further,
Justice Burger, having dissented in Barrentine just two years earlier, argued
vehemently that arbitration should be favored to help reduce the courts'
workload. 3' Certainly the Court has not offered any reason for preferring
arbitration to litigation other than reducing both judicial caseloads and
parties' presumed monetary and temporal investments in litigation.
The Court has relied upon this policy of favoritism toward arbitration in
many of its subsequent cases. During the course of its decision in Mitsubishi
Motors, allowing the arbitration of an antitrust claim in the international
context, the Court found that although "the parties' intentions control...
those intentions are generously construed as to issues of arbitrability.""' The
Court has relied on the preference not only to interpret the terms of an
arbitration agreement broadly but also to reject proposed statutory exemptions
129. See Dickinson v. Heinold Sec., Inc., 661 F.2d 638, 643 (7th Cir. 1981) (stating as established
federal policy that "when construing arbitration agreements, every doubt is to be resolved in favor of
arbitration"); Wick v. Atlantic Marine, Inc., 605 F.2d 166, 168 (5th Cir. 1979) (stating that a stay for
judicial proceedings should be granted unless the arbitration clause is "not susceptible" to an
interpretation that would properly bring the issue to arbitration); Becker Autoradio U.S.A., Inc., v.
Becker Autoradiowerk GmbH, 585 F.2d 39, 43-45 (3d Cir. 1978) (citing a policy of favoring
arbitration agreements in the absence of "positive assurance" that a dispute was not meant to be
arbitrated). Perhaps these courts failed to take note of the distinction between labor and commercial
arbitration.
130. Hanes Corp. v. Millard, 531 F.2d 585, 598 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (stating that a policy of liberally
construing arbitration agreements serves to ease court congestion).
131. After recounting the importance of reducing courts' caseloads and extolling the virtues of
arbitration, Justice Burger wrote:
The Court seems unaware that people's patience with the judicial process is wearing thin. Its
holding [restricting arbitration] runs counter to every study and every exhortation of the
Judiciary, the Executive, and the Congress urging the establishment of reasonable
mechanisms to keep matters of this kind out of the courts .... Approving an extrajudicial
resolution procedure "is not a question of first-class or second-class... means. It is a matter
of tailoring the means to the problem that is involved."
Barrentine v. Arkansas-Best Freight Sys., 450 U.S. 728, 752 (1981) (Burger, C.J., dissenting)
(citations omitted) (quoting Resolution of Minor Disputes, Joint Hearings Before the Subcomm. on
Courts, Civil Liberties and the Administration of Justice of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, and
Subcomm. on Consumer Protection and Finance of the House Comm. on Interstate and Foreign
Commerce, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 28 (1979) (testimony of Assistant Attorney General Meador)).
Although Justices Burger and Rehnquist actually dissented in Moses H. Cone, they did so on other
grounds, arguing that arbitration could be fostered by state as well as by federal courts. See 460 U.S. at
30-36.
132. Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 626 (1985).
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to arbitration.' 33
As the Court has become more concerned with the public utility of
arbitration and less concerned with whether the parties actually agreed to
arbitration, the Court has at times also rejected as irrelevant the question of
whether an inequality in bargaining power affected the parties' agreement to
arbitrate. 34 While the Court in theory continues to allow parties to use claims
of bargaining inequality to support a showing of fraud or coercion in a
particular case,'35 the Court will no longer rule out whole categories of cases
on the assumption that the parties lacked equal bargaining power.'36
At the same time that the Court was enunciating a policy of favoritism
toward arbitration, in another line of cases it was reiterating the idea that
arbitration agreements are based upon a policy of freedom of contract. In Volt
Information Sciences, Inc. v. Board of Trustees of Leland Stanford Junior
University,'37 the Court held that parties could contractually choose to be
governed by state arbitration laws rather than the FAA so long as the state law
does not actually conflict with the FAA.3' Emphasizing that "[a]rbitration is
a matter of consent, not coercion,"' 3 the Court affirmed reliance on a
California statute that permitted a stay of arbitration pending resolution of
133. Id. at 626 (allowing arbitration of antitrust claim in international context); see also
Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., 115 S. Ct. 1212, 1214 (1995) (holding that policy
favoring 'arbitration supports allowing arbitrators to award punitive damages); Gilmer v.
Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 26 (1991) (citing fderal policy favoring arbitration in
ruling that ADEA claims are arbitrable); Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., 490 U.S.
477, 481 (1989) (taking note of federal policy of favoring arbitration in reversing Wilko and holding
that securities fraud claims can be arbitrated); Shearson/Am. Express Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220,
227 (1987) (stating that given federal preference for arbitration "[t]he burden is on the party opposing
arbitration .. . to show that Congress intended to preclude a waiver of judicial remedies for the
statutory rights at issue").
134. See, e.g., McMahon, 482 U.S. at 230 (finding that Wilko was concerned not with
overreaching or bargaining inequalities but only with whether the party had waived benefits that were
non-waivable pursuant to securities law). Given this reading of Wilko, the Court found it was
permissible to send to arbitration both section 10(b) securities fraud and RICO claims despite
arguments that the arbitration agreement had been imposed on the weaker party. Id.
135. See, e.g., Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 115 S. Ct. 834, 843 (1995); Gilmer, 500
U.S. at 33. Significantly, the Court has not actually voided any arbitration agreements based on such a
defense.
136. Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 32-33; cf id. at 39 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (arguing that the FAA should
not apply to employment-related disputes in part because such contracts are often not entered into
voluntarily).
137. 489 U.S. 468 (1989).
138. Id. at 477-78.
139. Id at 479. Along a similar line, the Court explained that the federal policy was "to ensure the
enforceability, according to their terms, of private agreements to arbitrate." Id. at 476 (emphasis
added). The Court further observed that "[t]here is no federal policy favoring arbitration under a
certain set of procedural rules." Id.
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related litigation. 4°
The Court has also emphasized the central importance of the parties'
knowing consent in Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc.,141
holding that the parties may determine whether punitive damages should be
available, 42 and in First Options of Chicago v. Kaplan,43 holding that the
parties may determine whether the arbitrators or the court should decide any
questions that arise pertaining to arbitrability.' 4
While the Court has never directly discussed or attempted to reconcile the
differences between the Moses H. Cone line of cases preferring arbitration
and the Volt line of cases emphasizing the importance of the parties' consent,
the Court's recent decision in Doctor's Associates, Inc. v. Casarotto
145
implicitly chooses the Moses H. Cone preference for arbitration. The
Montana Supreme Court found that Montana's notice provision was
necessary to ensure knowing consent to arbitration and was consistent with
Volt. ' 46 The U.S. Supreme Court reversed and held that any state law that was
targeted specifically to void arbitration agreements, and not contracts in
general, was preempted by the FAA, even if the purpose of the state's law
may have been to promote the knowing choice of arbitration.
t47
140. Id. at 476-78. This "stay" effectively rendered unnecessary any arbitration. Most
interestingly, the arbitration agreement reached between the parties did not actually specify that
California rather than federal arbitration law should apply. Nonetheless, the Court interpreted such an
intent into the general choice-of-law clause, which provided that "[tfhe Contract shall be governed by
the law of the place where the Project is located." Id. at 470.
141. 115 S. Ct. 1212 (1995).
142. The Court explained in Mastrobuono that "[a]rbitration under the Act is a matter of consent,
not coercion, and parties are generally free to structure their arbitration agreements as they see fit." Id.
at 1216. The Court read the ambiguous arbitration contract in favor of the customer, and not to exclude
punitive damages, in part because "[a]s a practical matter, it seems unlikely that petitioners were
actually aware of New York's bifurcated approach to punitive damages, or that they had any idea that
by signing a standard-form agreement to arbitrate disputes they might be giving up an important
substantive right." Id. at 1219.
143. 115 S. Ct. 1920 (1995).
144. A unanimous Court stated: "Just as the arbitrability of the merits of a dispute depends upon
whether the parties agreed to arbitrate that dispute, so the question 'who has the primary power to
decide arbitrability' turns upon what the parties agreed about that matter." Id. at 1923 (citations
omitted). However, the Court held that whereas any doubts concerning the scope of arbitrable issues
should be resolved in favor of arbitration, arbitrators would only be permitted to resolve arbitrability if
the parties gave them such power clearly and unmistakably. Id. at 1924. The Court justified this
distinction on the ground that parties are unlikely to have given any thought to who should decide the
issue of arbitrability. Id. at 1924-25.
145. 116 S.Ct. 1652 (1996).
146. Casarotto v. Lombardi, 901 P.2d 596, 597-98 (Mont. 1995).
147. Doctor's Assocs., 116 S. Ct. at 1656 (declaring that Montana Supreme Court misread Volt
Info. Sciences Inc. v. Board of Trustees of Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 489 U.S. 468 (1989)).
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2. Scope of FAA: Broadened to Cover State Courts and Virtually All
Federal and State Claims
a. The FAA Applied to State Court Proceedings
The Supreme Court dramatically increased the scope of the FAA during
this third period by expounding the dual myths that the FAA applies to
actions brought in state court and that the FAA prohibits states from enacting
legislation hostile to arbitration. While the FAA only governs transactions
involving interstate commerce, cases decided in this third period have
established that this limitation barely restrains the FAA. 41
Southland Corp. v. Keating149 was the landmark Supreme Court case that
first applied the FAA to state courts. Justice Burger, in a 7-2 decision, 50 held
that the FAA not only applied to state courts but also preempted the
California Supreme Court's interpretation of a California statute to the effect
that claims under that law could only be brought in court, and not through
arbitration.' Justice Burger based these conclusions on the Court's earlier
decision in Prima Paint that the FAA rests on Congress' authority to enact
substantive rules under the Commerce Clause'52 as well as on his reading of
legislative history.'53 Most commentators disagree with his assessment of the
legislative history."'
148. See infra notes 158-62 and accompanying text.
149. 465 U.S. 1 (1984).
150. Justice Stevens concurred in part but dissented in part, concluding that while the FAA applies
to the states, it does not necessarily preempt those state laws not inconsistent with the FAA. Id. at 21.
151. The plaintiffs, 7-Eleven franchisees, sued franchisor Southland in state court, alleging
Southland had violated disclosure requirements of the California Franchise Investment Law., see CAL.
CORP. CODE §§ 31000-31516 (West 1994). When Southland sought an order to compel arbitration, the
California Supreme Court held that the Franchise Investment Law required claims to be brought in
court, and therefore refused to order arbitration. See Southland, 465 U.S. at 5.
152. Southland, 465 U.S. at 10 (citing Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S.
395 (1967)).
153. The Court states: "Although the legislative history is not without ambiguities, there are strong
indications that Congress had in mind something more than making arbitration agreements enforceable
only in the federal courts." Southland, 465 U.S. at 12. Justice Burger fully recognized the significance
of this conclusion, noting that just 2% of civil litigation is brought in the federal courts. Id. at 15 n.8.
154. Scholars Ian Macneil, Richard Speidel and Thomas Stipanowich sharply criticize the
legislative history put forth by Justice Burger, calling it a "pillar of sand." MACNEIL ET AL., supra note
9, § 10.5.3. Professor Macneil, writing on his own, is even more blunt:
[IThe majority used the artifacts of the history of the USAA in building their arguments just
as a mason uses stone in building a stone wall-picking ones that are useful, ignoring ones
that are not, discarding troublesome ones, chipping away offensive spurs on otherwise useful
pieces, twisting and turning each stone until it best fits, and above all, covering up the chinks
and defects with a mortar of words.... The result is pathological history.
MACNEIL, supra note 12, at 170; see also Strickland, supra note 32, at 391 (finding that when the FAA
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Ten years after Southland, the Court's decision to apply the FAA to state
courts and to preempt state legislation was still extremely controversial. Thus,
when the Court granted certiorari in Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson,'"
twenty state attorney generals joined together in an amicus brief to ask the
Court to reverse its earlier holding in Southland.15 6 However, the Court
refused the invitation.
51
Terminix is a significant decision in that it not only refused to overrule
Southland but also expanded the scope of the FAA further into the realm of
state court jurisprudence. Following Southland there had been a dispute
among courts as to the scope of the FAA in light of the statute's limited
application to a "written provision in any maritime transaction or a contract
evidencing a transaction involving commerce."' 58 The Supreme Court, again
purporting to rely on legislative history, adopted the broadest possible
definition of interstate commerce, concluding that the FAA should be
interpreted to cover the full range of Congress' authority and to regulate all
"commerce in fact."' 59 That is, regardless of party intent, the FAA applies to
was enacted, few if any commentators thought that the FAA would apply in state courts).
155. 115 S. Ct. 834 (1995).
156. The twenty states were Alabama, Alaska, Arkansas, Colorado, Florida, Illinois, Hawaii,
Massachusetts, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey,
North Dakota, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, Utah, and Vermont. Brief Amiei Curiae for the Attorneys
General in Support of Petitioners, Terminix, 115 S. Ct. 834 (1995) (No. 93-1001). Observing that the
Court had issued its opinion in Southland without the benefit of parties' briefing on the issue of the
scope of the FAA, id. at 1-2 & n.2, the amici argued that states should have the power to determine
how proceedings in their own courts should be handled, and that specifically they should be allowed to
protect "consumers and others of unequal bargaining power or information," id. at 3 & n.5, 19 & n.25.
157. It stated:
Nothing significant has changed in the 10 years subsequent to Southland; no later cases have
eroded Southland's authority; and, no unforeseen practical problems have arisen. Moreover,
in the interim, private parties have likely written contracts relying upon Southland as
authority. Further, Congress, both before and after Southland, has enacted legislation
extending, not retracting, the scope of arbitration. For these reasons, we find it inappropriate
to reconsider what is by now well-established law.
Terminix, 115 S. Ct. at 839 (citations omitted).
158. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (1994). Some courts had interpreted the reference to interstate commerce very
broadly. E.g., Foster v. Turley, 808 F.2d 38, 40 (10th Cir. 1986); Robert Lawrence Co. v. Devonshire
Fabrics Inc., 271 F.2d 402, 406-07 (2d Cir. 1959), cert. dismissed, 364 U.S. 801 (1960). Others had
interpreted the phrase more narrowly. The Supreme Court of Alabama in Terminix had found that the
Act applies to a contract only if 'at the time... [the parties] entered into the [contract] and accepted
the arbitration clause, they contemplated substantial interstate activity."' Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos.
v. Dobson, 628 So. 2d 354, 355 (Ala. 1993) (quoting Metro Indus. Painting Corp. v. Terminal Constr.
Co., 287 F.2d 382, 387 (2d Cir.) (Lumbard, C.J., concurring), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 817 (1961); see
also R.J. Palmer Constr. Co. v. Wichita Band Instrument Co., 642 P.2d 127, 130 (Kan. Ct. App. 1982);
Burke County Pub. Sch. Bd. of Educ. v. Shaver Partnership, 279 S.E.2d 816, 821-23 (N.C. 1981).
159. Terminix, 115 S. Ct. at 841.
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any transaction Congress would have the power to regulate directly under its
commerce power. In Terminix, the Court applied this rule to cover an
agreement reached between a homeowner and a local pest extermination
company 6 In light of the extremely broad interpretation that has been given
to the Commerce Clause,161 it is now quite difficult to conjure up many
transactions that would not be regulated by the FAA. 62
b. The FAA Interpreted to Preempt Protective State Laws
Southland not only found that the FAA applied in state court, but also
invalidated California's interpretation of its own Franchise Act, to prohibit
arbitration of claims under the Act, as preempted by the FAA. 63 Justice
Burger found that the California Supreme Court's interpretation of its own
statute" conflicted directly with the FAA by purporting to invalidate an
arbitration clause for reasons other than those existing at law or equity. 65 As
Justice Stevens pointed out in dissent, the Court could have interpreted the
preemptive scope of the FAA far more narrowly than it did. 66 Subsequently,
in Peny v. Thomas, the Court again invalidated a California statute it found
160. Id. at 843 (noting that the parties did not contest that the transaction in fact involved interstate
commerce). But see Brief of Respondents at 2 & n.5, Terminix, 115 S. Ct. 834 (1995) (No. 93-1001)
(emphasizing local nature of transaction).
161. Although the Court in United States v. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. 1624 (1995), struck down a federal
law attempting to prohibit gun possession near schools, few doubt that the Court will continue to
interpret the Commerce Clause quite broadly. See, e.g., United States v. Robertson, 115 S. Ct. 1732
(1995) (upholding RICO conviction despite argument that operation of gold mine in Alaska did not
sufficiently implicate interstate commerce).
162. But see Columbus Anesthesia Group v. Kutzner, 459 S.E.2d 422 (Ga. Ct. App. 1995)
(finding no interstate commerce sufficient to bring FAA into play where dispute involved contract for
doctor to join a Georgia professional corporation providing medical services in Georgia, even though
doctor himself came from outside Georgia and contract required him to contribute equipment
manufactured outside Georgia to the corporation).
163. Southland v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1 (1984).
164. CAL. CORP. CODE §§ 31000-31516 (West 1994). The statute did not explicitly require that
claims could only be resolved through litigation, but was so interpreted by the California Supreme
Court. See Keating v. Superior Court of Alameda County, 645 P.2d 1192 (Cal. 1982) (en bane),jurisd.
postponed, 459 U.S. 1101 (1983), appeal dismissed in part and rev'd in part, 465 U.S. 1 (1984).
165. Justice Burger stated: "In enacting § 2 of the federal Act, Congress declared a national policy
favoring arbitration and withdrew the power of the states to require a judicial forum for the resolution
of claims which the contracting parties agreed to resolve by arbitration." Southland, 465 U.S. at 10.
Section 2 of the FAA provides that arbitration agreements are valid except "upon such grounds as exist
at law or in equity for revocation of any contract." 9 U.S.C. § 2 (1994).
166. Southland, 465 U.S. at 18-21. Justice Stevens argued that the FAA should be interpreted to
preempt those state statutes that were directly at odds with the FAA, but that states should be allowed
to regulate arbitration in ways consistent with the purpose of the FAA, particularly to express
important state interests such as protecting franchisees.
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inconsistent with the FAA' 67 in that California sought to preserve an
employee's right to bring certain wage collection actions in court.
Whereas Southland, Peny, and Terminix made it clear that, except with
respect to purely local transactions, a state could not require certain categories
of claims to be resolved through litigation rather than through arbitration,
Doctor's Associates, Inc. v. Casarotto interpreted the preemptive scope of the
FAA even more broadly, thereby devastating virtually all state attempts to
protect consumers, franchisees, and other weaker parties.'16  Doctor's
Associate held that even a mere requirement that an arbitration clause be
"typed in underlined capital letters on the first page of the contract" 69 was
inconsistent with the FAA and therefore preempted.'70 In an 8-1 decision 7'
the Justices found the rule quite clear: "Courts may not ... invalidate
arbitration agreements under state laws applicable only to arbitration
provisions."' 72 The Court's ruling explicitly rejected the Montana Supreme
Court's finding that the notice provision was consistent with and thus not
preempted by the FAA in that the goal of the FAA is not to promote
167. 482 U.S. 483 (1987) (holding that the FAA preempts provision of California Labor Law
which stated that wage collection actions could be maintained in court without regard to existence of
private agreement to arbitrate).
168. Lower federal and state courts had already invalidated numerous state statutes. See supra
note 15 and infra notes 387-95 and accompanying text; see generally Rita M. Cain, Preemption of
State Arbitration Statutes: The Exaggerated Federal Policy Favoring Arbitration, 19 CONTEMP. L. 1
(1993).
169. MONT. CODE ANN. § 27-5-114(4) (1993).
170. Plaintiff Paul Casarotto was a Subway sandwich shop franchisee who brought suit against
franchisor Doctor's Associates for breach of contract, fraud, and various business torts. Casarotto v.
Lombardi, 886 P.2d 931, 933 (1994). Plaintiff alleged, specifically, that whereas defendant had
promised him an exclusive right to run a Subway Sandwich Shop in Great Falls Montana, Defendant
subsequently allowed another franchisee to open a store at a more desirable location. Id. at 932-33.
When plaintiff brought suit in state court, defendants filed a motion to dismiss or stay judicial
proceedings pending arbitration, pointing to the arbitration clause contained at paragraph 10(c) on
page 9 of the franchise agreement. Id. at 933. Pursuant to the clause, arbitration would have taken
place in Connecticut, the headquarters state for Doctor's Associates. Id. Plaintiff Casarotto argued that
the clause was in violation of Montana law and thus invalid in that the first page of the contract failed
to provide him with notice ofthe arbitration clause contained within the contract. Id.
171. The sole dissenter, Justice Thomas, stated simply that he did not believe the FAA applied at
all to proceedings brought in state court. Doctor's Assocs., Inc. v. Casarotto, 116 S. Ct. 1652, 1657
(1996).
172. Id. at 1656. The court cited language from Southland, Perry, and Terminix to support its
conclusion that states may not regulate arbitration contracts more strictly than they would regulate
other contracts. Id. at 1656-47; see Terminix, 115 S. Ct. at 842-43; Perry, 482 U.S. at 492 n.9;
Southland, 465 U.S. at 10. However, in none of these decisions has the Court ever enunciated why a
state should not be particularly protective of parties' waiver of a constitutional right, as compared to
other more ordinary types of contracts. Cf Stemlight, supra note 11 (arguing that courts have failed
properly to apply Supreme Court's waiver decisions in arbitration context).
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arbitration at any cost, but rather to promote arbitration that is knowingly
selected by the parties. 7 3 Assuming the Court's decision in Doctor's
Associates is neither overturned by Congress 74 nor later reversed as
constitutionally misguided, 75 state legislatures will be permitted to protect
consumers and others from unfair binding arbitration clauses only to the
extent they regulate purely local transactions, or draft legislation that
addresses arbitration jointly with other concerns.'76
c. Eradication of Public Policy Exclusion
The Court began the third era by making further inroads on public policy
exclusions in the international context. Reiterating its conclusion in Scherk
173. The Montana Supreme Court's first ruling in the case is contained at 886 P.2d 931 (Mont.
1994). After the Supreme Court vacated and remanded the decision for reconsideration in light of
Terminix the Montana Supreme Court issued a second opinion again holding the Montana notice
provision was not preempted by the FAA. 901 P.2d 596 (Mont. 1995). It stated that "[t]he FAA
contains no express pre-emptive provision, nor does it reflect a congressional intent to occupy the
entire field of arbitration," 901 P.2d at 597-98 (quoting the prior decision, 886 P.2d at 938-39), and
that "[presumably... the... Court would not find it a threat to the policies of the Federal Arbitration
Act for a state to require that before arbitration agreements are enforceable, they must be entered
knowingly. To hold otherwise would be to infer that arbitration is so onerous as a means of dispute
resolution that it can only be foisted upon the uninformed." Id.
The Casarotto case is further complicated by the fact that the franchise agreement at issue
contained a "a choice of law" provision calling for the application of Connecticut law. Id. at 933.
Because Connecticut does not require particular notice be provided as to an arbitration clause
contained within a contract, defendants argued the Montana statute was irrelevant, as well as
preempted. Id. at 934. However, citing its own prior decision in Youngblood v. American States Ins.
Co., 866 P.2d 203, 205 (Mont. 1993), as well as the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS
§ 187(2) (1971), the Montana Supreme Court found that "this State's public policy will ultimately
determine whether choice of law provisions in contracts are 'effective."' 886 P.2d at 934. Looking to
the history of Montana's provision, the Montana court found Montana legislators had been extremely
concerned both that Montanans not waive their constitutional right to court access unknowingly, and
that Montanans not be required to arbitrate disputes at distant locations. Id. at 935. Upon noting that
the specific clause at issue would have required Casarotto to arbitrate all disputes, no matter how
small, in Connecticut, and that the costs of such travel would be expensive, id. at 935, and upon
further observing that the arbitration itself lacked procedural and evidentiary protections provided in
Montana, the Montana Supreme Court concluded that application of Connecticut law would violate
Montana public policy and thus voided that choice of law. Id. at 935.
174. See infra notes 385-411 and accompanying text.
175. See Sternlight, supra note 11.
176. The Court has implied, for example, that a state could permissibly prohibit all adhesive
contracts, even though it may not focus particularly on adhesive arbitration agreements. Termninix, 115
S. Ct. at 843. More realistically, perhaps a state could require certain notice as to all waivers of
constitutional rights, including but not limited to waivers of the right to jury trial. Or, the state might
require certain notice as to unexpected provisions contained in adhesion contracts. Counsel for
Casarotto asserted at oral argument that the Montana Supreme Court's decision could be justified
under this broad rule, but the Court concluded that in fact the lower court's decision was based entirely
on the narrow arbitration statute and thus prohibited. Doctor's Assocs., 116 S. Ct. at 1656 n.3.
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that international transactions should be treated differently,177 the Court in
Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth Inc.' held that even if
antitrust claims could not be arbitrated domestically,'79 they should be
arbitrable in the context of international transactions. "°
Although the Court purported to base its decisions in Scherk and
Mitsubishi Motors on the special nature of international transactions, the
Court subsequently used these decisions to cut back, if not eliminate, the
domestic public policy exception it had established in Wilko with respect to
Securities Act claims.' First, in Shearson/American Express, Inc. v.
McMahon,"8 2 the Court held that a consumer's claims against a brokerage
house brought under both section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of
193483 and the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act
('RICO") 184 were arbitrable. Refusing to extend Wilko to cover these
claims," 5 the McMahon Court reasoned that it had allowed arbitration of a
section 10(b) securities fraud claim in Scherk because "under the
circumstances of that case, arbitration was an adequate substitute for
adjudication as a means of enforcing the parties' statutory rights.' 8 6 The
Court then cited its Mitsubishi Motors decision to show that an agreement to
arbitrate is not a waiver of substantive rights8 7 and that arbitrators are fully
177. See Scherk v. Alberto-Culver, 417 U.S. 506,518-19 (1974).
178. 473 U.S. 614 (1985).
179. The Court chose not to reach the question of whether antitrust claims would be arbitrable if
brought in the domestic context. Id.
180. Noting that "federal policy applies with special force in the field of international commerce"
id. at 631, the Court stated, "[W]e conclude that concerns of international comity, respect for the
capacities of foreign and transnational tribunals, and sensitivity to the need of the international
commercial system for predictability in the resolution of disputes require that we enforce the parties'
agreement, even assuming that a contrary result would be forthcoming in a domestic context," id. at
629. The Court further explained that if international arbitration is to "take a central place in the
international legal order, national courts will need ... to subordinate domestic notions of arbitrability
to the international policy favoring commercial arbitration." Id. at 638-39 (citations omitted).
181. See Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427 (1953). The Court in Wilko had held claims brought under
section 12(2) of the Securities Act of 1934 were not arbitrable. See supra notes 49-54 and
accompanying text.
182. 482 U.S. 220 (1987).
183. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b)(1994).
184. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (1994).
185. McMahon, 482 U.S. at 238-42. Although McMahon did not overrule Wilko, it did state that
"the mistrust of arbitration that formed the basis for the Wilko opinion in 1953 is difficult to square
with the assessment of arbitration that has prevailed since that time." Id. at 233.
186. Id. at 229. The Court found that pursuant to Scherk"Wilko must be understood ... as holding
that the plaintiff's waiver of the 'right to select the judicial forum' was unenforceable only because
arbitration was judged inadequate to enforce the statutory rights created by section 12(2)." Id. at 228-
29 (quoting Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427,435 (1953)).
187. McMahon, 482 U.S. at 229-30 (discussing Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-
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capable of following the law and handling complex legal and factual
claims. 88
Two years later, in a 5-4 decision in Rodriguez de Quiyas v.
Shearson/American Express, Inc.,8 9 the Supreme Court took the final step
and overruled Wilko. 9 ' The Court held that because the securities customers,
now plaintiffs, had signed a customer agreement accepting arbitration, they
could not bring their section 12(2) fraud claims in court. 9 ' The majority
rejected Wilko because of its judicial hostility to arbitration. 92 Quoting Justice
Frankfurter's dissent in Wilko, the Court announced: "There is nothing in the
record before us, nor in the facts of which we can take judicial notice, to
indicate that the arbitral system.., would not afford the plaintiff the rights to
which he is entitled."' 93
Then, in the controversial decision of Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane
Corp., 94 the Court held that arbitration clauses must even be enforced to
prevent a plaintiff from bringing suit pursuant to the federal Age
Discrimination in Employment Act ("ADEA"). 95 Citing the Court's decision
Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614 (1985)).
188. McMahon, 482 U.S. at 232, 239. The Court similarly cited Scherk as holding that arbitrators
are fully capable of resolving section 10(b) claims. Id. at 232 (discussing Scherk v. Alberto-Culver,
417 U.S. 506 (1974)).
189. 490 U.S. 477 (1989). Plaintiffs in Rodriguez de Quifas were two individuals who had sued
the Shearson brokerage house and its broker-agent for unauthorized and fraudulent transactions. Id. at
478.
190. The Court overruled Wilko even though plaintiffs' facts were extremely sympathetic,
Plaintiffs were "a group of first-time investors that included widows, retirees, minors, and 'individuals
without the ability to understand English."' G. Richard Shell, Contracts in the Modern Supreme Court,
81 CAL. L. REV. 433, 459 (1993) (quoting Brief for Petitioners at 2, Rodriguez de Quyas, 490 U.S.
477 (1989) (No. 88-385)). Further, the broker was alleged to have concealed the arbitration clause
from the plaintiffs when he presented them with documents for their signature, Id. at 459-60.
Nonetheless, the Court found plaintiffs had made "no factual showing" to support a showing that the
agreement was adhesive. Rodriguez de Quyias, 490 U.S. at 484.
191. RodriquezdeQuias,490U.S. at483.
192. Id. at480.
193. Id. at 483 (quoting Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427, 439 (1953) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting)).
Referring back to its own analysis in McMahon, the Court explained that arbitrators are well capable of
deciding securities fraud disputes, particularly given the oversight role played by the Securities and
Exchange Commission. Id. at 483.
194. 500 U.S. 20(1991).
195. Id. at 30-33. Gilmer sued with respect to his discharge claiming violation of the ADEA, 29
U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1988). Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 23. Gilmer had worked as Manager of Financial
Services for Interstate/Johnson Lane. Pursuant to his employment, Gilmer registered with the New
York Stock Exchange ("NYSE"). Id. The application contained an arbitration provision, under which
Gilmer agreed to arbitrate any claims that the exchange rules required to be arbitrated. Id The NYSE,
in turn, had a rule that required arbitration of any employment disputes. Id.
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in Gardner-Denver,96 Mr. Gilmer argued that "compulsory arbitration of
ADEA claims pursuant to arbitration agreements would be inconsistent with
the statutory framework and purpose of the ADEA.'' 197 The Supreme Court
disagreed, finding that public policies can be vindicated in the arbitral
forum,' 9 that Mr. Gilmer would not be precluded from filing a charge of
discrimination with the EEOC,199 that the availability of arbitration provides
potential claimants with more options,2°° and that there was no showing that
the arbitration procedures would be inadequate in that particular case.2"' In
the wake of Gilmer, lower courts have issued numerous decisions holding
that employees may be held to have contracted to arbitrate their Title VII
claims as well. 02
Finally, in Vimar Seguros y Reaseguros, S.A. v. M/V Sky Reefer,"3 the
Court reversed a long-standing set of circuit court precedents to hold that
although the federal Carriage of Goods by Sea Act voids "[a]ny clause,
covenant, or agreement in a contract of carriage relieving the carrier or the
ship from liability for loss or damage ... or lessening such liability," 2°4 this
statutory provision should not render moot a contractual provision requiring
plaintiff to seek relief through Japanese arbitration.25 The Court found that
although plaintiff's transaction costs in bringing the claim might be
substantially increased by the requirement to bring the claim in Japan, such
196. Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36 (1974); see supra notes 83-95 and
accompanying text.
197. Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 27.
198. Id. at 28.
199. Id.
200. Id. at 29.
201. Id. at 30-32. The Court rejected Gilmer's assertion that the panels would be biased, that
discovery would be insufficient, that the unavailability of written arbitrators' awards would stifle
development of the law, or that the arbitrators would be unable to fashion equitable relief. Id.
202. See, e.g., Bender v. A.G. Edwards & Sons, Inc., 971 F.2d 698 (11th Cir. 1992); Mago v.
Shearson Lehman Hutton Inc., 956 F.2d 932 (9th Cir. 1992); Wilis v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 948
F.2d 305 (6th Cir. 1991); Alford v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 939 F.2d 229 (5th Cir. 1991);
DeGaetano v. Smith Barney, Inc., No. 95 Civ. 1613, 1996 WL 44226 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 5, 1996)
(requiring arbitration of Title VII claim by plaintiff securities analyst even though arbitration
agreement required plaintiff to waive substantive tights to attorney fees, injunctive relief, and punitive
damages).
203. 115 S. Ct. 2322 (1995).
204. 46 U.S.C. app. § 1303(8) (1994).
205. Sky Reefer, 115 S. Ct at 2326-30. As the Court observed, following Judge Friendly's
decision in Indussa Corp. v. S.S. Ranborg, 377 F.2d 200 (2d Cir. 1967) (en banc), the courts of appeals
without exception had invalidated foreign forum selection clauses under section 3(8) of the COGSA.
Sky Reefer, 115 S. Ct. at 2326. The Court further noted that "[a]s foreign arbitration clauses are but a
subset of foreign forum selection clauses in general, the Indussa holding has been extended to foreign
arbitration clauses as well." Id. (citations omitted).
19961
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increased costs would not constitute a "lessening of liability," as precluded by
statute.2°6 The Court further found it wrong to assume that the Japanese
arbitrators would not fairly apply the U.S. statute, observing that in any event
the district court would retain jurisdiction to review the finding of the
Japanese arbitrators at the award enforcement stage. 07
At this point the only remaining vestige of the public policy exception to
arbitration is the Gardner-Denver line of cases, holding that where a union
signs an employment contract containing a grievance provision, individual
employees may nonetheless file individual complaints in court.208 While the
Supreme Court has said Congress could explicitly preclude arbitration under
a specific federal statute,29 the Supreme Court has failed to so interpret any
statutes except the three labor statutes in the context of arbitration negotiated
by a union.210
3. Arbitration Is Just as Appropriate, IfNot More Appropriate, Than
Litigation for Most Disputes
In Mitsubishi Motors, the Court initially enunciated the myth that
arbitration is as appropriate for virtually all disputes as is litigation.21' It
stated:
By agreeing to arbitrate a statutory claim, a party does not forgo the
substantive rights afforded by the statute; it only submits to their
resolution in an arbitral, rather than a judicial, forum. It trades the
206. Sky Reefer, 115 S. Ct. at 2327-28 (citing Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute, 499 U.S. 585
(1991) (upholding a forum selection clause applied to a cruise passenger)).
207. Sy Reefer, 115 S. Ct. at 2329-30. However, as Justice Stevens pointed out in dissent, this
retention of jurisdiction provides only small comfort to the American distributor who, having spent
thousands of dollars to pursue a claim in Japan, would likely have to wait years to have even a chance
of reversing the arbitrators' award under the difficult appellate standard for vacating an arbitrator's
award. Id. at 2332-33.
208. See supra notes 83-95 and accompanying text.
209. E.g. Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 26 (1991) (noting that Congress
could preclude arbitration of claims under a particular statute).
210. Butsee Prudential Ins. Co. v. Lai, 42 F.3d 1299, 1304 (9th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct.
61 (1995) (holding that employees did not knowingly forego their statutory remedies under Title VII in
signing the securities registration form, and thus could not be required to arbitrate such claims);
Graham Oil Co. v. ARCO Prods. Co., 43 F.3d 1244 (9th Cir. 1994) (invalidating arbitration clause that
purported to waive longer statute of limitations, right to recover exemplary damages, and attorney fees
under federal Petroleum Marketing Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 2801-2841 (1994), on ground that such
waiver would be inconsistent with the Act).
211. Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 628 (1985).
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procedures and opportunity for review of the courtroom for the
simplicity, informality, and expedition of arbitration."
The Court also analyzed arbitrators' capabilities as decision makers in some
detail. It found that "potential complexity should not suffice to ward off
arbitration,"2 3 particularly because "adaptability and access to expertise are
hallmarks of arbitration."2 4 The Court also rejected the proposition that
arbitrators would tend to be biased.211 Finally, to the extent there are
differences between the arbitral and judicial fora, the Court observed that
parties may often be willing to forego the judicial remedies in order to keep
down costs. 21
6
The Court has repeated its Mitsubishi Motors analysis in many subsequent
contexts, including claims for securities fraud, RICO violations, and age
discrimination. In these cases, the Court has observed that arbitration, while
different, does not forego any substantive rights,2 7 that arbitrators can handle
complex legal, as well as factual, matters,21 ' and that arbitrators are not
inherently biased. 9 Significantly, the Court has not based these assertions on
any empirical data. Rather, the Court has simply announced its own opinion
that arbitrators are as capable as judges and thereby shifted the burden to a
party seeking to demonstrate the inferiority of arbitration. The Court's
analysis is also noteworthy for its failure to differentiate between contracts
involving two equally knowledgeable businesspeople, who agree to
arbitration to save litigation costs for all, and contracts used by a more
powerful party to inflict its will upon a weaker party.
212. Id
213. Id. at 633.
214. Id
215. Id. at 634.
216. Id. at 633. The Court further stated "so long as the prospective litigant effectively may
vindicate [his or her] statutory cause of action in the arbitral forum, the statute will continue to serve
both its remedial and deterrent function." Id. at 637.
217. Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 27-28 (1991); Rodriguez de Quijas v.
Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 481-83 (1989); Shearson/Am. Express, Inc. v. McMahon,
482 U.S. 220,229-30 (1987).
218. McMahon, 482 U.S. at 231-32.
219. Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 30-31; see also Vimar Seguros y Reaseguros, S.A. v. MV Sky Reefer,
115 S. Ct. 2322 (1995) (holding that contract of adhesion requiring fruit distributor to pursue
negligence claim against ship owner through arbitration brought in Japan does not violate Carriage of
Goods by Sea Act, 46 U.S.C. app. § 1303 (1994), by lessening liability under that statute).
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D. Conclusion
To sum up, the Court's current interpretation of the FAA is not supported
by the legislative history. Rather, the Court's preference for arbitration over
litigation, its conclusion that the FAA preempts all protective state legislation,
and its assurance that arbitration is just as fair a forum as litigation for
resolution of legal complaints are myths that the Court has expounded since
1983. However, the mere fact that the Court's conclusions are new does not
necessarily mean they are wrong as a matter of policy. Some would argue that
even though Congress in 1925 may not have intended the FAA to be
interpreted as it is currently, the modem interpretations are nonetheless
desirable."20 Viewed in a broader context, the Court's decisions in these cases
can be seen as expressing a law and economics philosophy favoring the
alienability of court access rights. 2 In the section which follows, however,
this Article demonstrates that none of the policy justifications that have been
offered support the Court's extreme advocacy of unregulable arbitration.
III. THE COURT'S PREFERENCE FOR BINDING ARBITRATION Is NOT
SUPPORTED BY LEGITIMATE POLICY ARGUMENTS
Four major policy arguments can be articulated in defense of a preference
for binding arbitration. First, some might propound a genuine or free will
freedom of contract argument, asserting that where all parties have knowingly
agreed to arbitrate the court should enforce that agreement.22 Second, some
contend that even if all parties have not knowingly agreed to binding
arbitration, they will nonetheless all benefit from the process because
arbitration will save all parties time and money. Third, some argue that even
though sellers might want to use the arbitration process to gain an advantage
over consumers, the operation of the market will prevent them from doing so,
and that arbitration will again benefit all. Fourth, some might contend that
even if a few parties are harmed by binding arbitration, the gains for society
220. See, e.g., Larry E. Ribstein, Choosing Law By Contract, 18 J. CORP. L. 245 (1993)
(defending private selection of arbitration as well as choice of law on law and economic grounds).
221. See Shell, supra note 190, at 458; Mullenix, Another Choice of Forum, supra note 118, at
296-97 ("the supremacy of contract law over long-established jurisdictional doctrines has significantly
eroded certain fundamental litigation rights").
222. I distinguish in this Article between what I call a genuine or pure freedom of contract
argument, which depends upon all parties having knowingly accepted the terms of a contract, and a
second argument which contends that even absent knowledge by all consumers, the free market will
protect their interests. Although some would also characterize this second argument as a freedom of
contract argument, to avoid confusion I will not do so.
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as a whole outweigh any such individual losses. This section discusses and
critiques each argument, showing that none justifies imposing unregulable
arbitration on nonconsenting consumers and other little guys.
A. A Preference for Binding Arbitration Is Not Justified by Genuine
Freedom of Contract
Advocates of binding arbitration have long argued that parties who prefer
this legal process over litigation should have the freedom to select binding
arbitration. 3 The Supreme Court particularly emphasized this freedom of
contract idea in some of the cases involving international business, explaining
that companies doing business abroad needed to be able to work out mutually
satisfactory ways of avoiding uncertainty and chaos in the international
context.224 The Court also echoed this freedom of contract theme in Volt,
Mastrobuono, and First Options, holding that parties should have the right to
choose to be governed by state rather than federal arbitration law, 5 to
determine the availability of punitive damages,226 and to decide whether
courts or arbitrators should interpret the arbitrability of a particular issue.227
The Court has expressed a similar philosophy in enforcing parties'
contractual choice of a particular litigation forum.22 Law and economics
devotees would argue that allowing parties to contract freely is preferable not
only because the contract provides certainty,2 2 9 but also because it allows
223. For example, the business forces who helped secure passage of the FAA emphasized their
own right to structure their business dealings. See generally MACNEIL, supra note 12, at 25-58
(discussing important role of Chamber of Commerce and other business interests in securing passage
of FAA and comparable state laws).
224. See Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 630 (1985)
(allowing arbitration of antitrust claim in international context given general presumption in favor of
freely negotiated choice of forum provisions and particular importance of that policy in international
context); Scherk v. Alberto-Culver, 417 U.S. 506 (1974) (applying binding arbitration agreement
between two companies involved in international business to resolve securities claim, even though
such a dispute might not have been arbitrable in a domestic context).
225. Volt Info. Sciences, Inc. v. Board of Trustees of Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 489 U.S. 468,
479 (1989) (alluding to "the FAA's primary purpose of ensuring that private agreements to arbitrate
are enforced according to their terms").
226. Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., 115 S. Ct. 1212, 1216 (1995).
227. First Options of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan, 115 S. Ct. 1920, 1923 (1995).
228. In M/S Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1 (1972), the Court took note of "ancient
concepts of freedom of contract," id. at 11, in holding that two international businesses, negotiating at
arm's length and absent "fraud, undue influence, or overweening bargaining power," id. at 12, should
be able to select their own forum, id. at 14-15. The Court observed that the agreement might not have
been enforceable had the parties chosen to resolve their local disputes in a remote alien forum, in
which case the remoteness might have suggested that the contract was adhesive in nature. Id. at 16.
229. See JOHN D. CALAMARI & JOSEPH M. PERILLO, THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 9-42 (3d ed.
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parties to act free of state constraint and will maximize the efficiency and
utility of society as a whole.230
While the pure freedom of contract rationale has some appeal as applied to
two entities engaging in an arm's length transaction, it cannot realistically be
used to justify imposing binding arbitration through contracts of adhesion on
unwitting consumers."3 Few, if any, would be foolish enough to argue that
most employees and consumers actually read and understand the form
contracts that they sign which commit them to binding arbitration.232 With
respect to arbitration agreements in particular, even a consumer who reads the
clause might well lack the legal sophistication to understand its significance,
perhaps not recognizing that appeals from arbitration are virtually unwinnable
and that little or no discovery may be made available in an arbitration
proceeding.233 Moreover, the very essence of form contracts is that they can
rarely, if ever, be renegotiated by the consumer.234 Thus, one cannot with a
1987).
230. Melvin A. Eisenberg, The Limits of Cognition and the Limits of Contract, 47 STAN. L. REV.
211, 211 (1995); Goldman, supra note 117, at 714-15; see also RICHARD POSNER, ECONOMIC
ANALYSIS OF LAW 10-11 (4th ed. 1992); Michael I. Meyerson, The Efficient Consumer Form
Contract: Law and Economics Meets the Real World, 24 GA. L. REV. 583, 623-25 (1990).
231. This Article uses the terms "form contract" and "contracts of adhesion" interchangeably to
describe contracts prepared in advance and offered to consumers on essentially a take-it-or-leave-it
basis. See 3 ARTHUR L. CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 559C (Supp. 1994) (noting that adhesion
contracts may be voided to prevent injustice to an innocent party); Goldman, supra note 117, at 701. I
characterize a contract as a contract of adhesion even if one or two key terms, such as color and price,
are subject to negotiation, where the contract contains many subordinate terms that are prepared in
advance and not subject to negotiation. See generally Todd D. Rakoff, Contracts of Adhesion: An
Essay in Reconstruction, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1173, 1176-80 (1983) (defining adhesion contracts and
arguing that adhesion contracts should be presumptively unenforceable); Friedrich Kessler, Contracts
ofAdhesion-Some Thoughts About Freedom to Contract, 43 COLUM. L. REv. 629, 637 (1943).
232. The Restatement (Second) of Contracts explicitly notes that "[a] party who makes regular use
of a standardized form of agreement does not ordinarily expect his customers to understand or even to
read the standard terms." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 211 cmt. b (1979); see also Alex
Y. Seita, Uncertainty and Contract Law, 46 U. PITT. L. REv. 75, 133 (1984). One author estimated in
1971 that 99% of all contracts were standard form agreements. David Slawson, Standard Form
Contracts and Democratic Control of Lawmaking Power, 84 HARV. L. REV. 529, 529 (1971). One
would assume that the percentage of form contracts has increased rather than decreased since 1971, as
our society has become more automated and complex. Cf. Patricia Sturdevant & Dwight Golann,
Should Binding Arbitration Clauses be Prohibited in Consumer Contract?, DISP. RESOL. MAO.,
Summer 1994, at4, 4 (asserting that consumers often do not have the vaguest idea of the consequences
of what they are signing when they "agree" to arbitration). Of course, consumers may be aware of the
content of certain key terms, such as price, but ignorant as to other more obscure provisions in the
contract. Rakoff, supra note 231, at 1177.
233. Eisenberg, supra note 230, at 241-43 (a rational form taker will typically choose to remain
ignorant of the terms because the verbal and legal obscurity of understanding form contract provisions
is exceptionally high, the probability of the clause becoming relevant is low, the cost of research
relative to the value of the contract is high, and the chances of negotiating a revision are low).
234. Goldman, supra note 117, at 717-18; Meyerson, supra note 230, at 599.
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straight face justify enforcement of form arbitration agreements imposed by
sellers on consumers on the ground that the consumers actually accepted the
contract with knowledge of those terms.
Indeed, the Supreme Court itself has recognized that a pure freedom of
contract rationale cannot be used to defend a contract imposed in an adhesive
situation. In Carnival Cruise Lines v. Shute 5 the Court was asked to
determine whether, by accepting a cruise ticket which, in the small print of a
three page document, required any claims to be brought in Florida, cruise
passengers had waived their right to bring a claim against the cruise line in
another forum. The Court without hesitation found that the rationale of MIS
Bremen, a previous forum selection case involving two companies, 6 was
inapplicable and that the passengers could not be assumed to have freely and
knowingly contracted for the forum selection clause. 37
B. A Preference for Binding Arbitration Is Not Justified by the Argument
that Binding Arbitration Is Necessarily Better for All Parties Involved
in the Transaction
Some advocates of binding arbitration argue that regardless of whether
consumers and other little guys know that they are agreeing to binding
arbitration, arbitration does in fact serve their best interests. In economic
terms, the argument is that binding arbitration is "Pareto optimal" as
compared to litigation, meaning that all parties are better off in binding
arbitration and none are worse off." Such advocates as former Chief Justice
235. 499 U.S. 585 (1990).
236. See supra notes 114-18 and accompanying text.
237. The Court stated:
In this context, it would be entirely unreasonable for us to assume that respondents--or any
other cruise passenger-would negotiate with petitioner the terms of a forum-selection clause
in an ordinary commercial cruise ticket. Common sense dictates that a ticket of this kind will
be a form contract the terms of which are not subject to negotiation, and that an individual
purchasing the ticket will not have bargaining parity with the cruise line.
Shute, 499 U.S. at 593. Nonetheless, while rejecting the freedom to contract rationale, the Court went
on to validate the forum selection clause in that the consumer had failed to show that it was
unreasonable or void as a contractual matter. Id. at 593-94. This conclusion has been sharply criticized.
See, e.g., Goldman, supra note 117; Linda S. Mullenix, Another Easy Case, Some More Bad Law:
Carnival Cruise Lines and Contractual Presumed Jurisdiction, 27 TEX. INT'L L.J. 323 (1992). But see
Ribstein, supra note 220. Solimine, supra note 118.
238. "Efficiency," in the sense used by economists, is a technical term. However, economists have
recognized that there are multiple potential definitions of efficiency. A system is "Pareto" efficient
where one party cannot be made better off without making another party worse off. A system is Pareto
inefficient where one or more parties could be made better off without making another party worse off.
See POSNER, supra note 230, at 11-15. Sometimes economists also use another definition of efficiency,
1996]
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Warren Burger claim, for example, that arbitration is quicker, cheaper, and
more final than litigation, and thus allows all of the parties to save on legal
fees and costs."P Some emphasize that because arbitration is cheaper, than
litigation, many persons who would not even be able to pursue a claim in
litigation will be able to arbitrate the claim.24 Arbitration advocates also
argue that the private and more conciliatory nature of arbitration may often
help all parties protect their reputations, maintain better morale, and protect
valuable working relationships.24' Moreover, quicker resolution of disputes
arguably allows all involved to get on to more productive uses of their time.
There are two major flaws with the argument that binding arbitration is
necessarily better for all parties. First, although most would agree that
arbitration can often be superior, as an empirical matter it is not clear that
binding arbitration is necessarily faster, cheaper, and otherwise better than
litigation. Unfortunately, most of the studies focusing on binding arbitration
have examined attitudinal responses rather than objective measures, and even
these show somewhat mixed results. Professor Thomas J. Stipanowich
surveyed some of these studies in 1988 and concluded that while participants
in commercial arbitration generally believed arbitration to be faster and
cheaper than litigation,242 many respondents disagreed.243 In particular,
Stipanowich found less satisfaction with the speed and cost of arbitration
relative to litigation as the size of the arbitration increased and as the
known as "Kaldor-Hicks" or "potential Pareto efficiency." Here, a situation is said to be efficient if the
benefit accrued by one party would permit that party to fully compensate the loser, even if this transfer
does not in fact take place. See id. at 13-14; see also Gregory S. Crespi, The Mid-Life Crisis of the Law
and Economics Movement: Confronting the Problems of Nonfalsiflability and Normative Bias, 67
NOTRE DAME L. REv. 231 (1991). Neither definition of efficiency speaks to distributional equities or
inequities in a system.
239. See, e.g., Burger, Isn't There a Better Way, supra note 126; see also Dwight Golann,
Developments in Consumer Financial Services Litigation, 43 Bus. LAW. 1081, 1091 (1988) (arguing
that arbitration is potentially faster, cheaper, and more private for all parties); Sturdevant & Golann,
supra note 232, at 5-6 (finding that a cheaper, quicker, more final justice system is better for all and
allows consumers who could not otherwise afford to sue to secure some relief).
240. E.g.. DUNLOP COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 30, at 25-26 (concluding that problems with
high cost and combative nature of litigation have led both employers and employees to seek
alternatives to litigation); Ann C. McGinley, Rethinking Civil Rights and Employment At Will: Toward
a Coherent National Discharge Policy, 57 OHIO ST. L.J. (forthcoming 1996) (proposing a federal 'just
cause" statute that would require employees to arbitrate disputes with employers while providing
various substantive and procedural safeguards).
241. See generally STEPHEN B. GOLDBERG ET AL., DISPUTE RESOLUTION: NEGOTIATION,
MEDIATION, AND OTHER PROCESSES 200 (2d ed. 1992) (discussing theoretical advantages of
arbitration over litigation).
242. Thomas J. Stipanowich, Rethinking American Arbitration, 63 IND. L.J. 425, 460 (1988).
243. Id. at 452-76.
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respondents gained more experience.2" The more objective studies performed
on court-attached arbitration also fail to show that arbitration is clearly better
than litigation.245 Dr. Deborah Hensler concluded: "The efficiency gains from
court-annexed arbitration... appear mixed: The fiscal savings to courts from
diverting cases from trial may be outweighed by the costs of running an
efficient ADR program, and savings in lawyer time are often modest and not
necessarily passed on to litigants through lower legal fees." '246
Second, even assuming for the sake of argument that arbitration is
cheaper, quicker, and even better for society as a whole, it may still not serve
the interests of all parties. Some could argue that a system of slavery would
be more efficient for society as a whole,247 but that certainly does not mean
that the system would be just or fair to the slaves. This Article asserts that any
social gains achieved by forcing binding arbitration on unknowing little guys
are outweighed by the distributional inequities and injustices also incurred.
Those who believe binding arbitration is better for everybody rarely seem
troubled by the fact that the arbitration may have been imposed on
unknowing consumers through form contracts. Rather, they argue that form
contracts are desirable because it is too costly for suppliers and consumers to
negotiate contracts on an individual basis.248 Form contracts are arguably
particularly desirable for consumer contracts, because the transaction involves
a "one-shot" rather than continuing relationship and the amount at stake is
relatively small. In this context it may make little sense for either party to
invest a great deal in negotiating individual contract terms.
2 49
244. Id. at 460,471-72. Respondents observed that scheduling difficulties often delayed resolution
of arbitrations. Id. at 461.
245. Of course, the success of court-attached arbitration, which is generally non-binding, is not
entirely relevant to assessing the success of binding arbitration.
246. Deborah R. Hensler, A Glass Hal/Full, A Glass Half Empty: The Use ofAlternative Dispute
Resolution in Mass Personal Injury Litigation, 73 TEX. L. REV. 1587, 1593 (1995) (noting, however,
that disputants felt their process concerns were better met through arbitration than in court); see also
Kim Dayton, The Myth ofAlternative Dispute Resolution in the Federal Courts, 76 IOWA L. REV. 889,
896 (1991) (finding that comparisons of federal districts that do and do not use ADR "conclusively
show that ADR has not resulted in speedier resolution of federal civil cases, has not reduced backlogs,
and has not affected the incidence of civil trials").
247. See ROBERT W. FOGEL & STANLEY L. ENGERMAN, TIME ON THE CROSS: THE ECONOMICS OF
AMERICAN NEGRO SLAVERY (1974) (arguing that slavery, while efficient, is not necessarily morally
acceptable).
248. See POSNER, supra note 230, at 114. They implicitiy argue that the default regime supplied
by litigation to enforce contractual obligations is prohibitively expensive. Ribstein, supra note 220; see
also Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 115 S. Ct. 834, 842 (1995) (arbitration is desirable
because it avoids the delay and expense of litigation).
249. See Meyerson, supra note 230, at 594-95 (arguing that form contracts may "benefit both
consumers and sellers by reducing the cost of negotiation and by limiting the time each party has to
19961
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Whether one employs common sense or the more technical language of
economists, it is clear that mandating binding arbitration in form contracts
does not necessarily serve the interests of consumers or other little guys. The
argument has three components: (1) procedural factors influence and
sometimes determine substantive outcomes; (2) the party that drafts an
agreement will try to draft it so as to achieve maximum advantage for itself,
which may well entail imposing disadvantage on the opposing party; and (3)
competition will neither prevent businesses from taking advantage of little
guys nor ensure that gains from lower liability exposure will be passed on to
the little guys.
1. Procedure Influences Substance
Every litigator knows that procedural rules affect substantive outcomes.
Litigators learn that judges' determinations on such matters as venue,
discovery, whether a matter may proceed as a class action, and whether a
claim should be dismissed on summary judgment will likely determine the
outcome of the case. Savvy litigators can use procedural tools to force
opponents to try a case in a hostile arena, to split up a claim so that it is no
longer economically viable, or to require opponents to try their case on a
piecemeal basis. In short, as Professor Purcell has argued with respect to
forum selection clauses, procedural mechanisms can be used as a "litigation
weapon.'
250
2. The Drafter of the Agreement Will Attempt to Draft the Procedures
to Take Advantage of its Opponent
The profit-maximizing company will attempt to draft a dispute resolution
contract so as to maximize its profits and minimize its losses. The company
will seek an agreement that will minimize the likelihood of having any claims
made against it at all. In addition, where claims are to be brought, the
company will attempt to minimize both its own transaction costs of engaging
in dispute resolution and the cost of the actual payout upon loss of a claim to
the consumer."
spend on bargaining").
250. Purcell, supra note 5, at 486-95 (arguing that forum selection clauses are a powerful litigation
weapon used by large-scale corporate defendants to decrease consumers' likelihood of success in their
substantive claims). See generally Mullenix, supra note 237, at 364-66 (discussing substantial burdens
placed on distant plaintiff).
251. In a study performed on five California banks by the Rand Institute for Civil Justice the
banks frankly admitted they had instituted arbitration to reduce the likelihood of large plaintiff
verdicts. ERIK MOLLER ET AL., PRIVATE DISPUTE RESOLUTION IN THE BANKING INDUSTRY 7-8, 11
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Advocates of binding arbitration emphasize the argument that binding
arbitration will reduce transaction costs for both businesses and consumers.
They note specifically that businesses seek a process that is quicker, cheaper,
more final and more expert 52 They urge that consumers, as well, are better
off with a quicker, cheaper system of justice. 53 Businesses also generally
prefer the greater privacy offered by arbitration to avoid publicity and to
protect trade secrets.2" Some might urge that privacy is also better for
consumers because it preserves relationships between the company and the
consumer.5
5
Few would deny that consumers would benefit from a quicker, cheaper
system of justice, all else being equal. However, all else is not equal. The
truth is that businesses opt for arbitration not only to reduce transactions costs
that may or may not accrue equally to consumers, but also to reduce their
payouts. Any reduction in payout is likely to come out of the pockets of the
consumers and other little guys who bring the claims. 56
(1993).
252. The House of Representatives stated:
The advantages of arbitration are many: it is usually cheaper and faster than litigation; it can
have simpler procedural and evidentiary rules; it normally minimizes hostility and is less
disruptive of ongoing and future business dealings among the parties; it is often more flexible
in regard to scheduling of times and places of hearings and discovery devices....
Terminix, 115 S. Ct. at 843 (quoting H.R. REP. No. 542, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 13 (1982)); see also
James L. Guill & Edward A. Slavin, Jr., Rush to Unfairness: The Downside ofADR, JUDGES' J.,
Summer 1989, at 8, 9 (noting that proponents of arbitration cite advantages of informality, lower cost,
speed, lack of publicity, and finality); Shields, supra note 3, at 49 (citing advantages of speed,
economy, finality, expertise, and privacy). However, not all agree that arbitration is necessarily quicker
or cheaper than arbitration. See Richard S. Bayer & Harlan S. Abrahams, The Trouble with
Arbitration, LITIG., Winter 1985, at 30; James Lyons, Arbitration, The Slower, More Expensive
Alternative, 7 AM. LAW., Jan.-Feb. 1985, at 107 (quoting AAA President Robert Coulson as stating
"People used to promote arbitration [for its speed, economy, and justice] ... like religious zealots....
I don't think any of those words are entirely accurate."); cf Engalla v. Permanente Med. Group, Inc.,
43 Cal. Rptr. 2d 621, 640 (Cal. Ct. App. 1995) (concluding that substantial evidence showed HMO
deliberately delayed appointment of a neutral arbitrator until after claimant's death).
253. E.g., Terminix, 115 S. Ct. at 842 (implying that consumers would benefit from arbitration as
much as businesses).
254. See ROBERT COULSON, BUSINESS ARBITRATION-WHAT YOU NEED TO KNOW 9-10 (3d ed.
1987) (discussing value of privacy as to trade secrets); Hugh R. Jones, Arbitration From the Viewpoint
of the Practicing Attorney: An Analysis ofArbitration Cases Decided by the New York State Court of
Appeals From January, 1973 to September, 1985, 14 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 523, 526 (1986) (praising
virtue of privacy as to fact of controversy and result).
255. See Joseph T. McLaughlin, Resolving Disputes in the Financial Community: Alternatives to
Litigation, 41 ARB. J. 16, 21 (1986).
256. Theoretically, a business's gains might come exclusively from the pocket of the consumer's
attorney, leaving the consumer's recovery untouched. In practice, however, as most plaintiffs'
attorneys work on a contingent fee basis, the lower recovery would hurt both the plaintiff and her
attorney.
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To understand how businesses use binding arbitration to reduce their
payout one must consider the nature of consumer and little guy claims against
businesses." Imagine that a consumer and a company have entered into a
contract in which the company agrees to provide banking or financial
services, medical care, or pest control. One can expect a certain number of
routine disputes to arise where the company accuses the consumer of failing
to pay for a service that has been provided. Where non-payment is the only
issue, the dispute will generally be settled relatively simply and expeditiously.
The consumer, by contrast, might want to bring a more complicated action for
damages, malpractice, or violation of a federal statute.25 Moreover, the
consumer is likely to be much more ignorant about the specifics of the dispute
than is the company providing the service or product.
Given this basic scenario, companies might use two interrelated
approaches to reduce their own payouts. First, the company might seek to
discourage or prevent the consumer from bringing any action at all. Second,
the company might directly attempt to limit its payout, assuming the
consumer does bring a claim.259
a. Discouraging Consumer Claims
The company might discourage the consumer from using the arbitration
remedy not only by reducing the consumer's expected recovery,26 as will be
discussed in the following section, but also by increasing the consumer's own
transaction costs. Such transaction costs may be increased in a variety of
ways. For example, the agreement might require the consumer to bring the
action in a distant forum, under laws different from those applicable in the
consumer's own jurisdiction, or even in a language foreign to the
consumer.26" ' If the consumer cannot afford to hire a distant lawyer or travel to
a distant location, the consumer may drop the claim.262 Studies have shown
257. Although, for simplicity, this section focuses on consumer claims, the same arguments
generally apply regarding claims by employees, franchisees and other little guys.
258. See Budnitz, supra note 3, at 309-18 (describing disputes that might likely arise between
consumers and financial institutions).
259. By minimizing payouts the company will also further discourage consumers from bringing
any claims. If consumers have a low expected value of success, they will not find it in their economic
interest to sue. Moreover, consumers who have a low likelihood of success will find it much more
difficult to retain lawyers to represent them.
260. A consumer's "expected recovery" is the product of her expected likelihood of success times
the expected value of her recovery if successful.
261. Supra notes 5,203-07 and accompanying text.
262. See Goldman, supra note 117, at 712 (noting that cost of transporting witnesses, hiring local
counsel, and attending trial in distant location make pursuit of legitimate consumer claims
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that some companies do methodically use distant forum selection clauses in
order to discourage individuals from bringing claims against them.263 Also,
the company might ensure that the consumer has to pay a substantial amount
for the arbitrator's time. As one lawyer noted, at least when one goes to court
the judge is free.2" Finally, the company might seek to prevent consumers
from joining together in a class action, thereby forcing each plaintiff to bear
the full burden of litigation costs on her own.265 Often, suits that cannot be
brought as a class action cannot economically be brought at all.266
b. Minimizing Payout on Claims That Are Brought
Second, the companies can be expected to structure the arbitration to
minimize their liability exposure if claims are brought. The company would
rationally seek to reduce the likelihood of a plaintiff victory and also to
decrease a plaintiff's recovery in the event of a verdict. One way defendants
can decrease a consumer's expected return is to prevent the consumer from
engaging in adequate discovery. Because the consumer will be more needful
of discovery than will the company, which maintains the relevant records and
has continuing access to the decision makers, even a seemingly neutral
impractical); Gorman, supra note 3, at 664 (arguing that private attorneys will be reluctant to handle
employment arbitration cases unless arbitrators award attorneys' fees in appropriate cases); Mullenix,
supra note 237, at 364-66 (discussing burdens of hiring local counsel, traveling to participate in a case,
and conducting discovery in a distant location); Purcell, supra note 5, at 446, 456 (noting that
geography may be used to increase costs and that contingent fee attorneys are less likely to take a case
as costs increase or likely payoffs decrease); cf Shields, supra note 3, at 52 (citing study showing 23
of 35 cases sent to arbitration by courts were dropped by the plaintiffs). A small study done by the
Rand Civil Institute of Justice tends to support this fear. It showed that after a California bank adopted
mandatory arbitration, substantially fewer consumers filed claims against that bank. MOLLER ET AL.,
supra note 25 1, at 21-23.
263. See Purcell, supra note 5, at 453-54.
264. Ellie Winninghoff, Consumers'Arbitration Risks Debated, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 24, 1994, at 37.
265. See MOLLER E" AL., supra note 251, at 6-9 (finding that California banks adopted arbitration
to avoid large verdicts and plaintiff class actions); Budnitz, supra note 3, at 286. Courts are split on
whether class actions can be pursued in arbitration. Compare Gammaro v. Thorp Consumer Discount
Co., 828 F. Supp. 673, 674-75 (D. Minn. 1993), appeal dismissed, 15 F.3d 93 (8th Cir. 1994) and
McCarthy v. Providential Corp., No. C 94-0627 FMS, 1994 WL 387852, at *9 (N.D. Cal. July 18,
1994) (refusing to permit class actions in arbitration) with Dickler v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc.,
596 A.2d 860, 864-67 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1991) and Izzi v. Mesquite Country Club, 231 Cal. Rptr. 315,
321 (Cal. Ct App. 1986) (allowing class actions in arbitration). See generally Note, Classwide
Arbitration: Efflcient Adjudication or Procedural Quagmire?, 67 VA. L. REV. 787, 800-01 (1981).
266. Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156 (1974), is a classic case. An estimated class of 6
million odd-lot traders, each of whom had blocks of less than 100 shares, brought claims for violations
of antitrust and securities laws. The Supreme Court's ruling that potential plaintiffs must receive
individualized notice, paid for by the class, effectively prevented plaintiffs from pursuing the litigation
either as a class or individually. See generally RICHARD L. MARCUS ET AL., CIVIL PROCEDURE: A
MODERN APPROACH 308-09 (2d ed. 1995).
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restriction on discovery will affect consumers adversely.267
Large companies will also attempt to select a decision maker likely to
decrease their likely payout. One of the company's chief goals in selecting
arbitration over litigation is generally to avoid a jury trial.268 Potential
defendants, like potential plaintiffs, believe juries will often be sympathetic to
the claims of a consumer against a large company.269 Beyond avoiding the
jury trial, the company will also seek an arbitrator or panel favorably disposed
toward the company. This does not mean that companies will select
arbitrators who are corrupt. The FAA provides that an arbitral award is to be
vacated where the arbitrator is actually biased.2 7' However, the company will
likely select arbitrators who are at least unconsciously biased toward the
company. Arbitration agreements frequently provide that the arbitrator shall
be a current or former manager from the company's field of business,27' and
courts have repeatedly held that mere selection of a former manager from a
particular industry is not evidence of bias.272 Although such an individual
may well do her best to decide the case fairly, she will probably be able to see
the company's position more easily than the little guy's position. 3 In
267. Budnitz, supra note 3, at 283-84; see Gorman, supra note 3, at 661-62 (emphasizing
importance of discovery for worker, who will typically possess far less access to workplace
information than will employer); cf. Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 31-32
(1991) (basing acceptance of mandatory arbitration of age discrimination claim in part on fact that
particular arbitration process provided for adequate discovery). As Professor Gorman notes, adequate
discovery is even more important for individual claimants than for those represented by a union in a
labor arbitration because the union will typically have secured a body of expertise about workplace
practices over the years, and will also have continued access to current employees. Gorman, supra note
3, at 661-62.
268. Sturdevant & Golann, supra note 232, at 5 ("Corporations often write arbitration clauses into
consumer contracts to avoid high litigation costs, inexpert judges, and, let's be candid, juries.").
269. Golann, supra note 239 (observing that consumers are disadvantaged in arbitration by the
loss of a jury).
270. 9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(2) (1994).
271. See, e.g., Bakri v. Continental Airlines, Inc., No. CV92-34876 SVW(K), 1992 WL 464125, at
*1 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 24, 1992) (requiring all hearing panel members to be company employees);
Broemmer v. Otto, 821 P.2d 204 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1991) (requiring arbitrator to be
obstetrician/gynecologist), rev'd, 840 P.2d 1013 (Ariz. 1992) (en banc); Ditto v. Re/Max Preferred
Properties, Inc., 861 P.2d 1000, 1001 (Okla. Ct. App. 1993) (arbitration to be heard by Re/Max
employees selected by manager). One law firm set up an internal dispute resolution process but
required that the arbitrators had to be partners from law firms with 50 or more lawyers. More Law
Firms SeekArbitration for Internal Disputes, WALL ST. J., Sept. 26, 1994, at B 13.
272. See, e.g., Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 30 (refusing to assume securities arbitrators will be biased).
273. See Dwight Golann, Taking ADR to the Bank: Arbitration and Mediation in Financial
Services Disputes, ARB. J., Dec. 1989, at 3, 6 (noting that arbitrators, steeped in industry customs
rather than in following legal rules, may wipe out a generation of protective consumer legislation). A
General Accounting Office report concluded that most arbitrators who decided employment
discrimination cases brought against the securities industry were white males with an average age of
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addition, arbitrators may be consciously or unconsciously influenced by the
fact that the company, rather than the consumer, is a potential source of repeat
business. 74 An arbitrator who issues a large punitive damages award against a
company may not get chosen again by that company or others who hear of
the award. Finally, even if the arbitrators are not biased, the consumer, likely
a "one-shot" player, will be less able to make an informed selection of
arbitrators than will the "repeat-player" company.275 Whereas companies can
afford to keep track of an arbitrator's record, individual consumers and
employees cannot. One empirical study has confirmed that employees recover
less in their claims against repeat-player companies, defined as companies
that use arbitration more than once in a year, than they do against non-repeat
players.2
76
Defendants will also attempt to reduce their payout by drafting the
arbitration agreement expressly to limit the arbitrator's right to award certain
damages. For example, the Supreme Court has held that parties may use an
arbitration agreement to prohibit the award of punitive damages,277 and
companies will sometimes write the arbitration agreement to prohibit such
damages.27 Courts have also held that parties may use an arbitration
agreement to alter substantive law by, for example, shortening a statute of
60. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, PUB. NO. GAO/HEHS-94-17, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION:
How REGISTERED REPRESENTATIVES FARE IN DISCRIMINATION DISPUTES 2 (1994). This may be true
even where arbitrators are drawn from outside a specific industry. For example, a sex discrimination
plaintiff has alleged that the AAA panels are biased against plaintiffs in that the vast majority of
arbitrators are white, male defense lawyers who primarily represent management. Margaret A. Jacobs,
Woman Claims Arbiters of Bias Are Biased, Too, WALL ST. J. Sept. 19, 1994, at B10. See generally
Linda Krieger, The Content of Our Categories: A Cognitive Bias Approach to Discrimination and
Equal Employment Opportunity, 47 STAN. L. REV. 1161 (1995) (focusing on cognitive antecedents to
unconscious discrimination); Charles R. Lawrence I1, The Id, the Ego and Equal Protection:
Reckoning with Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REV. 317 (1989) (discussing phenomenon of
unconscious discrimination and citing to psychology literature).
274. See Gorman, supra note 3, at 656; Guill & Slavin, supra note 252, at 11; see also Michael A.
Hiltzik & David R. Olmos, 'Kaiser Justice' System's Fairness is Questioned, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 30,
1995, at pt. A, 1, available in Westlaw, LATIMES database (because its arbitrations can make-up
nearly half of an active arbitrators' annual fees, arbitrators are afraid to issue decisions adverse to
Kaiser, which arbitrates approximately 700 claims per year in California).
275. Gorman, supra note 3, at 656; Guill & Slavin, supra note 252, at 9-10. See generally Marc
Galanter, Why the "Haves '" Come Out Ahead: Speculations on the Limits of Legal Change, 9 LAW &
SOC'Y REV. 95 (1974)(discussing multiple advantages of "repeat players" over "one shotters" in our
legal system).
276. Lisa B. Bingham, Employment Arbitration: The Effect of Repeat-Player Status, Employment
Category and Gender on Arbitration Outcomes (1996) (unpublished study, on file with author).
277. Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., 115 S. Ct. 1212 (1995).
278. MOLLER ET AL., supra note 251, at 13 (finding that banks opted for arbitration to avoid
punitive damages); Budnitz, supra note 3, at 285-86.
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limitations, eliminating a remedy, or even eliminating a cause of action.2 79 To
the extent defendants use arbitration to limit their own liability, they will, of
course, decrease plaintiffs' expected payout
The typical arbitral requirement of privacy can itself be viewed as a
substantive term that favors the company over the consumer. Where one party
wants publicity and the other party wants privacy, it is likely to be the
plaintiff/consumer who favors publicity, as a way of informing others of the
way in which she was harmed by an unethical broker, a negligent pest
exterminator, or a careless doctor. The consumer may also wish to set a
precedent to prevent the company from engaging in future similar
wrongdoing or to publicize wrongdoing by the company. Further, a
consumer's attorney often relies on public information gained from other
lawsuits to build her own claims of negligent or intentional misconduct.
Repeat-player companies can gain similar information through private
channels. Thus, by requiring private arbitration the company may again
deprive the consumer of certain relief she might have obtained through
litigation.280
Finally, having used the arbitration agreement to limit discovery, to pick
favorable decision makers, and to select favorable substantive law, the
company can consolidate these gains by depriving the consumer of a
significant opportunity to appeal. The appeal right is most important to the
party likely to have been disadvantaged in the original proceeding. Therefore,
the strict limit on appeals contained in the FAA and possibly enhanced in
private arbitration agreements also cuts against the consumer.
3. Competitive Market Forces Will Not Be Able to Prevent Businesses
from Gaining an Advantage over Consumers
Some defenders of mandatory binding arbitration, while recognizing that
businesses would perhaps like to use form contracts and binding arbitration to
benefit themselves at the expense of the consumer, argue that competitive
279. See, e.g., DeGaetano v. Smith Barney, Inc., No. 95 Civ. 1613 (DLC), 1996 WL 44226
(S.D.N.Y. Feb. 5, 1996) (upholding applicability of arbitration clause as applied to employment
discrimination claims, even though clause waived plaintiff's right to punitive damages, attorney fees,
and injunctive relief); cf Graham Oil Co. v. ARCO Prods. Co., 43 F.3d 1244 (9th Cir. 1994) (refusing
to enforce arbitration agreement because waiver of longer statute of limitations, attorney fees, and
punitive damages was inconsistent with federal law under which claim was brought), cert. denied, 116
S. Ct. 275 (1995).
280. Budnitz, supra note 3, at 312-13 (arguing that lack of public filings will prevent consumer
protection agencies from doing their jobs and will also prevent other members of the public from
hearing of the danger alleged in the lawsuit).
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market forces will prevent companies from achieving those goals. These free
marketeers argue that if the terms of consumer contracts were in fact unduly
and inefficiently biased toward the supplier, then other suppliers, in order to
benefit themselves, would step in and offer a contractual provision that
treated the consumer more generously."' The free marketeers further contend
that the market will ensure that any benefits secured by the suppliers through
imposition of an arbitration provision will be passed on to the consumers.282
Thus, if mandatory arbitration provisions are common in form contracts, it is
because the greater speed and lower cost of arbitration benefits all parties and
is therefore efficient and preferable." 3
Although the Supreme Court has not explicitly applied this market
analysis to binding arbitration provisions, it has used a similar economic
analysis to justify enforcement of a forum selection clause in a consumer
form contract. In Carnival Cruise Lines,2" the Court held that a forum
selection clause buried within a three page, single-spaced ticket for a trip on a
cruise ship was enforceable even though there was no showing that the
passengers had read or understood the clause, and even though the court of
appeals had concluded that the clause would effectively deny the consumers
their day in court.285 The Court proclaimed that the clause was justifiable
281. See Meyerson, supra note 230, at 594-95 (presenting argument that even where form
contracts are used, resources will be distributed efficiently). See generally Posner, supra note 230, at
11-12 (asserting that absent barriers to free flow of resources, prices will fall to ensure zero profits).
282. For example, assume that the price of a widget, absent an arbitration clause, would be $1000.
Assume further that the seller's cost would fall by $50 per widget if the seller included a binding
arbitration clause in the sales contract. If the average cost imposed by the binding arbitration clause on
the consumer is less than $50, then the seller would reduce the price from $1000 to $950 and both
parties would be better off. On the other hand, if the cost to the consumer of imposition of the clause
exceeded $50, then the seller would sell the widget for $1000 and leave out the binding arbitration
clause. The free market will ensure that the savings are passed along and that the cost is born by the
party best able to bear that cost. Goldman, supra note 117, at 714-15 (critiquing the argument). Free
market advocates further argue that there will be competition as to a non-price term even where the
market is noncompetitive. POSNER,supra note 230, at 278-79; Goldman, supra note 117, at 715.
283. Sturdevant & Golann, supra note 232, at 5-6 (arguing that consumers, as well as companies,
are better off with arbitration). Professor Golarm attempts to counter the argument that if arbitration
were so wonderful for all concerned, then mandatory clauses would not be necessary. He argues
essentially that lack of information and lawyer self-interest will often prevent parties from selecting
arbitration after a dispute has already arisen, even though such arbitration would be mutually
beneficial. Id. at 6.
284. Carnival Cruise Lines v. Shute, 499 U.S. 585 (1991).
285. Id. at 589-90. The Shutes, residents of Washington, had purchased cruise tickets to sail from
Los Angeles to Puerto Vallarta, Mexico. Mrs. Shute suffered an injury on board the ship and
subsequently filed suit in Washington. Id. at 587-88. Although the Ninth Circuit had upheld
jurisdiction in Washington, the Supreme Court reversed, concluding the Shutes were bound by the
forum selection clause designation of Florida that was contained on the ticket. Id. at 589.
Washington University Open Scholarship
WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY
because the savings it generated for the cruise ship would have been passed
on to the consumers.286 In light of the fact that the Court has called arbitration
clauses a type of forum selection clause," 7 it seems likely that the Court
would use the same efficiency analysis to justify imposition of a form
arbitration clause.
This story of "free market to the rescue" is significantly flawed in that it
rests on a set of assumptions that cannot be shown to exist.288 Most
importantly, the competitive defense of form contracts depends on an
assumption that consumers read, understand, and evaluate the cost of the
binding arbitration clause being imposed by the seller.289 Instead, it seems
generally true that while consumers may be well informed about certain key
contractual terms, such as price or color or engine size, they generally know
very little about the subordinate contract terms, commonly known as
"boilerplate.""29 If the consumer is not aware of the existence or significance
286. Id. at 594. The Court stated:
[A] clause establishing ex ante the forum for dispute resolution has the salutary effect of
dispelling any confusion about where suits arising from the contract must be brought and
defended, sparing litigants the time and expense of pretrial motions to determine the correct
forum and conserving judicial resources that otherwise would be devoted to deciding those
motions. Finally, it stands to reason that passengers who purchase tickets containing a forum
clause like that at issue in this case benefit in the form of reduced fares reflecting the savings
that the cruise line enjoys by limiting the fora in which it may be sued.
Id. at 593-94 (citation omitted). Professor Mullenix notes the irony of the contrast between the Court's
willingness to make a sweeping empirical assumption regarding the extent to which costs would be
passed on, as compared to its refisal to accept the Ninth Circuit's conclusion that Mrs. Shute would be
seriously inconvenienced if compelled to litigate her case in Florida. Mullenix, supra note 237, at 343-
44.
287. Scherk v. Alberto-Culver, 417 U.S. 506, 519 (1974) ("An agreement to arbitrate ... is, in
effect, a specialized kind of forum-selection clause that posits not only the situs of suit but also the
procedure to be used in resolving the dispute."); Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth,
Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 630 (1985).
288. See generally Goldman, supra note 117 (critiquing free market defense of forum selection
clauses, but observing that arbitration clauses may be more defensible); Meyerson, supra note 230
(critiquing free market defense of forum selection clauses for failing to recognize use of geography as
litigation weapon). The free marketeers do not adequately take account of the fact that information is
costly and transaction costs are high. As one commentator put it: "Without empirical support,
efficiency is in the eye of the beholder." Shell, supra note 190, at 519.
289. Unless consumers read and understand the clauses, they cannot choose the product that truly
maximizes their utility, nor can competitors successfully market a better product. See Eisenberg, supra
note 230, at 242 (rational consumer will remain ignorant as to terms of form). This problem of
asymetrical information is a variant of the "lemons problem" discussed in George A. Akerlof, The
Market For "Lemons": Quality, Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism, 84 Q.1 ECON. 488 (1970);
see also Walter Kamiat, Labor and Lemons: Effcient Norms in the Internal Labor Market and the
Possible Failures of Individual Contracting, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1953 (1996) (applying "lemons"
concept to explain absence of "just cause" contracts in non-union workplace).
290. Meyerson, supra note 230, at 595; Rakoff, supra note 231, at 1179. Several empirical studies
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of the clause, the supplier is free to impose a term that benefits the supplier
but significantly harms the consumer.29' In fact, economists generally
recognize that where one party lacks information as to the cost of a non-price
term in a contract, there will be two inefficiencies: a quantity effect and a
quality effect.292 The quantity effect will cause the consumer to purchase too
much of the item because she will not recognize its full cost.293 The quality
effect will cause the parties to enter into the wrong contract-one containing
a binding arbitration clause-even in circumstances where a fully
knowledgeable consumer would have refused to accept such an agreement.294
Further, one cannot fairly argue that the consumer made the deliberate
choice to forego reading the contract and thus may rightly be penalized.
Given the high cost of obtaining and understanding information in a complex
economy, the consumer's behavior may reflect rational economic behavior.
Specifically, the marginal cost of obtaining information about a particular
contractual clause may exceed the expected marginal benefit from such
information.295 To obtain such information the consumer would not only have
to read the fine print, but would also likely have to obtain legal advice to
assist her in understanding its significance.296 Given her limited knowledge
also show that consumers rarely read and understand form contracts. See, e.g., Stewart Macaulay, Non-
Contractual Relations in Business: A Preliminary Study, 28 AM. SOC. REV. 55, 59 (1963) (study
involved business persons); William C. Whitford, Strict Products Liability and the Automobile
Industry: Much Ado About Nothing, 1968 WIS. L. REV. 83, 143-53 (study ofautomobile consumers).
291. Given the consumer's inability to evaluate the cost of the risk, the seller would be irrational
not to shift as many such costs as possible to the consumer. Meyerson, supra note 230, at 605-06;
Eisenberg, supra note 230, at 242 (rational form giver will spend a significant amount of time and
money ensuring that form contract, which will be used repeatedly, is maximally advantageous).
Consistent with this view, Allen Farnsworth, Reporter for the Restatement (Second) of Contracts noted
that in his personal experience "no one in any of the corporations or in the law firm ever suggested that
the forms should be drafted other than as one-sidedly in the interests of the corporate client as
possible." Allen Farnsworth, On Trying to Keep One's Promises: The Duty of Best Efforts in Contract
Law, 46 U. PIn. L. REv. 1, 44 (1984).
292. See generally POSNER, supra note 230, at 180-82 (contending that information asymmetry
explains need for strict liability with respect to defective products); Allen Schwartz, Proposals for
Products Liability Reform: A Theoretical Synthesis, 97 YALE L.J. 353, 358 (1988) (discussing
significance of misinformation in context of product liability); Steven Shavell, Strict Liability Versus
Negligence, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 5 (1980).
293. See Goldman, supra note 117, at 718.
294. See id.
295. See also Melvin A. Eisenberg, The Structure of Corporation Law, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1461,
1474 (1989) (concluding that for many shareholders the cost of reading and understanding proposals
will exceed the benefits); Robert Ellickson, Of Coase and Cattle: Dispute Resolution Among
Neighbors in Shasta County, 38 STAN. L. REv. 623, 667-68 (1986) (observing that people lack perfect
legal knowledge due to both cost of legal research and limits of human cognitive capacity). See
generally Eisenberg, supra note 230.
296. Goldman, supra note 117, at 717; Meyerson, supra note 230, at 598-99. Nor will the
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and her hope that she will not need to sue the seller,297 and also recognizing
the difficulty of finding or negotiating an alternative clause in any event,298
the rational consumer will not attempt to comprehend most form contractual
terms. 
2 99
The free market advocates have responded to this lack of information with
several arguments, none of which is convincing." According to the
consumer necessarily realize that she ought to obtain legal advice. For example, prior to the Supreme
Court's decision in Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., 115 S. Ct. 1212 (1995), several
courts had held that where a form contract simply provided that New York choice of law applied, the
contract should be interpreted to prohibit the arbitrator from awarding any punitive damages. See
Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., 20 F.3d 713 (7th Cir. 1994), rev'd, 115 S. Ct. 1212
(1995); Barbier v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., 948 F.2d 117 (2d Cir. 1991). Few consumers could
have anticipated this interpretation; thus, few would have recognized a need to seek legal advice to
ensure the availability of punitive damages. Cf Mastrobuono, 115 S. Ct. 1212 (interpreting ambiguous
contract in favor of consumer).
297. This effect is amplified by psychologists' insights into individuals' behavior, demonstrating
that individuals are not always the rational profit maximizers economists like to assume. Rather,
individuals view risk of prospective gain differently than they view risk of prospective loss. In general,
they are willing to gamble more on a prospective loss, and seek a surer thing with respect to gains.
Eisenberg, supra note 230, at 217 (decisionmaker's preference between two options depends how
issue is framed); Richard L. Hasen, Comment, Efficiency Under Informational Asymmetry: The Effect
of Framing on Legal Rules, 38 UCLA L. REV. 391, 396 (1990). Thus, individuals might well take an
irrational gamble that they would not need to sue a seller anyway and thus need not concern
themselves with the terms of a binding arbitration clause.
298. See Goldman, supra note 117, at 717-18.
299. I myself, for example, recently received a mailing from my bank. The mailing consisted of
two items: a glossy color brochure, designed to encourage customers to think seriously about applying
for a loan; and a small black and white sheet with tiny print. If one actually took the trouble to read the
sheet (as I never would have done had I not been writing this Article), one found in the seventh
paragraph on page two in very small print a clause stating:
If either you or we have any unresolvable dispute or claim concerning your account, it will be
resolved by binding arbitration under the expedited procedures of the Commercial Financial
Disputes Arbitration Rules of the American Arbitration Association (AAA) and Title 9 of the
US Code. Arbitration hearings will be held in the city where the dispute occurred or where
mutually agreed to. A single arbitrator will be appointed by the AAA and will be a retired
judge or attorney with experience or knowledge in banking transactions. The arbitrator will
award the filing and arbitrator fees to the prevailing party. A judgment on the award may be
entered by a court.
(Information on file with author). Although the clause is not as egregious as it might be, I would have
preferred to retain my option to take the bank to court. Nonetheless, I have not yet taken the time to
determine whether other local banks do not require arbitration, nor to switch my account to such an
institution. Most consumers are probably not aware of the many arbitration clauses to which they are
already a party with respect to insurance, banking, credit cards, health care, and pest extermination
services. Few would take the time to look for such clauses and fewer would seek legal advice. Cf.
Catherine L. Fisk, Lochner Redux: The Renaissance of Laissez-Faire Contract in the Federal Common
Law Benefits, 56 OHIO ST. L.J. 153, 198 n.169 (1995) (describing authors' own attempt to learn about,
much less negotiate, the terms of her benefit package prior to accepting a new position).
300. See generally Edward Brunet, Arbitration and Constitutional Rights, 71 N.C. L. REV. 81,
105-07 (1992) (concluding that arbitration clause is not necessarily efficient given lack of perfect
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"knowledgeable minority" defense, even though many consumers do not read
form contracts, enough consumers do read such contracts and evaluate the
advantages and disadvantages of their respective terms to ensure that
suppliers will not be able to inflict unfair terms.3"' If a supplier did try to
impose a detrimental arbitration clause without lowering its price sufficiently
to make the clause acceptable to a knowledgeable consumer, the portion of
consumers who read such clauses would notice the detrimental provision and
either insist on its being changed or switch to another supplier." 2
There are several flaws to this Pollyannaish defense. First, it seems likely
that the "knowledgeable minority" is an extremely small minority. Arbitration
clauses are often buried in seemingly insignificant places, camouflaged as
insignificant junk mail, written in very small print, and written in technical
terms not likely to be meaningful to most.30 3 If the knowledgeable minority is
sufficiently small, the supplier may well make enough money from taking
advantage of the majority to more than justify losing the minority's
business.3" Further, if the seller is in a position to be able to discriminate as to
contractual terms between consumers, the seller could satisfy the well-
informed consumers while still imposing a binding arbitration clause on the
other more ignorant consumers.0 5 In addition, because different consumers
information, significant transaction costs, and lack of real competition); Shell, supra note 190, at 511
(arguing that "the Court quietly ignores the degree of misinformation and institutional
unresponsiveness ... in the real world"); see also Purcell, supra note 5, at 486-95 (arguing that forum
selection clauses are not mutually advantageous but rather benefit company and disadvantage
consumer).
301. Goldman, supra note 117, at 716: Meyerson, supra note 230, at 601; Allen Schwartz & Louis
L. Wilde, Intervening in Markets on the Basis of Imperfect Information: A Legal and Economic
Analysis, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 630, 652-55 (1979).
302. Meyerson, supra note 230, at 601. Alternatively, such consumers might purchase first party
insurance to cover their potential losses.
303. For example, many employees in positions related to the securities industry have been
required to participate in arbitration even though they never signed an arbitration clause explicitly
covering their claim. See, e.g., Armijo v. Hourigan, 72 F.3d 793 (10th Cir. 1995) (requiring insurance
company employees to arbitrate discrimination claims against their employer because, in order to
qualify to sell mutual funds, they had signed a U-4 Form stating that they would arbitrate disputes as
required under the by-laws of any organizations with which they registered). Similarly, the arbitration
provision contained in the form sent to me by my own bank was buried in paragraph 7 on the back of a
document in small print. See supra note 299. In Casarotto the arbitration clause appeared on page 9 of
a multi-page franchise agreement. Casaratto v. Lombardi, 886 P.2d 931,932 (Mont. 1994).
304. One set of researchers suggested that if one third of the consumers in a market comparison
shop, by reading contract terms and investigating alternatives, the market will behave competitively.
Schwartz & Wilde, supra note 301, at 652-55. However, even assuming this is true, it is quite unlikely
that such a large proportion of consumers read and understand their form contracts, much less that they
actively investigate alternatives. Eisenberg, supra note 230, at 243-44.
305. Goldman, supra note 117, at 716. See generally George L. Priest, A Theory of the Consumer
Product Warranty, 90 YALE L.J. 1297, 1346-47 (1981); Schwartz & Wilde, supra note 301. The
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have different tastes for risk and other features, a knowledgeable minority
cannot necessarily look out for the interests of the majority.30 6
The free marketeers may also seek to counter the fact that consumers lack
knowledge with the argument that sellers will use advertising to educate the
consumers. Some economists argue that where one seller seeks to gain a
competitive advantage by lowering quality in order to lower price, the
underpriced seller will expose the tactic through advertising.3 7 The problem
with this argument is that, realistically, no seller is likely to call attention to
possible problems with its own product by telling consumers that "if it
explodes you can sue us in court, not just through an arbitration." In other
words, by publicizing the risks relevant to the arbitration clause the seller
might well cause sales as a whole to plummet.30 8 Moreover, sellers may be
reluctant to expend a significant portion of their advertising budget on
subordinate terms when they could likely achieve greater inroads by focusing
on terms more likely to influence consumer choice.0 9 Furthermore, the free
marketeers ignore the fact that in many industries barriers to entry have
apparently discouraged new suppliers from joining the industry, and that all
the suppliers in the industry may well employ essentially the same arbitration
clause.31 0
In addition to the flaws of lack of information, transaction costs, and
barriers to entry outlined above, the free market advocates must also confront
a growing literature demonstrating that individuals may be quite far from the
rational profit maximizers economists like to hypothesize. Professor Robert
Ellickson, in particular, has recently done some pathbreaking work showing
availability of low-cost insurance to protect those consumers who are knowledgeable about the risk of
having to arbitrate may support the supplier's attempt to discriminate between knowledgeable and
ignorant consumers.
306. See generally Hasen, supra note 297 (discussing effect of different individuals' preferences
for or aversions to risk on structuring of legal rules).
307. Ronald Coase, The Choice of the Institutional Framework: A Comment, 17 J.L. & ECON.
493, 495 (1995) (asserting that a firm whose competitor lowers price by lowering quality has a strong
incentive to advertise); Meyerson, supra note 230, at 601-02.
308. See Goldman, supra note 117, at 718-19; Meyerson, supra note 230, at 601-02. Rather, as
Professor Eisenberg notes, an increase in advertising is likely to degrade the quality of form contracts
in that advertisers will focus on the highly visible characteristics such as price that are most easily
conveyed to consumers. Eisenberg, supra note 230, at 244.
309. See Goldman, supra note 117, at 718-19. In addition, the seller who seeks to advertise may
face "free rider" problems, in the form of other competitors who would also benefit. Further, a very
substantial amount of advertising might be needed to overcome consumer confusion. Id. at 719.
310. See Purcell, supra note 5, at 492-93 (arguing that even when a particular industry is generally
competitive, the industry may well act uniformly as to certain contractual provisions such as arbitration
clauses).
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that policymakers must consider culture and human frailties, as well as self-
interest, in developing legal rules and policies."' If consumers do not act
rationally, one cannot assume that their actions will ensure efficient operation
of the market.
In sum, because the market for most consumer goods differs substantially
from the perfectly competitive, perfect information, zero transaction cost
market envisioned by some economists, there is little or no reason to believe
that market forces will prevent sellers from using arbitration clauses to take
unfair advantage of consumers and other little guys. Rather, given the high
cost of information and consumers' behavior with respect to risk, it appears
that failing to regulate the market with respect to arbitration clauses is likely
to lead to an inefficient result that benefits those who impose form arbitration
agreements. 31
2
C. No Net Societal Gains Attributable to the Imposition ofBinding
Arbitration Justify Imposing Costs on Individual Consumers
Some advocates of binding arbitration argue that even if such arbitration is
not actually better for every party, it is better for most, better for society as a
whole, and justifiable on that basis.313 Such advocates contend that if more
cases are resolved through binding arbitration, society as a whole will need to
spend less money on judges, court staff, legal fees, and law schools.314 The
advocates of binding arbitration might also assert that arbitration improves
social productivity by bettering long-term relationships between disputants,
and by encouraging more cases to settle quickly and amicably.315 Finally, they
might argue that because arbitration is often cheaper than litigation, imposing
binding arbitration would allow some persons to pursue a claim who could
not otherwise afford to do so.
316
There are several weaknesses in this societal benefit argument. First, once
all of the relevant factors are considered, it is not clear that binding arbitration
311. See ROBERT C. ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW (1991); Robert C. Ellickson, Bringing
Culture and Human Frailty to Rational Actors: A Critique of Classical Law and Economics, 65 CHI.-
KENT L. REv. 23 (1989).
312. See supra notes 271-311 and accompanying text.
313. In economic terms, the argument is that binding arbitration is efficient in the "Kaldor-Hicks"
sense, in that the benefits secured by society as a whole outweigh the detriments imposed on particular
individuals. The utility of society as a whole is therefore maximized. See POSNER, supra note 230, at
13-14.
314. See, e.g., id.; Golann, supra note 239; Goldman, supra note 117.
315. See, e.g., GOLDBERG ETAL., supra note 241.
316. E.g., McGinley, supra note 240 (arguing for arbitration in employment context).
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is preferable for society as a whole. Second, even if binding arbitration were
clearly better for society as a whole, it is not necessarily fair to force some
persons to resolve their disputes in a less favorable forum in order to benefit
other persons.3 7
1. Mandatory Binding Arbitration Is Not Plainly Better for Society as
a Whole
To assess the comparative societal values of binding arbitration and
litigation one must analyze both the costs and benefits of the two altematives.
From a cost standpoint, not everyone would agree that binding arbitration is
cheaper and quicker than litigation. As arbitrations become more complex
they become more like litigation and just as expensive.318 Further, even to the
extent one can show that resolving a case through arbitration is cheaper than
resolving the case through trial, the fact is that most claims never make it to
trial.3"9 To the extent that parties choose to take a case to arbitration that either
would not have been litigated or would have settled quickly had it been
litigated, arbitration may actually increase societal costs.32°
Nor is it necessarily true that there would be more widespread access to
justice if all claims were resolved through binding arbitration rather than
through litigation. On the contrary, the authors of arbitration agreements enter
into binding arbitration agreements in order to pay out less money in
arbitration than they would have paid out in litigation. As discussed earlier,
suppliers are often able to control arbitration sufficiently to prevent many
317. See generally JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971) (arguing that individuals are
entitled to certain minimum rights of which they cannot be deprived even to secure a greater advantage
for others).
318. See generally Dayton, supra note 246, at 896 (assessing empirical studies as showing that
ADR used in federal courts "has not resulted in speedier resolution of federal civil cases, has not
reduced backlogs, and has not affected the incidence of civil trials"); Deborah R. Hensler, Does ADR
Really Save Money? The Jury's Still Out, NAT'L LAW J., Apr. 11, 1994, at C2; Lyons, supra note 252;
Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Pursuing Settlement in an Adversary Culture: A Tale of Innovation Co-Opted
or "The Law ofADR ", 19 FLA. ST. L. REV. 1 (1991) (discussing increasingly adversarial and legal
nature of ADR).
319. RICHARD L. MARCUS ET AL., CML PROCEDURE: A MODERN APPROACH, 102-04 (2d ed.
1995) (observing that most legal claims are not litigated, and that only 3% of litigated claims are
actually tried).
320. See Hensler, supra note 318, at C2. Moreover, where an arbitration requires resolution of a
dispute by a panel of private arbitrators, some parties have found that the scheduling difficulties that
arise actually make it more costly and time consuming to resolve a matter through arbitration than it
would have been before ajudge. Engalla v. Permanente Medical Group, Inc., 43 Cal. Rptr. 2d 621, 629
(CL App. 1995) (on average it takes 863 days to reach a hearing in a Kaiser arbitration); see also
Hiltzik & Olmos, supra note 274, at 1 (discussing how HMO deliberately delays in selecting
arbitrators in order to slow arbitration process).
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persons from either bringing or winning arbitration claims." At least absent
regulation there seems to be no valid reason to assume that consumers as a
whole will do better in arbitration than in litigation, and the seller's preference
for arbitration suggests that the seller does better.
Even if binding arbitration were clearly cheaper than litigation, many
would argue that the benefits society gains through avoiding litigation are not
sufficiently great to justify the additional expense. Arbitration may not
provide certain public goods that are provided by litigation. 22 For example,
Professor Owen Fiss, Professor Judith Resnik, and Judge Harry Edwards
argue that our existing system of justice serves a public purpose.3" By closing
off access to proceedings, eliminating judicial precedent, and allowing parties
to write their own laws, we compromise society's role in setting the terms of
justice.324 Ironically, the privacy of arbitration results may actually make it
less likely that other cases will settle3 25 The lack of publicity may be
particularly detrimental in the context of consumer claims because one set of
consumers will not be able to learn from the misfortunes of others.326
321. See supra notes 251-80 and accompanying text.
322. See generally Guill & Slavin, supra note 252, at 8-9 ("[Certain forms of private judging
dispense with many of the most cherished and carefully developed features of our public system: open
proceedings, written decisions, appellate review, and the evolution of the common law."); Edward
Brunet, Questioning the Quality ofAlternate Dispute Resolution, 62 TUL. L. REV. 1, 8 (1987). But see
Leo Kanowitz, Alternative Dispute Resolution and the Public Interest: The Arbitration Experience, 38
HASTINGS L.J. 239, 303 (1987) (asserting that arbitration is an effective method for addressing large
public policy issues).
323. Harry T. Edwards, Alternative Dispute Resolution: Panacea or Anathema?, 99 HARV. L.
REV. 669 (1986); Judith Resnik, Many Doors? Closing Doors? Alternative Dispute Resolution and
Adjudication, 10 OHIO ST. J. ON DISp. RESOL. 211 (1995); Owen M. Fiss, Comment, Against
Settlement, 93 YALEL.J. 1073 (1984).
324. See Budnitz, supra note 3, at 322-27 (arguing that arbitration will undercut social norms
embodied in consumer protection statutes such as the Truth in Lending Act, the Equal Credit
Opportunity Act, the Fair Housing Act, the Community Reinvestment Act, the Home Mortgage
Disclosure Act, the Women's Business Ownership Act, and state anti-usury provisions); Sterk, supra
note 30, at 486 (arguing that agreements to arbitrate should not be enforced when the law at issue
seeks justice in society as a whole, and not merely between the parties). But see Stempel, supra note 30
(opposing reliance on public policy exception).
325. Guill & Slavin, supra note 252, at 12 (asserting that where law is clearer and better known,
more disputes will settle without either trial or arbitration). Seegenerally Robert H. Mnookin & Lewis
Komhauser, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: The Case of Divorce, 88 YALE L.J. 950 (1979)
(arguing that greater certainty in the law will encourage settlement).
326. Whereas the publicity generated by a lawsuit may warn other consumers of a problem,
unpublished arbitration decisions can rarely have such an impact. Budnitz, supra note 3, at 313 (noting
that arbitrators may not even be required to issue written decisions). Even in the rare situation where
the consumer reports a victory to the press, the newspaper can report at most the amount of the award,
and not any reasoning employed by the arbitrator. Id. (noting that arbitrators are not generally required
to set out their reasoning).
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Moreover, denying consumers adequate compensation may itself be a
social cost. If one party is able to dominate the process of setting the terms for
arbitration, that party may be able to secure an unfair advantage over its
opponent.327 Such inadequate recoveries may hurt not only the consumers
themselves but also their families, thereby affecting overall social
cohesiveness and productivity.328 Persons who were not able to recover
compensation against a seller of consumer goods might have to be supported
by all of society.329
2. Even IfBinding Arbitration Were Better for Society as a Whole, It
Would Not Necessarily Be Fair to Impose It on Certain Individuals
to Secure a Gain for Society as a Whole
Finally, assuming binding arbitration is preferable to litigation for society
as a whole, having considered both the costs and benefits of the two systems,
it is not necessarily fair or just to force a loss on certain individuals to bring
about a benefit for society as a whole.33 As first-year economics students
learn, there is a difference between efficiency and equity.33' It could be that
society as a whole would be better off if a particular nasty individual were
gagged, locked up, or even thrown off a cliff.32 Still, most would argue that
the individual's rights of free speech, liberty, and life make it wrong to harm
the individual, even if society as a whole would gain. Applying this same
reasoning, it may be wrong to force a detrimental system of justice on
consumers merely to obtain a gain for society as a whole.333 It is particularly
egregious to allow this imposition where, as discussed above, the net social
benefits of arbitration have not been proven.
More specifically, the Constitution provides all of us with the right to a
327. See supra notes 251-80 and accompanying text.
328. See generally FRANCIS FUKUYAMA, TRUST: SOCIAL VIRTUES AND THE CREATION OF
PROSPERITY (1995) (discussing relationship between economics, culture, and social welfare in a broad
sense).
329. See Purcell, supra note 5, at 490.
330. For this same reason, it is problematic to cap individuals' recovery of damages.
331. See, e.g., POSNER, supra note 230, at 14.
332. Of course, many (myself included) would argue that such violence is detrimental to the
society at large.
333. See generally Sturdevant & Golann, supra note 232, at 4 ("No system of resolving disputes
can be considered fair if it exposes the parties to manifest injustice without their consent. Nor does a
system of speedy, economical injustice solve the problem of court overcrowding in a socially
acceptable way."); see also MACNEIL Er AL., supra note 9, ch. 3. (assessing advantages and limitations
of arbitration). Indeed, our Bill of Rights and much of our law support the proposition that it is wrong
to take from one person merely to secure a greater gain for others).
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jury trial for claims "at common law" for an amount in excess of $20."'
While the Court has recognized that constitutional rights may voluntarily be
waived,335 waiver should not encompass forcing a consumer unknowingly to
relinquish her right to pursue a claim through a fair jury trial solely to benefit
other consumers. 36
IV. FEDERALISM PRINCIPLES SUPPORT ALLOWING STATES TO REGULATE
ARBITRATION
The Supreme Court's use of the FAA to preempt state legislation is also
inconsistent with the Court's supposed commitment to federalism-a
doctrine that has been called "the unique contribution of the Framers to
political science and political theory." '337 In Gregory v. Ashcrof1338 the Court
explained:
Perhaps the principal benefit of the federalist system is a check on
abuses of government power. "The 'constitutionally mandated
balance of power' between the States and the Federal Government
334. U.S. CONST. amend. VII. See generally Chauffeurs Local No. 391 v. Terry, 494 U.S. 558
(1990) (discussing historical right to jury trial and analyzing when right is applicable to particular
claims).
335. See Edward L. Rubin, Toward a General Theory of Waiver, 28 UCLA L. REV. 478 (1981);
Stemlight, supra note 11.
336. As Professor Rubin observes, the Court has applied different theories of waiver in different
contexts, distinguishing particularly between civil and criminal law. Rubin, supra note 335, at 478-79.
Yet where a person does not act willingly or knowingly, and where the act is against the person's own
interest, it is hard to see how a person can be said to have waived, rather than been robbed of, her
rights. See generally Stemlight, supra note 11 (arguing that the Supreme Court's decisions in Fuentes
v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972) and D.H. Overmyer Co. v. Frick Co., 405 U.S. 174 (1972), require
courts to assess the legitimacy of arbitral waivers in terms of the visibility and clarity of the waiver, the
relative knowledge and economic power of the parties, the voluntariness of the purported agreement,
and the substantive fairness of the agreement).
Significantly, the Court has been more permissive of waiver in the arbitration context, where a
party's constitutional rights to a jury trial, to an Article III judge, and to procedural due process are at
stake, than even in the context of forum selection clauses, where no such rights are involved. A forum
selection clause is valid only if it survives contractual attack and if it is "reasonable." Carnival Cruise
Lines v. Shute, 499 U.S. 585, 591-95 (1991). By contrast, in interpreting arbitration clauses the Court
has held that courts should be mindful of the preference for arbitration and has imposed no
requirement that arbitration clauses must even be "reasonable." See generally Stemlight, supra note
11.
337. United States v. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. 1624, 1634 (1995) (Kennedy & O'Connor, JJ., concurring)
(citing Henry Friendly, Federalism: A Forward, 86 YALE L.. 1019 (1977); GORDON S. WOOD, THE
CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC, 1776-1787, at 524-32, 564 (1969)). See generally Larry
Kramer, Understanding Federalism, 47 VAND. L. REv. 1485 (1994); Deborah Jones Merritt, Three
Faces of Federalism: Finding a Formula for the Future, 47 VAND. L. REV. 1563 (1994).
338. 501 U.S. 452(1991).
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was adopted by the Framers to ensure the protection of 'our
fundamental liberties.' 33
9
Concluding that states have a core interest in being able to regulate their own
judiciary,3 41 the Court found that the federal Age Discrimination in
Employment Act ("ADEA")341 should not be interpreted to prevent states
from requiring their judges to retire at a particular age. The Court explained
that while "Congress may legislate in areas traditionally regulated by the
States ... [i]t is a power that we must assume Congress does not exercise
lightly. '3 42 Therefore, because Congress had not made "clear and manifest"
an intention to restrict states' selection of their own judges, the federal statute
should be interpreted narrowly to allow states autonomy in this key area. 43
The Court has recently applied federalist principles in other contexts as
well. In New York v. United States3" the Court held that Congress lacked the
power to force the state of New York into federal service by giving it a choice
of either accepting ownership of certain hazardous waste or regulating the
waste according to Congress' instructions.34  Finally, in United States v.
Lopezi46 the Court struck down Congress' attempt to regulate the use of
handguns on local school premises as not legitimate under the Commerce
Clause.3 47 The Court emphasized that the Court had a duty to ensure that the
Commerce Clause was not so stretched as to deprive states of their crucial
role in the federalist scheme of government.
3 4
339. Id. at 457-58 (quoting Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 242 (1985) (quoting
Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 572 (1985) (Powell, J., dissenting))); see
also New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 181 (1992) ("Mhe Constitution divides authority
between federal and state governments for the protection of individuals.").
340. Gregory, 501 U.S. at 459-60.
341. 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1994).
342. Gregory, 501 U.S. at 460.
343. Id. at 470.
344. 505 U.S. 144 (1992).
345. Id. at 174-77. The Court found the "commandeerting]" of state government unconstitutional
because it would allow federal government officials to engage in actions without it being clear to the
electorate that they had done so. Id. See generally James F. Blumstein, Federalism and Civil Rights:
Complementary and Competing Paradigms, 47 VAND. L. REv. 1251, 1287-94 (discussing the Court's
decisions in Gregory and New York).
346. 115 S. Ct. 1624 (1995).
347. Id. at 1633-34; see U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl.8; see also Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida,
116 S. Ct. 1114, 1122 (1996) (emphasizing that "each state is a sovereign entity in our federal system,"
and holding that the Eleventh Amendment precluded Congress from using the Indian Commerce
Clause of the Constitution to subject states to lawsuits by Indian tribes without their consent); Lopez,
115 S. Ct. at 1633-34.
348. Two concurring Justices stressed the familiar theme that federalism allows states to "perform
their role as laboratories for experimentation to devise various solutions where the best solution is far
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Several Justices have suggested that the Court should also interpret the
FAA narrowly to allow states maximum authority over their own judicial
system. Writing for the majority in Volt, Chief Justice Rehnquist observed
that "[t]he FAA contains no express pre-emptive provision, nor does it reflect
a congressional intent to occupy the entire field of arbiration." '349 Thus,
although the FAA preempts state legislation that "actually conflicts with
federal law,"35  the Court found that states should be permitted to enact
arbitration legislation that is consistent with the purpose of the FAA. 5 As
Justice Stevens wrote, concurring in part and dissenting in part in Southland:
[I]t must surely be true that given the lack of a "clear mandate from
Congress as to the extent to which state statutes and decisions are to
be superseded, we must be cautious in construing the [A]ct lest we
excessively encroach on the powers which Congressional policy, if
not the Constitution, would reserve to the states. 352
Justices O'Connor and Rebnquist, dissenting in Southland, found that state
courts and legislatures ought to be allowed "to develop their own methods for
enforcing the new federal rights."353 Eleven years later, dissenting in
Terminix, Justices Thomas and Scalia also spoke out strongly for federalism,
concluding:
Even if the interstate commerce requirement raises uncertainty
about the original meaning of the statute, we should resolve the
uncertainty in light of core principles of federalism. While
from clear." Id. at 1641 (Kennedy & O'Connor, JJ., concurring).
349. Volt Info. Sciences Inc. v. Board of Trustees of Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 489 U.S. 468,
477 (1989). However, Chief Justice Rehnquist joined the majority in Doctor's Associates that struck
down Montana's notice requirement in arbitration contracts. Doctor's Assocs., Inc. v. Casarotto, 116 S.
Ct. 1652 (1996).
350. Volt, 489 U.S. at 479.
351. Id.
352. Southland v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 19 (1984) (Stevens, J., concurring and dissenting) (quoting
Metro Indus. Painting Corp. v. Terminal Constr. Co., 287 F.2d. 382, 386 (2d. Cir.) (Lumbard, C.J.,
concurring), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 817 (1961)). Justice Stevens concluded that although the FAA
should be applied in state as well as federal courts, states should be allowed to regulate arbitration in
ways not inconsistent with the FAA. He specified that "[given the importance to the State of franchise
relationships, the relative disparity in the bargaining positions between the franchisor and the
franchisee, and the remedial purposes of the California Act, I believe this declaration of state policy
[prohibiting a claim under the California Franchise Act from being arbitrated] is entitled to respect."
Southland, 465 U.S. at 20.
353. Southland, 465 U.S. at 31; see also Perry v. Thomas, 482 U.S. 483, 493-94 (1987) (Stevens,
J., dissenting) (arguing that states' power to exempt certain matters from arbitration should be
preserved); id. at 494-95 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (same).
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"Congress may legislate in areas traditionally regulated by the
States" as long as it "is acting within the powers granted it under the
Constitution," we assume that "Congress does not exercise [this
power] lightly." To the extent that federal statutes are ambiguous,
we do not read them to displace state law. Rather, we must be
"absolutely certain" that Congress intended such displacement
before we give preemptive effect to a federal statute.354
Justice O'Connor, while concurring rather than dissenting in Terminix, made
it quite clear that she was uncomfortable with the broad preemption being
announced by the Court. She observed, for example, that the Court's
interpretation of the FAA would "displace many state statutes carefully
calibrated to protect consumers," 355 including "state procedural requirements
aimed at ensuring knowing and voluntary consent."356
Notwithstanding the Court's purported commitment to federalism, its
recent 8-1 decision in Doctor's Associates57 sharply impinges upon states'
right to regulate in an area of traditional state concern.358 Although Congress,
in the FAA, did not expressly provide that certain state legislation should be
preempted, the Court nonetheless interpreted the preemptive scope of the
FAA to invalidate a state's attempt to require that consumers, employees, and
franchisees receive adequate notice that they were signing away their right to
trial by accepting an arbitration clause.359 While Justice Thomas, dissenting,
implicitly raised the federalism concerns he had previously expressed inTerminix, this time he was not even joined by Justice Scalia.360 Rather, Justice
Scalia and the other seven members of the Court issued a decision that was so
354. Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 115 S. Ct. 834, 848 (1995) (Thomas & Scalia, JJ.,
dissenting) (quoting Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 460, 464 (1991)). Justices Scalia and Thomas
therefore concluded that Southland ought to be overturned and that the FAA should be held not to
apply to proceedings brought in state courts. Id. at 849-50.
355. Terminix, 115 S. Ct. at 843 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
356. Id. (citation omitted). Justice O'Connor essentially stated that although she continued to
disagree with the Court's decision in Southland. and that although she believed that "over the past
decade, the Court has abandoned all pretense of ascertaining congressional intent with respect to the
Federal Arbitration Act, building instead, case by case, an edifice of its own creation," she would
follow Southland on grounds of stare decisis. 115 S. Ct. at 844 (citing Perry, 482 U.S. at 493 (Stevens,
J., dissenting)). Justice O'Connor called upon Congress to correct the Court's faulty interpretation of
the FAA "if it wishes to preserve state autonomy in state courts." Id.
357. Doctor's Assocs., Inc. v. Casarotto, 116 S. Ct. 1652 (1996).
358. Few areas are more fundamentally local than the regulation of basic contracts.
359. Doctor'sAssocs., 116 S. Ct. at 1656.
360. Id. at 1657.
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brief as to imply that no reasonable person could question the Court's
ruling.36
1
V. REASSESSING THE PREFERENCE
It is time for the Supreme Court to reassess its extreme preference for
mandatory binding arbitration over litigation, and to replace its current
preference with the more limited acceptance of binding arbitration initially
intended by Congress when it enacted the FAA. Rather than numbly repeat
the mantra that arbitration is to be favored over litigation, the Court should
instead look upon arbitration with favor in appropriate circumstances.
Specifically, it should distinguish between those arbitration agreements
entered voluntarily and knowingly by two or more parties of comparable
strength, and those imposed by a stronger party on a weaker party that is
ignorant of the clause's terms and implications. Further, the Court should not
permit its assessment to be controlled by the interests of court administrators
in hiring fewer judges and building fewer courthouses. 362 To the extent that
the Supreme Court refuses to recognize that unregulated mandatory binding
arbitration agreements can be detrimental to consumers, employees, and other
little guys, Congress should step in to protect their interests.
Like many of arbitration's strongest advocates, I believe that binding
arbitration can be quicker, cheaper, more harmonious, and fairer than
litigation. However, whereas some believe binding arbitration is necessarily
361. See id.
362. Judge Trieweiler, specially concurring in Casarotto v. Lombardi, 886 P.2d 939 (Mont. 1994),
has expressed this same point very forcefully and candidly. Addressing his remarks "[t]o those federal
judges who consider forced arbitration as the panacea for their 'heavy case loads' and who consider
the reluctance of state courts to buy into the arbitration program as a sign of intellectual inadequacy,"
886 P.2d at 939, Judge Trieweiler states:
What I would like the people in the federal judiciary, especially at the appellate level, to
understand is that due to their misinterpretation of Congressional intent when it enacted the
Federal Arbitration Act, and due to their naive assumption that arbitration provisions and
choice of law provisions are knowingly bargained for, all of these procedural safeguards and
substantive laws [provided in courts] are easily avoided by any party with enough leverage to
stick a choice of law and an arbitration provision in its pre-printed contract and require the
party with inferior bargaining power to sign it. [Such opinions] illustrate an all too frequent
preoccupation on the part of federal judges with their own case load and a total lack of
consideration for the rights of individuals.... Furthermore, if the Federal Arbitration Act is to
be interpreted as broadly as some of the decisions from our federal courts would suggest, then
[Congress] ... has written state and federal courts out of business as far as these corporations
are concerned .... These insidious erosions of state authority and the judicial process threaten
to undermine the rule of law as we know it.
Id. at 940.
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superior to litigation, I believe only that arbitration can be superior to
litigation, depending on the circumstances. Two or more merchants, with
roughly equal bargaining power, should be permitted to select binding
arbitration over litigation if they believe that selection serves their best
interests. Consumers and employees, as well, should be permitted to opt for
binding arbitration if they believe binding arbitration is preferable. However,
companies should not be permitted to mandate that consumers or other little
guys unknowingly waive their jury trial, due process, and Article III rights in
favor of a possibly unfair arbitration process." The Court should interpret the
FAA to allow both state legislatures and lower courts to protect consumers
from injustice.
The Court's prior decisions offer a great deal of support for this Article's
arguments. First, prior to 1983 the Court's opinions were consistent with the
idea that the FAA was intended to require acceptance of, rather than
preference for, arbitration.3" In 1967 in Prima Paint, the Court declared: "As
the 'saving clause' in § 2 indicates, the purpose of Congress in 1925 was to
make arbitration agreements as enforceable as other contracts, but not more
so.9365 Second, the Court's past and even its current decisions support the
proposition that arbitration is beneficial only to the extent it is adopted
voluntarily by the parties. As discussed earlier, the Volt, Mastrobuono and
First Options decisions all emphasize that arbitration is meant to be a
consensual process. 66 Third, as discussed in Section IV, this Article's thesis
is consistent with the Court's recent focus on federalism principles.367 Fourth,
both the Court and Justice Stevens in particular have at times focused on the
difference emphasized in this Article between contracts negotiated between
equal parties and those imposed by a stronger party upon a weaker party.
Fuentes v. Shevin,3" a 1972 decision, discussed the extent to which a
consumer signatory to a form contract could be held to have waived a
constitutional right. The Court observed that "a waiver of constitutional rights
363. The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission has already recognized this distinction,
having taken the position that employers may not force employees to arbitrate rather than litigate
disputes as a condition of their employment. Margaret A. Jacobs, Firms with Policies Requiring
Arbitration are Facing Obstacles, WALL ST. J., Oct. 16, 1995, at B5.
364. See supra notes 31-125 and accompanying text.
365. Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 403,405 n.12 (1967).
366. See First Options of Chicago v. Kaplan, 115 S. Ct. 1920 (1995); Mastrobuono v. Shearson
Lehman Hutton, Inc., 115 S. Ct. 1212 (1995); Volt Info. Sciences v. Board of Trustees of Leland
Stanford Junior Univ., 489 U.S. 468 (1989); see also supra notes 137-44 and accompanying text.
367. It is not, however, consistent with the Court's ignoring of federalism and other policy
concerns in Doctor's Associates. See supra notes 168-76 and accompanying text.
368. 407 U.S. 67 (1972).
[VOL. 74:637
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol74/iss3/6
PANACEA OR CORPORATE TOOL?
in any context must, at the very least, be clear."3 69 Observing that the sellers
of a stove and stereo to a consumer "made no showing whatever that the
appellants were actually aware of or made aware of the significance of the
fine print now relied upon as a waiver of constitutional rights,"37 the Court
held that by signing the form contract the consumer did not waive her right to
procedural due process prior to replevin of her stove. 71 The Court should
apply this important insight to hold that consumers and other weaker parties
do not waive their right to a jury trial by having a form arbitration clause
forced upon them.372
In Terminix, the Court briefly considered the argument, presented by
amicus curiae, that binding arbitration agreements may be detrimental to
consumer interests.373 While the Court blithely concluded that the speed and
inexpensiveness of arbitration would benefit consumers as well as more
powerful parties,374 the Court did not entirely reject the idea that consumer
and other form contracts must be treated differently than those contracts
entered into by two businesses negotiating at arm's length. Rather, the Court
found that states could use general common law principles to protect
consumer interests.375
Justice Stevens has repeatedly urged that arbitration agreements entered
into between equals must be distinguished from those imposed by a stronger
party upon a weaker party. For example, dissenting in Mitsubishi Motors, he
urged that a car dealer should not be forced to resolve its claim against a large
automobile manufacturer through arbitration.3 76 Similarly in Gilmer, Justice
369. Id. at 95 (emphasis added).
370. Id.
371. Id.; see also D.H. Overmyer Co. v. Frick Co., 405 U.S. 174 (1972) (upholding confession-of-
judgment provision, which waived the right to a day in court where it was accepted knowingly in
return for consideration by a sizable company).
372. See Sternlight, supra note 11 (arguing that courts should assess clarity, voluntariness,
disparate power and fairness in determining validity of arbitral waiver of constitutional rights).
373. Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 115 S. Ct. 834, 842 (1995). See generally Brief of
Amicus Curiae of the Southern Poverty Law Center in Support of Respondents 33, Terminix (No. 93-
1001) (arguing that broad application of FAA would "devastate consumer interests" in that "[ain
arbitration clause inserted by the superior party into a form contract, or other in circumstances in which
there is a marked imbalance of sophistication, knowledge, and financial resources, functions
essentially as an uninformed waiver of the right to trial by jury").
374. Terminix, 115 S. Ct. at 842. The Court presented no real evidence to support its assumption
that all parties would benefit equally from such savings and did not seem to worry much about whether
the more powerful parties might also use the arbitration agreement to gain advantage over the weaker.
Id. Instead, the Court simply cited some general statements urging the value of arbitration and noted
that many small claims are heard by arbitrators. Id.
375. Id. at 843.
376. Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 665 (1985)
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Stevens, again dissenting, urged that the FAA was intended to allow
merchants with roughly equal bargaining power to agree to arbitration, but
should not be applied to allow employers to impose arbitration upon their
workers.377 Finally, writing for the majority in Mastrobuono, Justice Stevens
emphasized that the consumers likely had no "idea that by signing a standard-
form agreement to arbitrate disputes they might be giving up an important
substantive right. 3 78 He interpreted the agreement in favor of the consumer,
to allow punitive damages, and against the brokerage house that drafted the
agreement. 3
79
Given these broad principles and their support in prior law and Supreme
Court decisions, the Court and the lower courts should change their approach
to binding arbitration in four key areas of arbitration doctrine.
A. Interpret Contracts Evenhandedly, Rather Than with a Preference for
Arbitration
The Court should reject the view that ambiguities in arbitration
agreements should always be interpreted as broadly as possible to favor
arbitration. The practice of interpreting ambiguities to favor arbitration, which
the Court first enunciated in Moses H. Cone in 1983,380 is nothing less than a
means of spreading binding arbitration by Supreme Court fiat. Some courts
have used this interpretive power boldly to require consumers, employees and
others who likely had no idea arbitration would be relevant to a given issue to
submit the problem to arbitration.38' However, no policy supports the Court's
practice of interpreting an ambiguous arbitration agreement any differently
(Stevens, J., dissenting) (arguing that "it is particularly improper to require a party to resolve a
statutory antitrust claim through arbitration where there has been no genuine bargaining over the terms
of the submission, and the arbitration remedy provided has not even the most elementary guarantees of
due process").
377. Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 36-43 (1991) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
378. Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., 115 S. Ct. 1212, 1219 (1995).
379. Id.
380. Moses H. Cone Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24-25 (1983).
381. For example, the Tenth Circuit recently held that a highly ambiguous contract between an
insurance company and several of its sales agents should be interpreted to require arbitration of the
employees' claims of employment discrimination in violation of federal law. "Notwithstanding the
ambiguity of the February 1992 version of the Code (or perhaps more correctly, because of such
ambiguity), we conclude that the most appropriate construction of the February 1992 Code is to apply
its arbitration provisions to employment disputes involving these Plaintiffs." Armijo v. Prudential Ins.
Co., 72 F.3d 793, 798 (10th Cir. 1995); see also Gregory v. Electro-Mechanical Corp., 83 F.3d 382
(11th Cir. 1996) (interpreting arbitration provision broadly to cover tort, fraud, and deceit as well as
claims for breach ofcontract).
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from any other ambiguous contract.
Courts should no more interpret a contract to prefer arbitration than they
should interpret an ambiguous contract to favor banks or insurance
companies. If parties want pink elephants to proliferate, they may so contract,
but the court should interpret ambiguous contracts either evenhandedly or
against the interest of the drafting party.3 82 Congress never authorized the
Court to put its thumb on the scale to favor arbitration in the commercial or
consumer context,383 and such bias also lacks support as a matter of policy. 84
B. Allow States to Regulate Arbitration So Long As the Regulations Are
Consistent with the Purposes of the FAA
Congress should amend the FAA to clarify and narrow its preemptive
scope. Specifically, Congress should revise the statute to allow states to
regulate arbitration both to ensure that persons enter arbitration agreements
knowingly and to ensure that the arbitration process is fair.3" 5 If Congress is
going to allow parties to waive their constitutional rights to a jury trial and a
fair process in favor of the more informal arbitration process Congress should
also ensure that parties receive the functional equivalent of those
constitutional rights-specifically, notice and a fair hearing.386
Many states currently have laws on the books that purport to regulate the
nature of arbitration agreements to ensure that persons who agree to
382. In Mastrobuono, 115 S. Ct. 1212, although the Court repeated its stock phrase that "due
regard must be given to the federal policy favoring arbitration," id. at 1218, the Court also relied on the
common-law rule that ambiguous contractual language should be construed against the drafter, holding
that the arbitrator should be allowed to award punitive damages in the contract at issue in the case. Id.
at 1219.
383. As discussed earlier, commercial and consumer arbitration must be distinguished from
arbitration used to resolve disputes between management and organized labor. In the organized labor
context Congress has expressed a preference for resolving labor disputes through arbitration rather
than through strikes or shutdowns. See supra notes 24-25 and accompanying text. But, as discussed
earlier, it is entirely inappropriate to apply Congress' preference for labor arbitration over strikes to
support a preference for consumer arbitration over litigation. Id.
384. See supra Section III.
385. I do not urge Congress to reverse the Court's recent decisions in Southland or Terminix that
the FAA applies in state courts to all transactions subject to regulation under the Commerce Clause.
While these decisions are somewhat suspect, on both historical and policy grounds, I share Justice
Stevens' view that although Congress did not originally intend for the FAA to apply in state courts,
"intervening developments in the law compel the conclusion that the Court ... reached [in
Southland]." Southland v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 17 (1984) (Stevens, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part). Given the development of the Erie doctrine, it seems virtually inevitable that
Congress' substantive regulation with respect to arbitration should apply equally to state as well as
federal fora.
386. Rubin, supra note 335, at 536-41.
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arbitration do so knowingly and willingly. Some states, for example, require
that arbitration provisions appear in a particular point size,387 be accompanied
by a written acknowledgrnent,3 8 be prominently displayed,389 or that the
arbitration form be approved in advance by the state.3" However, the Court's
recent decision in Doctor's Associates places all of these state laws in
jeopardy.39' The decision confirms the validity of lower court decisions that
have concluded that the FAA preempts all state laws that would in any way
prevent an arbitration from occurring. Such decisions had held preempted not
only state laws barring all pre-dispute arbitration agreements or prohibiting all
claims under a particular statute from being arbitrated,392 but also state laws
requiring that contracts provide adequate notice as to an arbitration clause,393
as well as state laws regulating the fairness of a particular arbitration
process.394 Now, under Doctor's Associates, all such state laws are invalid,
387. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE §§ 1295, 1298 (West 1994); Mo. REV. STAT. § 435.460
(1989).
388. See, e.g., VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 5652 (1994).
389. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 09.55.535 (1994); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-64-403 (West
1994); MO. REV. STAT. § 435.460 (1994); MONT. CODE ANN. § 27-5-114 (1993) (must appear on first
page).
390. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 09.55.535 (1994).
391. Cf Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 115 S. Ct. 834, 843 (1995) (O'Connor, J.,
concurring) (noting that the Court's broad reading of preemptive scope of the FAA "will displace
many state statutes carefully calibrated to protect consumers").
392. See, e.g., Saturn Distrib. Corp. v. Williams, 905 F.2d 719, 721 (4th Cir.) (holding that a
Virginia statute forbidding nonnegotiable arbitration provisions in auto franchise agreements was
preempted by the FAA), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 983 (1990); Seymour v. Gloria Jean's Coffee Bean
Franchising Corp., 732 F. Supp. 988 (D. Minn. 1990) (holding that a Minnesota law prohibiting
franchisors from forcing franchisees to arbitrate disputes as a condition of becoming franchisees was
preempted); Johnson v. Piper Jaffray, Inc., 530 N.W.2d 790 (Minn. 1995) (holding that the FAA
preempts Minnesota Human Rights Act to the extent the MHRA purports to void agreements that
require waiver ofjudicial forum with respect to such claims).
393. See, e.g., David L. Threlkeld & Co. v. Metallgesellshaft Ltd., 923 F.2d 245, 249 (2d Cir.)
(preempting Vermont law requiring that "any agreement to arbitrate must be displayed prominently in
the contract or contract confirmation and must be signed by the parties"), cert. dismissed, 501 U.S.
1267 (1991); Securities Indus. Ass'n v. Connolly, 883 F.2d 1114, 1117 (1st Cir. 1989) (preempting
Massachusetts securities regulations that ordered arbitration clause to be placed "conspicuously" and
further demanded "full written disclosure of the legal effect of the pre-dispute arbitration contract or
clause"), cert. denied, 495 U.S. 956 (1990); Webb v. R. Rowland & Co., 800 F.2d 803, 805-06 (8th
Cir. 1986) (preempting Missouri statute requiring that "arbitration clauses be introduced by a notice, in
10 point capital letters, that the contract contains a binding arbitration clause"); Mr. Mudd, Inc. v. Petra
Tech., 892 S.W.2d 389 (Mo. Ct. App. 1995) (holding that a state statute requiring notice of arbitration
clause to be specially stated in the contract was preempted by the FAA); Woermann Constr. Co. v.
Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 846 S.W.2d 790 (Mo. Ct. App. 1993) (striking down state law requirement
that notice of binding enforceable arbitration appear in 10 point type).
394. See, e.g., Olde Discount Corp. v. Tupman, 805 F. Supp. 1130 (D. Del.) (preempting state
regulation allowing Securities Commission to impose remedy of recission for alleged securities trading
violations because remedy would interfere with parties' right to arbitrate claims), aff'd, 1 F.3d 202 (2d
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except as applied to purely local transactions, to the extent a state may justify
the law as part of a broader regulatory effort, or perhaps to the extent the
parties have agreed to be regulated by state rather than federal arbitration
law.
39 5
The position taken by the Montana Supreme Court in Doctor's Associates
with respect to preemption under the FAA was correct, and it ought to have
been affirmed by the Supreme Court. Now that the Court has taken the
extreme position of voiding all protective state legislation, Congress should
amend the FAA to effectively reverse the Court's ruling, protect weaker
parties, and ensure the constitutionality of the FAA. Specifically, while states
should not be permitted to prohibit pre-dispute arbitration agreements
altogether, they should be allowed to enact legislation designed to ensure that
arbitration agreements are entered knowingly and voluntarily.
In addition, Congress should amend the FAA to allow states to regulate
the substance of arbitration proceedings themselves in ways that are
consistent with the initial purposes of the FAA. 396 Although a strong
argument can be made that states should not be permitted to interfere with
arbitration agreements entered into by two knowledgeable parties of roughly
equal strength," 7 states should be permitted to enact laws to protect weaker or
Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1065 (1994); Securities Indus. Ass'n v. Lewis, 751 F. Supp. 205,
206-08 (S.D. Fla. 1990) (preempting Florida securities statute requiring that parties be afforded option
of arbitration before an independent non-industry panel, such as the American Arbitration Association,
and not forced to arbitrate in an industry forum); Coco Concrete Constr. v. J.T. Schrimsher Constr.
Co., 792 F. Supp. 109 (N.D. Ga. 1992) (preempting state arbitration law which prohibited arbitration
awards from including attorney fees). But see Frank Fiore Enter. v. Francis, No. 86 Civ. 7241 (WCC),
1987 WL 9429 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 8, 1987) (holding that the FAA does not preempt state statute
prohibiting arbitration of controversy involving an incompetent person absent a prior court order);
Fouquette v. First Nat'l Sec., 464 N.W.2d 760 (Minn. Ct. App. 1991) (holding that the FAA does not
preempt Minnesota law providing that court rather than arbitrators should review claim of fraud in the
inducement of the entire contract).
395. Volt states that parties may elect to be governed by state rather than federal arbitration law, so
long as the state law does not "undermine the goals and policies of the FAA." Volt Info. Sciences, Inc.
v. Board of Trustees of Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 489 U.S. 468, 477-78 (1989). While the party
opposing a state restriction would likely argue that the restriction violates the FAA, citing Doctor's
Associates, the proponent could cite Volt's acceptance of a state law that effectively denied arbitration
by allowing litigation to proceed first. In any event, drafters of future arbitration clauses who do not
want to be bound by state law will probably state a clear choice for the FAA.
396. Dispute resolution organizations themselves can effectively regulate arbitration by refusing to
handle arbitrations that do not meet minimal fairness criteria. For example, JAMS/Endispute will only
take employment cases where "an employee retains the same avenues as in court, including the right to
... punitive damages... prehearing discovery and representation by counsel." Jacobs, supra note 363.
397. I recognize that there may be factual disputes as to whether certain categories of participants
are sufficiently unevenly matched as to warrant state protection. However, I believe that courts are
capable of resolving such disputes. Existing state protective language seems to focus primarily on
unequal contractual relationships which, for the reasons discussed earlier, are least likely to produce
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less knowledgeable parties, so long as the legislation does not forbid
arbitration altogether. For example, in order to protect a weaker party, states
ought to be permitted to enact legislation requiring that arbitrators be
impartial, requiring that a party be permitted to retain an attorney in
arbitration, precluding unfair forum selection clauses, and ensuring that
parties are allowed adequate discovery.398
Legislation that requires arbitrations to be consensual and fair is consistent
with the purpose of the FAA, which was not to impose arbitration at any cost,
but rather to assist parties in entering mutually beneficial arbitration
agreements. Because of the various market characteristics discussed in
Section III, allowing stronger parties to impose form arbitration agreements
on weaker parties may greatly harm the weaker parties, individually and as a
group.399 Nor are mere notice provisions likely to be adequate to protect
consumer interests. Even if provided with notice, many consumers still will
not read or understand the arbitration agreement a merchant is seeking to
apply. Given the inadequacy of notice provisions, states should be permitted
to step in with their own regulations to correct market imperfections and
protect the weaker party.
The FAA explicitly recognized that states should be allowed to protect
consumers using common-law contractual doctrines such as fraud or
duress.400 States should be able to use their own statutes to achieve similar
ends and to avoid total dependence on the interpretational whims of
individual judges.4' Such measures as notice provisions can easily be seen as
efficient results without state regulation. For example, states often focus on consumer contracts,
franchisor/franchisee contracts, employment contracts, and medical contracts.
398. This is just a small set of examples of ways in which states might choose to regulate the
arbitration process. For other examples of due process constraints, see supra note 30. Some may argue
that I am destroying the beauty of the arbitration process, and that over-legalizing arbitration will take
away its advantages of speed and economy. I have two responses. First, I do not advocate requiring
any regulations whatsoever. Rather, I simply advocate allowing individual states to determine what, if
any, regulation is appropriate. Second, as discussed earlier, it has not been shown that arbitration is
necessarily better than litigation for individual consumers, or even for society as a whole. See supra
notes 238-336 and accompanying text.
399. Other groups requiring protection might include employees and franchisees. Not surprisingly,
it is just such groups that states have already sought to protect through their legislation. See, eg.,
MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 445.1527 (West 1989); OR. REV. STAT. § 650.165 (1995); S.D. CODIFIED
LAWS § 32-6B-49.1 (Supp. 1994); TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 4413(36) § 5.02(18) (West Supp.
1996).
400. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (1994).
401. Congress could prevent states from voiding arbitration agreements altogether by expressly
stating such a prohibition, as well as by allowing states to regulate arbitration only to protect parties in
a substantially unequal bargaining positions. Further, current attitudes toward arbitration are quite
favorable, so that it is unlikely many states would seek to prohibit binding arbitration altogether.
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a legislative method of avoiding fraud or duress. Further, there is no valid
reason to restrict states' regulation of arbitration, so long as they do not
prohibit arbitration altogether. Rather, a state should be able to regulate more
closely a contract that requires a person to waive a constitutional right than it
might regulate the typical commercial agreement.4 °2
C. Encourage Lower State and Federal Courts to Be More Willing to
Reject Arbitration Agreements on Grounds of Fraud and Duress
Consistent with a policy of accepting but not preferring arbitration, the
Court and lower state and federal courts should be more open to rejecting
arbitration agreements on grounds such as coercion and duress. The FAA
explicitly provides that arbitration agreements may be voided on "such
grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract. ''4 3 This
language has widely been interpreted to allow courts to void arbitration
agreements on grounds of fraud, duress, and unconscionability,4° and the
Court itself has recognized that the common law doctrines may be used to
protect consumer interests.05 Nonetheless, citing the Court's policy of
favoritism toward arbitration, many courts have proved reluctant to void any
arbitration agreement on these common law grounds.40 6 For example, in
Rodriguez de Quifas v. ShearsonAmerican Express, Inc. the Court found that
while consumers might theoretically raise a defense of fraud or overwhelming
economic power, the consumers had failed to produce a sufficient factual
showing to support the defense. 7 Yet, according to Petitioners' brief, the
consumers were first-time investors including minors, retirees, and persons
who did not even speak English.40 ' Plaintiffs also accused the broker's agent
402. The Court has already recognized that "state law whether of legislative orjudicial origin, is
applicable if that law arose to govern issues concerning the validity, revocability, and enforceability of
contracts generally." Perry v. Thomas, 482 U.S. 483, 492 n.9 (1987) (emphasis added). Thus, the
Court has already accepted that states may use statutes as well as common laws to protect their citizens
from inappropriate arbitration agreements.
403. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (1994).
404. Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 115 S. Ct. 834, 843 (1995); Perry, 482 U.S. at 492
n.9; Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614,627 (1985).
405. Terminix, 115 S. Ct. at 843.
406. Jeffrey W. Stempel, A Better Approach to Arbitrability, 65 TUL. L. REV. 1377, 1397-414
(1991) (discussing great difficulty in prevailing on common-law defenses such as fraud, illegality,
impossibility, waiver, coercion, failure of consideration, unconscionability, or contract of adhesion);
MACNEIL ET AL., supra note 9, § 19.2.1 (noting that challengers to arbitration clauses on contract
grounds face an "uphill battle" and that such arguments will "hardly ever" prevail).
407. 490 U.S. 477,483-84 (1989).
408. Brief for Petitioners at 2, Rodriguez de QuiVas (No. 88-385).
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of having intentionally misled them.4 19 Lower courts, similarly, have been
extremely unsympathetic to consumers' claims of fraud and duress, holding
that consumers should have been aware of arbitration clauses even if they
were buried deep in contracts or conveyed in stressful or even dishonest
ways.410 The courts, in rejecting consumers' contractual defenses, repeatedly
cite the supposed federal policy favoring arbitration and observe that any
doubts as to the legitimacy of the agreement should be resolved in favor of
arbitration.4 These decisions are inconsistent with both the history and text
of the FAA and also lack any valid policy support.
D. Encourage Lower Courts to Scrutinize Arbitration Appeals More
Closely
Finally, the Court should allow and encourage lower courts to take a
closer appellate look at arbitration decisions. The FAA provides that
arbitration decisions should be reversed only for certain very limited reasons,
and this Article does not seek to undermine that provision. However, relying
on the supposed policy of preference for arbitration over litigation, some
courts have virtually refused to conduct any appellate review of arbitration
decisions whatsoever. For example, in Advanced Micro Devices, Inc. v. Intel
Corp.,"' the California Supreme Court refused to reverse an arbitral award
that all agreed far exceeded the award that a court might have ordered had the
case been litigated. The arbitrator effectively awarded plaintiff a royalty-free
licensed use of an Intel product that was not at issue in the pending
arbitration.413 The majority justified the award on the ground that "the remedy
an arbitrator fashions does not exceed his or her powers if it bears a rational
relationship to the underlying contract as interpreted....""4 4 Three of the
409. Id.; see also Shell, supra note 190, at 459-60.
410. See, e.g., Cohen v. Wedbush, Noble, Cooke, Inc., 841 F.2d 282,287-88 (9th Cir. 1988) ("We
see no unfairness in expecting parties to read contracts before they sign them.... We are unable to
understand how any person possessing a basic education and fluent in the English language could fail
to grasp the meaning of that [arbitration] provision."); Benoay v. E.F. Hutton & Co., 699 F. Supp.
1523, 1529 (S.D. Fla. 1988) (requiring arbitration even though broker had represented to consumer
that form was a "mere formality" because "[a] party who signs an instrument is presumed to know its
contents").
411. See, e.g., David L. Threlkeld & Co. v. Metallgesellschaft Ltd., 923 F.2d 245, 248 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 501 U.S. 1267 (1991); Cohen, 841 F.2d at 285; Benoay, 699 F. Supp. at 1526.
412. 885 P.2d 994 (Cal. 1994). Although the Advanced Micro decision is based on California law
rather than the FAA, the effect of the preference for arbitration is similar. See supra note 18.
413. Advanced Micro, 885 P.2d at 998; see Margaret A. Jacobs, Intel-Advanced Micro Case Stirs
Debate Over Arbitrator's Powers, WALL ST. J., Feb. 10, 1995, at B6.
414. Advanced Micro, 885 P.2d at 996. The court explained that because "[t]he decision to
[VOL. 74:637
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol74/iss3/6
PANACEA OR CORPORATE TOOL?
seven Justices dissented sharply, noting that "under the majority's test it is
theoretically possible for an arbitrator to order the losing party to be placed in
the stocks or the pillory or to direct that the contractual relationship be
repaired by ordering the marriage of the parties' first-born children."4 5
Advanced Micro Devices involved two large companies that had
bargained for the arbitration clause by which they were governed. As applied
to them, the majority's rationale makes some sense. If the parties want more
extensive appeal or less liberal remedies, they can provide for that in their
agreement. However, as applied to consumers and other weaker parties,
Advanced Micro Devices and other similar decisions threaten basic justice.
By limiting their review of arbitrators' decisions courts are simply furthering
the policy of sacrificing consumer interests to achieve judicial economy. The
FAA was written to limit, not eliminate, appeal. Although courts should
refuse to conduct de novo review on many arbitration decisions, they should
not be reluctant to set aside arbitral awards that are clearly unfounded and
inconsistent with applicable law.
416
VI. CONCLUSION
In case after case since the Moses H. Cone decision in 1983,4 17 the
Supreme Court has reiterated that arbitration should be preferred over
litigation.41 ' However, when the parties have not knowingly and voluntarily
agreed to arbitration, this preference has no justification as a matter of
legislative history, nor can it be defended as a matter of policy. Instead, such
an arbitral preference simply allows stronger parties to take advantage of
weaker parties.
The Court should abandon its unjustified preference for arbitration and
replace it with a policy of acceptance of arbitration voluntarily agreed to by
contracting parties.1 Such an approach is consistent with the legislative
history of the FAA and with policies of protecting individual self-
arbitrate disputes is motivated in part by the desire to avoid the delay and cost of judicial trials and
appeals," judicial review should be minimized. Id. at 1000.
415. Id.atO14n.2.
416. Cf. Engalla v. Permanente Med. Group, Inc., 43 Cal. Rptr. 2d 621 (Cal. Ct. App. 1995)
(reversing lower court's refusal to compel arbitration, despite allegations Kaiser had behaved
fraudulently in connection with arbitration process); Carbonneau, supra note 20, at 268-72 (arguing for
more thorough appellate review of arbitral decisions and noting that other countries' laws call for more
review than employed by U.S. courts).
417. Moses H. Cone Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 465 U.S. 1 (1983).
418. Seesupra note 10.
419. See supra Section V.
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determination, fairness, and state autonomy. If the Court does not restore the
balance between arbitration and litigation, Congress should step in to protect
weaker parties from improper and unfair arbitration agreements. Congress
need not enact its own laws directly regulating arbitration; rather, it should
simply restore to state legislatures and courts their power to protect
consumers and other little guys from agreements to which they were never
truly a party. In sum, if the Supreme Court will not change its course,
Congress must act quickly to prevent companies from using arbitration as a
tool of oppression, rather than to achieve justice.
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